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2Abstract
Neoliberalism constructs a particular version of  consumers as existing indi-
vidually and within markets, and not collectively outside of  markets where 
regulation and policy is made. This undermines the individual’s ability, as a 
consumer, to influence how markets are constructed and regulated. This thesis 
investigates the role of  consumer organisations in contemporary policy mak-
ing and regulation, asking how they matter in terms of  their representation 
of  individuals. In so doing, it assesses the position of  consumer organisations 
in the UK and Norway in terms both of  their institutionalisation, and their 
intermediation with other political actors. The principal argument is that in-
vestigating consumer organisations illuminates the complex and deeply politi-
cal relationships between states, markets and civil society. More specifically, 
it argues that despite the fact that consumer organisations have a relatively 
privileged position in terms of  their involvement in decision-making, and that 
developments in governance have encouraged stakeholder inclusion, they re-
main largely peripheral to regulatory and policy processes. This undermines 
the potential collective power of  consumers over how markets are regulated. 
Through a discourse analysis of  elite interviews with consumer organisations, 
regulators and policymakers, it is found that their relevance remains largely 
dependent on a combination of  the ideas, issues and ideologies involved in 
policy making and regulation. This is despite attempts to ensure that it is 
consumers’ interests that are seen as paramount in the institutional design 
of  the regulatory state. This thesis, through a thick description analysis of  
consumer organisations in policy making and regulation, problematizes the 
development of  the regulatory state and the inclusion of  consumer interests 
as a counter-balance to industry and agency pressures. In so doing it offers 
original insights into some of  the variegated political dimensions of  contem-
porary neoliberal capitalism, most specifically the ways in which people are 
represented in construction of  regulation.
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71. Introduction 
Being a consumer is a fundamental part of  contemporary life. Our ability to act freely within markets is considered by most mainstream political hues to be an inalienable right. We are also 
regularly told in the media that, among other things, it is a lack of  consumer demand that is suffo-
cating our economy. At the same time we are being told in both advertising and by popular com-
mentators that we need to buy greener, healthier and more ethical products. Furthermore, markets 
have continued to grow to include previously government run and controlled utilities, which we, 
as consumers, now have increasing choice over. It is uncontroversial to say that peoples’ place as 
consumers dominates social and political life.
However, these developments primarily concern consumers within markets. The place of  people 
as consumers outside of  markets, where regulation and policy is made, does not receive attention. It 
is also not examined in depth in academic research. This thesis challenges the focus on consumers 
within markets, with an investigation of  consumer organisations, and their role in regulation and 
policy making in the United Kingdom and Norway. It addresses the incorporation of  consumer 
organisations into the policy process in order to map how their place is constructed by both them-
selves and policy officials, and in so doing investigates the underlying politics of  regulation and 
policymaking.
Some regulators in the United Kingdom have sought to implement structural measures to en-
sure that the consumer voice is taken into account, and in Norway there has been a long tradition 
of  consumer representation at a high level since the 1950s. In both countries, despite the various 
social democratic endeavours to ensure consumer representation in policymaking and regulation, 
neoliberalism as an ideology still plays a significant role in how consumer organisations are per-
ceived. The neoliberal concern with consumers is explicit – consumers within markets are the van-
guard, or at least the foot soldiers, of  post-industrial capitalism, where the market is the democracy. 
In this respect consumer organisations are interesting as they address individuals in their neoliberal 
form, as actors in a market, yet represent them as a collective in a more social democratic mode. 
Consumer organisations therefore characterise some of  the complexity in the competing political 
perspectives at the heart of  contemporary politics.
The place of  consumers in society, and subsequently how they are represented at an elite level, 
is therefore of  significant interest if  we are to understand policy making today. It is also something 
that has seen little scholarly analysis. This thesis confronts this problem by investigating the role of  
consumer organisations as political representatives in regulation and policy making in the UK and 
Norway. 
1.2 Research Problem
Contemporary policy making and regulation is concerned with increasing the presence of stake-
holder voices in areas of  governance, in both theory and practice. This is done both for reasons 
of  democratic legitimacy, and to ensure more informed and accurate regulation; simply ‘better 
regulation’1.Various organisations and groups are called upon to represent a wide variety of  per-
spectives in the construction of  policy and regulation, through various forms of  consultation and 
1  As referred to in the UK’s Better Regulation Task Force’s More Imaginative Thinking About Regulation (London, 2003)
8network governance. 
What has not been well examined in the literature is the extent to which interest organisations, 
specifically public interest groups, have an impact on policy and regulation, and provide a coun-
terbalance to industry and agency pressure. This is especially the case in terms of  how well these 
organisations are perceived to have an impact on specific policy and regulation, by both the organi-
sations themselves and by policymakers. This matters as the policy domain is to a great extent 
defined by the perceptions of  the actors involved. Furthermore, the broader political context in 
which these developments have occurred has been one in which neoliberalism as an ideology has 
been dominant. This cannot be separated from the role that consumer organisations have come to 
have due to the relationship between states, markets and civil society. 
Therefore we need to understand consumer representation better. In particular we need to 
understand the representation of  consumers by organisations in regulatory and policy making 
forums. This thesis does this through exploring the connections, networks, politics and ideologies at 
the heart of  consumer representation in two different states, the UK and Norway.
1.3 Research Questions
This thesis investigates the role of  consumer organisations in regulation and policy making in the 
UK and Norway. The questions below combine looking at structures, processes and perceptions in 
order to gain a greater understanding of  what place consumer organisations have in contemporary 
policy making and regulation. They will guide the thesis throughout. The key question that drives 
this research is:
What is the role of  consumer organisations in contemporary policy making and regulation?
This question structures the broader orientation of  this thesis in all the chapters and is addressed 
throughout. Furthermore, there are three supplementary questions which investigate important 
dimensions in understanding the broader role of  consumer organisations.  
First, a more straight forward question that focuses on the structures and the institutions es-
tablished to take account of  consumer organisations and consumer representation in policy and 
regulatory forums:
How are consumer organisations institutionalised by the state? 
This is addressed in the literature review and theoretical chapter, and in the empirical chapters 
(chapters 6 and 7) where the key organisations and institutions involved in consumer representation 
are investigated, with regard to consumer organisations themselves.
Second, a question which directly assesses one of  the claims about how the regulatory state, 
and the process of  regulation, can be made 'better' in terms of  the countering potential issues of  
'capture':
To what extent do consumer organisations provide a counter-balance to industry and regulatory 
pressure? 
This question is the most crucial in determining the specific importance and role of  consumer 
organisations as public representatives. It attempts to address the empirical gap in the theoretical 
9literature on the regulatory state, and 'better regulation', by taking account of  the organisations 
that aim to provide a 'counter-balance'. It is addressed in the analysis and concluding chapters 
(chapters 8 and 9), but is alluded to numerous times throughout the empirical chapters (chapters 6 
and 7), the literature review (chapter 2) and theoretical chapter (chapter 3), when discussing some 
of  the problems consumer organisations face.
And finally:
In what respect are consumer organisations understood to impact upon policy and regulation? 
This third question most closely confronts the issue of  influence,  and is addressed in the empirical 
chapters (chapters 6 and 7). Influence is a common theme in the interest group literature but one 
which is notoriously difficult to address due to the complex causal inference of  its subject matter. 
What is targeted here is the extent to which consumer organisations themselves, and policy makers, 
perceive their impact. This is just as important as direct influence on particular policy as it enables 
a greater understanding of  the political context, and the extent to which consumer issues become 
embedded within a policy and regulation network. 
I will now turn to the wider debates that this thesis contributes to. 
1.4 Wider Debates
The arguments set out here contribute to a wider debate about the character of  neoliberalism, on 
which great deal has been written from a variety of  perspectives (Campbell and Pedersen, 2001; 
Harvey, 2005; Roy et al. 2006 ; Lee and McBride, 2007; Cerny, 2008; Turner, 2008; Plant, 2010; 
Steger and Roy, 2010; Crouch, 2011). Neoliberalism is widely understood to function as ‘an ideol-
ogy, a mode of  governance, and a policy package emphasising the pivotal role of  free markets and 
private enterprise,’ (Steger and Roy, 2010, p.136). My thesis and arguments concern all three of  
these dimensions. More specifically, contained within the neoliberal paradigm is the changing na-
ture of  the state and civil society, and the connections between the two. This is where the debates 
on the regulatory state and network governance are important. What needs to be understood is the 
extent to which a consumer organisation’s role is guided more by a neoliberal ideology or a more 
social democratic one.
More specifically the arguments speak to two particular bodies of  literature; that on the regula-
tory state, and that on governance networks, that both deal with dimensions of  neoliberalism in 
practice. Crucial though is that consumers, and by extension the organisations that represent them, 
come to have a particular significance in a more neoliberal political order due to the importance 
placed on consumers by neoliberal ideology. 
First is the literature that has focuses on the emergence of  the regulatory state (Majone, 1994; 
Moran, 2003). This is a state which concerns itself  with regulation over traditional taxation and 
spending.  The other is the scholarship on the development of  governance networks (Adam and 
Kriesi, 2007; Blanco et al., 2011; Davies, 2011), which seeks to take account of  the practice of  
governance through networks. Both of  these literatures recognise the increasing desire for polities 
to include civil society organisations in the processes of  governance. There are a variety of  argu-
ments from these literatures about the way that state-civil society relations have developed, but few 
of  them consider the role of  consumer organisations specifically. 
It is also important to recognise that major corporations and big business have seen a signifi-
cant increase in their presence in politics, as other forms of  representation, like labour unions 
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have declined (Faccio, 2006; Wilks-Heeg et al., 2012). This is most obviously attributed to the 
favourable conditions for business provided by globalised neoliberalism, and its three tenets: de-
regulation, liberalisation and privatisation. At the same time there has been growth in new social 
movements, NGOs and pressure groups (Grant, 2005). Furthermore, Grant (2005) has suggested 
there has in fact been a shift from a politics of  production to a politics of  collective consumption. 
This new political order is concerned not with the politics of  the production process itself, but with 
the outcomes of  the production process. It is concerned with the externalities, and the results, of  
the production process rather than being focused on what constitutes the production process itself. 
This can be witnessed in the increasing number of  environmental organisations, new social move-
ments and pressure groups concerned with the public interest. 
 My thesis is directly concerned with this new political order; a situation in which traditional 
modes of  representation for individuals have either declined, or been undermined, where at the 
same time corporations and big business have seen their presence and influence in politics grow. I 
am concerned with finding out how a particular type of  public interest, the consumer interest, is 
represented in contemporary governance against that of  the interests of  corporations, big business 
and the agencies themselves. What role do consumer organisations play in this context?
1.5 Wider Arguments
My thesis argues that through looking at consumer organisations we can gain an understand-
ing of  the extent to which individuals have representation in regulatory and policy forums. But 
furthermore, that this understanding can help us to see clearer the contours of  state-civil society re-
lations, in a context in which the market has become ever-present, and regulatory capitalism seem-
ingly immovable. This is important as it can help us to see the contestations about the extent of  
regulation and marketisation, and to appreciate the deeply political nature of  processes that some 
might suggest are at best depoliticised, and at worst ‘neutral’. My research, like Hajer (2003), sees 
policy making as constitutive of  politics, not as the result of  politics. In this respect, my thesis does 
not aim to provide technocratic answers about how this should be resolved, but critically explores 
the dynamics involved. 
The broader political context is one in which neoliberalism as an ideology has come under 
increasing pressure. This is in large part due to the global financial crisis, widely purported to 
have been the result of  the doctrines worst excesses (Krugman, 2008; Wolf, 2008; Tett, 2009; 
Hind, 2009; Rudd, 2009). However, in the UK governments and elites have continued to adopt a 
neoliberal mantra, arguing against the welfare state, and for the continued rolling back of  regula-
tion (Crouch, 2011). Understanding how consumer organisations have been involved or excluded 
from the developments, can show us the agency, potential or realised, individuals might have over 
decisions which impact on them on a daily basis, in contrast to that of  industry and agencies. The 
extent to which polities take account of  a consumer perspectives when embarking on particular 
regulatory regimes, and where consumer organisations feature in this, brings together two debates; 
1) the extent to which governments have sought to decentralise regulatory responsibility to agen-
cies, 2) while at the same time a norm of  participatory practice is being encouraged. These are 
brought together in the inclusion of  consumer organisations into the construction of  regulation 
and policy making, something which is under-researched.
As will be taken account of  in the literature review (chapter 2), there is a body of  empirical 
work that has been concerned with measuring the extent of  interest group influence on the rule 
making of  governments (for example Potters and Sloof, 1996; Michalowitz, 2007; Dür, 2008). 
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Various empirical studies have specifically focused on business interests, and others on civil society, 
in the US, the EU and elsewhere (Greenwood, 2003, 2007; Bouwen, 2004; Eising, 2004; Mahoney, 
2007). However these studies do not address the broader context in of  how regulation and policy 
are made.  When analysing interest group ‘influence’ the complexity of  the policy process needs 
to be addressed and better understood. A more functionalist and instrumentalist account fails to 
appreciate a whole host of  contingent concerns, like ideology, structure, institutional design, and 
sectoral and policy area differences. What is argued in my thesis is that much of  the scholarship on 
interest organisations and public policy, by searching for specific instances of  influence, and confin-
ing themselves to mere measurement of  influence, are missing a contextual investigation of  how 
individuals are represented in networked governance. My thesis aims to address this by considering 
consumer representation, specifically consumer organisations, in two distinct polities, the UK and 
Norway, and asking the question of  what role they play? My research assesses contexts which are 
favourable to their participation in the regulatory and policy process.
 A major concern for the regulatory state is that it can become easily ‘captured’ by the de-
velopment of  ‘too close’ relationships between the regulator and the regulated. It has been suggest-
ed that a system in which public interest groups are empowered within the regulatory process can 
help to ‘operate as counter balances to industrial and agency pressures.’ (Ayres and Braithwaite, 
1992; Baldwin et al., 2012). However, counter to this Republican Tripartism, where public interest 
groups act as counter-balances to industry and agencies, critics have suggested that these organisa-
tions can become ‘shadow regulators’ (Mendeloff, 1993), and that, among other concerns, ‘disputes 
about the representativeness of  empowered PIGs can be expected’ (Mendeloff, 1993). 
 This thesis unpacks and problematizes this tripartite system which was developed, in order 
to discern the extent to which consumer organisations contribute, and to argue that despite con-
sumer organisations inclusion they remain relatively peripheral, and that their inclusion is bound 
to a particular ideological commitment to the market. This will be done in two ideologically and 
structurally different settings, the UK and Norway, by investigating the role of  consumer organisa-
tions, a principal public interest group.  
  Furthermore, Davis (2011) suggests that governance networks reproduce ideology through 
a ‘hegemony of  ideas’. As a system of  ideas and practices the ideology of  the network masks that 
power is still highly centralised, and not dispersed. This is linked to how neoliberalism has been 
about ‘transforming and enrolling civil society, attempting to cultivate a connectionist ethos.’ 
(Davis, 2011, p.151) However, there is still space for consumer representation if  we take into ac-
count both the shift to a politics of  consumption, and that consumer organisations themselves are 
not ideologically fixed. They can act as much in the frame of  a social democratic force as they can 
a neoliberal one. This is outlined in the analysis chapter (chapter 8), where a typology of  positions 
towards consumer organisations is set out; in that they can be seen as either a ‘toxic agent’, a ‘per-
fect form’, or a ‘fly-in-the-ointment’. 
 The shift in political order, as outlined by Grant (2005), is argued to be of  far more im-
mediate importance in a context of  regulatory capitalism. Rather than focus on the production 
process itself, in a traditionally Marxist fashion, it would be better to consider consumer organisa-
tion in the context of  a politics of  collective consumption. Therefore understanding how consumer 
interests are represented in governance networks, and the regulatory state, can help us to better 
assess, and address, the character of  contemporary policy making and public administration. In 
this respect we can address how governance networks include the perspectives of  citizens inside of  
the state-civil society interface, and we do not necessarily have to throw the baby out with the
bathwater.
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1.6 Key Findings and Principal Argument
What my research shows, which is addressed in the empirical chapters (chapters 6 and 7), and in 
the analysis chapter (chapter 8), is that consumer organisations are given significant space in gov-
ernance networks, but that they face inconsistency in the extent to which they are included as core 
participants. It was found that despite the reasonably close connections to regulators and policy-
makers, the good working relationships, and the structures and institutional design, that they still 
had few ‘victories’ in their eyes. 
In addition it was found that consumer organisations in both political systems face similar issues 
in their operations, despite the differences in structure and ideology. Consumer organisations are 
often bracketed under ‘the consumer voice’, and included as a single interest, whereas business are 
often included individually and as a result generally outnumber the consumer interest. This causes 
significant difficulty for consumer representation in both polities. Consumer organisations are 
generally seen in a favourable light by policymakers, and their presence is considered as a positive 
development, yet feel they have little genuine impact on final policy and regulation. This seeming 
contradiction underpins the activities of  consumer organisations in contemporary policymaking 
and regulation.
In this respect, my thesis argues that policy and regulatory systems could be theorised in two 
perspectives. First, a situation in which the consumer interest is core to the process, where all actors 
would recognise this and policy and regulation would marginally meander to being preferential 
to either industry or agency interest. But that the consumer interest would be predominant. Here 
consumer organisations’ role is to ensure that the process is kept on track. Second, a situation 
where the consumer interest is peripheral and policy and regulation would constantly drift away 
from statutory obligations to consumers, as regulatory capture, and regulatory mission creep, 
occurs. In this circumstance consumer organisations’ role is to try to bring the regulatory and pol-
icy process back into line with the statutory requirements through lobbying or legal proceedings. 
These circumstances exist simultaneously in both polities, being different in different sectors, mar-
kets and industries, and can also change overtime. What this analysis provides is scenarios which 
we can draw upon to take account of  a particular policy processes, and governance networks, even 
though there are no generalisable rules. 
In summary, this is not a thesis about the intricacies of  particular regulation, it is not a thesis 
about how better regulation might be made, nor whether or not there is more or less regulation 
that there once was. It is a thesis about critically understanding the processes involved in regulatory 
networks, and what place a particular set of  interests has in the interconnections that make up con-
temporary processes of  governance. The focus therefore is not on the regulations themselves but 
on the contexts of  their making. It is the structures that form these contexts which are of  principal 
concern, and which will be analysed in a comparative and interpretive fashion (the methodology 
will be set out in chapter 3). It is in this respect that this thesis finds itself  aligned with the tradition 
of  critical policy analysis. The sub-field is fundamentally concerned with critically analysing the 
features of  contemporary policy networks and governance. This includes addressing the structural, 
ideological and political dimensions of  policy and regulation. 
What this thesis offers is a better understanding of  the development of  policy making and 
regulation. It takes account of  some of  the intricacies of  neoliberalism by investigating the repre-
sentation of  consumers in regulatory forums in two ideologically different settings. It suggests that 
consumer organisations are a potentially incisive force against that of  corporate power, and the 
negative effects of  markets, but which is being undermined by ideological and structural changes 
in both polities.
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1.7 Original Contribution 
This thesis is original, theoretically, methodologically and empirically, in five respects.
First and foremost, there are no studies that compare the UK and Norway as political systems. 
This is seen to be a great loss, especially when trying to understand the extent to which different 
ideological underpinning, and different political systems can have on the particular characteristics 
of  a liberal democracy. The key point for this comparison was to discover similarities by comparing 
cases-most-different. What we see that is similar in both countries despite the differences in ideol-
ogy, political system, and decision making. This can then help to show common problems, and 
potentially common solutions to issues around consumer representation and organisation. What 
has been gained from this comparison is that consumer organisations in both countries do experi-
ence similar issues concerning how consumer representatives are often grouped together under one 
label, whereas business interests are not. It was also significant that consumer organisations in both 
countries, despite the relatively favourable structural conditions, found themselves to be peripheral 
to the policy and regulatory process. Additionally consumer organisations in both countries face 
similar issues in their connections with policymakers, due to the fact that perspectives towards con-
sumer organisations matter when trying to get points of  view across. 
Secondly it is original theoretically as it links together three bodies of  literature which have not 
been previously linked. Through bringing together the theory on the regulatory state, the theory 
on governance networks and the theory on constructivist institutionalism, this thesis has been able 
to take account of  the processes around policymaking, regulatory forums and consumer organi-
sations. It has also been able to show that although much of  what these theories have to offer is 
accurate, there are still gaps. The state, and the processes of  governance, are fraught with clashes 
in political ideology. This can be witnessed in the significant changes taking place in the ‘consumer 
landscape’ in the UK, which have resulted in the closing of  one of  the central consumer organi-
sations Consumer Focus. This is part of  a drive on behalf  of  a more market liberal orientated 
government to consolidate and pull back from the public funding of  interest organisations and 
agencies. In Norway on the other-hand, the relatively stable social democratic structures, although 
not facing threats to their existence, as in the UK, the consumer organisations are still having to 
cope with the increased professionalisation of  the business lobby and a more neoliberal discursive 
culture.
Thirdly it is original in that it is the first study to explicitly try and understand consumer repre-
sentation outside of  markets. Other studies have considered consumer representation (Rose, 1981), 
and consumer organisations (Hilton, 2009), and although valuable to this research, they do not 
take account of  consumer organisations outside of  markets, in the policy making and regulatory 
processes in detail. 
Fourthly, it is original in its methodological approach and data collection through conducting a 
range of  interviews in both the UK and Norway with elites involved in consumer representation 
and policy making and regulation. These interview have enabled a ‘thick description’ account of  
the role that consumer organisations play in contemporary public policy and governance, and have 
enabled a deeper understanding of  institutional cultures and the perspectives, ideas and issues that 
characterise them.  
Lastly, it is original in its analysis, in both how it has framed how consumer organisations are 
understood ideologically, and how they are understood to be either core or peripheral to the 
policy and regulatory processes. As will be shown in the analysis chapter (chapter 8), a typology of  
perspectives towards consumer organisations, by those involved in the policy process, helps us to 
see more clearly the politics behind consumer representation. These positions towards consumer 
14
organisations underpin how individuals, and broader systems generally, address consumer or-
ganisations. They are seen by policymakers and elites, from left to right on the political spectrum 
respectively, as; a ‘toxic agent’, a ‘perfect form’, and as ‘a fly-in-the-ointment’. In addition it will be 
shown how we can understand the extent to which consumer organisations are seen to play either 
a core or peripheral role in policy and regulatory processes by considering the ideology, ideas and 
issues that have an impact on their place in the process. This will be shown in two diagrams set-out 
in the analysis chapter (chapter 8). 
1.8 Organisation of Thesis – Overview of Chapters
The thesis is organised into nine chapters on consumers, consumer organisations, the state and the 
connections between them.  Chapter one has been an introduction into the main arguments of  the 
thesis. It has covered the key research questions, the wider debates, and the original contribution.  
Chapter two is a broad literature review of  consumer organisations, interest groups, governance 
and the state. It overviews this literature in order to show the state of  the art in the understanding 
of  consumer organisations. There is relatively little written on these organisations specifically, so a 
broader concern with organisations as public representatives has been considered in order to gain 
an understanding of  the important, relevant, questions to political science. From this review the 
research questions were reached. 
Chapter three overviews the theoretical literatures engaged. This concerns three bodies of  
literature; theory on the regulatory state, governance network theory and constructivist institu-
tionalist analysis. This is done in order to situate the thesis theoretically, to show how the thesis is 
framed in terms of  these three dimensions. The three theories together take account of  the three 
elements considered to be vital for a comprehensive understanding of  consumer organisations: the 
state (regulatory state theory), the intermediation the state and civil society (governance network 
theory), and to take into account the role played by ideas in institutions (constructivist institutional-
ism). One theory was not enough to explain the dynamics that are being addressed here, therefore 
it was necessary to utilise these three different perspectives and bring them together to investigate 
consumer organisations.
Chapter four concerns the epistemology and methodology of  the research. It sets out the inter-
pretive tradition that this thesis situates itself  in, and makes clear why this position was reached, 
and what it means for the research. This is done in order to show the focus and breadth of  the 
research, but also to show its strengths and limitations. It also describes how the research was con-
ducted, what the priorities were, and how the research questions were addressed. 
Chapter five overviews the political systems under analysis. It considers the literature on the two 
different states and outlines the key features of  each system for an analysis of  consumer organisa-
tions. This was done in order to appreciate the different political contexts under analysis.
Chapter six moves into the empirical inquiry where consumer organisations in the UK are ex-
amined. The chapter looks at the two main consumer organisations, Which? and Consumer Focus, 
one of  the main regulators, Ofcom, and a particular policy issue: product placement legislation. It 
principally investigates the connections between the organisations and the regulator, and how the 
regulator has institutionalised these organisations. In addition it looks to see in what circumstances 
consumer organisations did, and did not, impact upon policy. 
Chapter seven then moves to address Norway in a similar fashion by looking at the main con-
sumer organisations, Forbrukerombudet, Forbrukerrådet and SIFO, in addition to the main gov-
ernment department dedicated to consumer issues. This chapter concerns how the different setting 
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in Norway impacts on the intermediation between the organisations themselves and policy makers.
Chapter eight is the comparative analysis chapter, where the findings in the previous two 
chapters (chapters six and seven) are brought together. This chapter combines the analysis of  the 
empirical material and the original reflections on the wider literature and the theory utilised. It sets 
out two main arguments with regard to both the framing of  consumer organisations ideologically, 
and also in terms of  their inclusion into the policy and regulatory process. 
Chapter nine then concludes by summarising the thesis as a whole, considering the literature 
on consumer organisations, the regulatory state, and governance networks, and how this research 
contributes to it by taking account of  consumer organisations in contemporary policy making 
and regulation. It sets out the original contribution of  the thesis, the main argument and directly 
addresses the research questions in turn.  It also finishes with some suggestions for future research 
with regard to three topics: the EU, the Media and representation.  
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2. Literature Review: Interest Groups
 and Governance, the Case of 
Consumer Representation
2.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews the literature of  three relevant fields and sub-fields: political and sociological 
literature on consumers and consumption, the literature on interest groups, both public advocacy 
groups and business, and also the literature on state-civil society relations. These three literatures 
are all relevant in trying to understand the role of  consumer organisations in contemporary poli-
tics, and in understanding characteristics of  contemporary capitalism more broadly. What this lit-
erature review will argue is that consumer organisations, as a particular type of  interest representa-
tion, are symptomatic of  how governance practices have been constructed by neoliberal discourse. 
Their inclusion into systems of  policy making and regulation are systematic of  practiced neolib-
eralism. Here discourses about the market promote particular regulatory structures. These are 
concerned with optimizing market circumstances whilst allowing for the representation of  citizens, 
as consumers, in creating these structures. This is argued to be of  interest in better understand-
ing some of  the complex politics that characterise state-market-civil society relations. Consumer 
organisations connect these spheres in a way that promotes both the political representation of  citi-
zens in addition to underlining the primacy of  the free market as the principal organising structure. 
Most importantly the focus here is not on consumers within markets, where the consumer has been 
lifted above passivity to be the active ‘pro-sumer’, or ‘citizen consumer’, but to understand people 
represented as consumers outside of  markets in the networks of  policy making. 
Contemporary life is saturated by consumer choice. Processes of  neoliberalism2 have required 
individuals to identify with being a consumer in evermore spheres of  life, both public and private. 
We engage in consumption activities with increasing regularity both in full knowledge and without 
much consideration, and consumption, and our place as consumers, is of  distinct significance to 
the functioning of  our economy. This has not always been the case, and is historically a relatively 
recent phenomenon3. Beyond the obvious economic importance, the cultural and social aspects of  
this development are also significant, and have seen considerable analysis (Bauman, 1998, 2007; 
2 Here it is understood, in line with Boas and Gans-Morse (2009), that the concept of  neoliberalism in political science, and 
scholarship more widely, suffers from conceptual ambiguity. In this thesis I am principally concerned with neoliberalism as 
an ideology, as a set of  principles that structure the character of  institutions, policy processes and political economies more 
broadly. Neoliberalism should be understood as not pure Hayekian free market, nor as outright Keynesian interventionism, 
but as a hybrid of  the acceptance of  the primacy of  markets as an organising structure with the necessary use of  ‘tools’ to 
optimise the outcomes of  markets. These can be seen as economic, legal and political instruments that make markets work 
‘better’, that in addition to deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation, there is a re-regulation through ‘reform’ where-by 
principles of  light touch, and steering, are seen to be optimal. What is crucial is the acceptance and promotion of  markets 
as the most optimal form of  organisation. It is also vital to appreciate that as well as neoliberal theory being different from 
practice, there are also many types of  neoliberalism, or neoliberalisms (Collier, 2012). 
3 Mass-consumption is widely understood to be a post WW2  phenomenon. However consumption, and therefore consumers, 
has been a feature of  capitalist economies for centuries (Brewer & Trentmann, 2006; Trentmann, 2006). 
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Baudrillard, 1998; Sassatelli, 2007; Lury, 2011). The political implications have however seen 
far less investigation, and this is especially the case with regard to how individuals, as consumers, 
are represented in the political sphere. This is of  significance, both to political science, and to the 
wider world, as how the public is represented, and the extent of  the influence of  that representa-
tion, can have considerable impacts on the ways our lives are governed. The existence of  consumer 
organisations as in capitalist liberal democracies is not a ‘natural’ phenomenon; there are reasons 
why these groups have come to play a role in policy-making, and the differences in both how they 
have emerged and what happens when they do, is of  significance. 
Consumer organisations, although having existed for some time, are under researched in po-
litical science, specifically in terms of  their place in the policy process. It is the intention of  this 
research project to better understand the extent of  the influence of  consumer organisations in 
contemporary liberal democracies, through understanding their place in the policy and regulatory 
process. In so doing it will address questions about how individuals are represented, and what role 
these groups play in policy making. In this respect there is both an empirical aspect, understanding 
the role these groups play, and a normative dimension, questioning what role they should play? The 
intention is to add to the debate in a variety of  ways; by bringing the understanding of  consumer 
organisations up-to-date, through questioning the conceived wisdom that these particular groups 
are both ‘outsiders’ (Grant, 1993), and are largely ineffectual (Greenwood, 2007), but also adding 
a critical perspective to the understanding of  how particular groups have come to have a distinct 
place in policy making in capitalist democratic systems.
It is argued that there are three conditions that are significant in establishing their position. 
First, that consumer organisations fail to mobilise organically in any significant way and therefore 
need to be represented by advocacy groups, both publicly and privately funded. Second, that de-
velopments of  neoliberalism, the deregulation of  economies (D), the liberalisation of  trade (L), and 
the privatization of  state-owned industries (P), (DLP), (Harvey, 2005; Steger and Roy, 2010), have 
required that social democratic states make markets work for consumers, and in so doing consumers 
need to be represented in regulatory forums. Third, and intimately connected to neoliberal devel-
opments, is the impact of  modes of  governance that require arm’s length bodies to conduct market 
regulation, whilst at the same time requiring input from the public, or ‘civil society’4. This input 
is used as a symbol of  legitimacy, and also provides valuable information as regard to how policy 
may impact upon consumers, but is crucially part of  the discourse around networked governance, 
and neoliberalism. It is argued that consumer organisations have come to have a distinct role, in 
two very different polities, and in different ways, due to these developments. This literature review 
seeks to provide an overview of  these key areas of  scholarship, with direct relevance to consumer 
organisations.
 
2.1.1 Consumers in Contemporary Life
Consumer politics has been addressed from a variety of  perspectives. There is an abundance of  so-
cial theory on the issues of  consumer identity (Lewis et al., 2005), consumer culture (Featherstone, 
1991; Lee, 1993; Sassatelli, 2007; Lury, 2011), the consumer society (Baudrillard, 1998; Bauman, 
2007; Goodwin et al., 1997), and the dichotomy between citizens and consumers (Aberbach and 
Christensen, 2005; Clarke et al., 2007; Livingstone et al., 2007). Although there are various dimen-
sions to this analysis, most argue that something is lost in this reconfiguration. The general line is 
4 According to Rhodes (1996), the concept of  governance is currently used in contemporary social sciences with at least six 
different meanings: the minimal State, corporate governance, new public management, good governance, social-cybernetic 
systems and self-organised networks. 
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that we should not sacrifice our place as citizens for an identity lacking in depth and difference, 
as this would somehow undermine the potential of  the democratic process, and would corrupt 
our institutions and public life in favour of  a more individualised and ‘economised’ public sphere5 
(Habermas, 1984, 1987). This perspective should not be taken lightly, even though its criticism of  
‘consumer politics’ is at times dogmatic, as it also reflects some fundamental concerns about the 
nature of   contemporary democracy. In this respect it is a useful critical tool for understanding the 
extent to which people, and institutions, have become embedded in an architecture that demand 
that we recognise ourselves as consumers in increasingly diverse spheres of  life, most famously by 
Habermas (1984, 1987), but also by others (Keat, 2000; Barber, 2007; Mouffe, 2000). 
Consumer organisations are active in the policy making and regulation of  both the UK and 
Norway, yet the extent of  their influence is unknown, as is an adequate explanation of  how and 
why they have come to have the roles that they do in contemporary forms of  governance. There is 
little known about the characteristics of  contemporary governance in terms of  discourses around 
representation and neoliberalism. It is a cardinal thread of  this research that neoliberal ideology 
plays a significant role in the extent to which these consumer organisations have become institu-
tionalised. This is in addition to other significant dimensions – the particular conditions of  a demo-
cratic state with regard to groups and organisations (pluralism/corporatist), and how these states 
have tended to involve the public (actively exclusive/actively inclusive) (Dryzek and Tucker, 2008), 
and the type of  ‘capitalism’ that the state manages (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Coates, 2005). The 
UK and Norway represent these differences in liberal democratic state, and in comparing them we 
can better understand how consumer organisations are institutionalised, and through that better 
understand the characteristics of  contemporary policy making and regulation. 
It is also the intention here to challenge the claim that market liberalism as a policy paradigm 
has ‘peaked’ (Dunleavy and Dryzek, 2009), in that the inclusion of  consumer organisations into 
policy making, as a form of  mitigation against market failures, is a feature of  interventionism that 
could be regarded as social-democratic, but has, in Britain at least, recently started to lose state 
support6. Whilst at the same time the inclusion of  consumer organisations can also be seen to 
represent aspects of  neoliberal ideology and neoliberalism in practice, they do not challenge the 
primacy of  the market. It can therefore be suggested that consumer organisations sit on contested 
ground; they are at once a socially inclined voice for ordinary people but simultaneously fit into a 
paradigm where people are seen as individual consumers. Therefore has the status of  consumer 
organisations as consultees grown in significance as markets have been liberalised and the need for 
public representation has increased? Why would this now be in decline? It is in this respect that an 
analysis of  consumer organisations, in their various forms, should be done so through the lenses of  
both network governance theory and state theory, whilst acknowledging the importance of  both 
institutions and ideology.
In addition an analysis of  group intermediation requires both an appreciation of  the organised 
interests and of  the state, and the extent of  a particular organisation’s influence, in comparison to 
others is at the heart of  this. If  it is the case that traditional sets of  interests, and political cleavages 
(Labour vs. Capital), are giving way to more complex forms of  politics with the inclusion of  a par-
ticular conception of  civil society then we need to understand how these new forms of  governance 
5 This is explored at great length by Habermas in his two volume work The Theory of  Communicative Action (1984 and 1987) 
where he develops the argument that the bureaucratisation of  the social world leads to a colonisation and rationalisation of  
the ‘lifeworld’ through the suppression of  particular forms of  communication. 
6 This is evidenced in the Department of  Business and Innovation’s (BIS) consultation and subsequent reforms of  the 
Consumer Landscape. The report can be found here: http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/consumer-issues/docs/e/12-
510-empowering-protecting-consumers-government-response.pdf
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are constituted – both institutionally and representatively.
What this chapter investigates is consumer organisations as political actors, in terms of  their for-
mal recognition by polities, in the UK and Norway, which will take into account analysis of  group 
intermediation and the changing nature of  the state. The research more broadly seeks to acknowl-
edge, and cast light upon the ‘...many complex and varied ways in which government and govern-
ance interact in public policy-making’ (Jordan et al., 2005, p.477), and it is argued that consumer 
organisations provide a unique example of  a site of  some of  the contestations and developments. 
This will bring an original contribution to the literature on neoliberalism and networked govern-
ance specifically, but also on how polities have sought to engage publics in various forms. This is 
vital to a contemporary understanding of  the relationship between capitalism and democracy, 
which in turn is vital to understanding contemporary politics generally. 
Contemporary political science has yet to fully address the existence, and influence, of  con-
sumer organisations in policy making. This research aims to correct this, whilst at the same time 
asking questions of  the current literature on interest group intermediation, and the place and role 
of  the public in systems of  governance. The representation of  consumers, and the co-option of  
these organisations by states, is embedded in a particular social and political context. This research 
is interested in the political context, both neoliberal and social democrat, and in so doing with the 
representation of  consumers in the policy processes in different states which typically embody these 
ideologies (UK and Norway).  
2.1.2 Structure of Literature Review
This chapter will provide an overview of  the literature on interest groups in relation to consumer 
organisations, seeking to show how consumer organisations form a particular type of  interest 
group in a political context in which capitalism as a mode of  production, and the market as an or-
ganising force, remain largely uncontested. This chapter will also consider democratic state theory, 
as interest group intermediation requires us to understand the relationship between organisations 
and states – they are interconnected. The extent of  group-state relations has been one of  the deter-
mining factors in different polities – whether or not a state is deemed either pluralist or neocor-
poratist is done so with regard to the nature of  interest intermediation. This chapter will analyse 
how consumer organisations as a phenomenon fit into this body of  research. In this respect, there 
will initially be a discussion of  definition: what are consumer organisations? This is important as 
the concept of  a consumer is understood differently by different disciplines7, as well as the sub-
discipline of  interest group scholarship being ‘awash with neologisms’ (Beyers et al., 2008, p.1106). 
This research wants to take a fairly nuanced approach to this, both accepting the more narrow 
definition that consumers are those merely engaged in economic transactions, but also that this 
takes place within a socio-political context that demands an appreciation for the encumbered, and 
non-neutral nature of  contemporary consumers. It is in this respect that this research aims to add 
to the literature; it will address consumer representation in contemporary policy making as a phe-
nomenon of  a particular socio-political context. 
The literature review will pay particular attention to the analysis and theory on public interest 
groups, civil society actors, and business interest intermediation. The intention of  an analysis of  
business group lobbying will be to provide a counter example of  a set of  ‘producers’ whose inter-
ests, although not necessarily at odds with consumers, are concerned with favourable conditions 
for profit maximizing, not consumer welfare. It is this dichotomy that will make for an interesting 
analysis which puts the analysis of  consumer representation alongside that of  business representa-
7 Economics, Sociology, History and Political Science all analyse and assess different notions of  ‘the consumer’.
20
tion. That although consumer representation may have been institutionalised to varying degrees 
they are relatively marginalised as an interest, something which complicates the impact of  some 
more participatory governance practices on the state. This chapter will pay particular consid-
eration to how the public are represented as consumers in policy making that takes place in a 
paradigm dominated by markets and network governance. To understand the role of  groups and 
organisations Woll says, in relation to democratic theory, is of  central concern: ‘The power of  pri-
vate actors and the balance between individual interests and the public good is a central question 
of  democratic theory.’ (Woll, 2007, p.570) Consumer organisations therefore need to be analysed 
as representatives of  the public good, or consumer welfare, which may balance the supposed 
dominance by business. More generally it also remains the case that there has been little substantial 
analysis of  group influence, in terms of  a close analysis of  the contexts and conditions of  interme-
diation, and although this thesis does not seek to in anyway measure influence per say, it does seek 
to better understand how a particular set of  interests are perceived to impact on policy and regula-
tion. This can show us a great deal about the ideological and discursive contours of  systems of  
governance. Michalowitz says: ‘Whether interest groups actually exert substantial influence, when 
they do so and why are therefore reasonable questions to be posed and answered.’ (Michalowitz, 
2005, p.5), and it is the intention of  this thesis to address these questions in relation to consumer 
organisations, but also being clear that definitive answers with regard to measurable influence are 
worthless without appreciating the deep and complex context in which political phenomena occur. 
The argument in this chapter, as stated, is threefold: (1) that consumer organisations fail to mo-
bilise organically due to problems of  collective action associated with public interest organisations, 
(2) that neoliberalisation has meant that people are identified as consumers in more spheres of  life 
and need to be represented accordingly, and (3) that developments in process of  governance have 
required states to appeal more to ‘civil society’ in policy and regulation formation. The literature 
review is therefore structured in this order. 
Initially, there is, however, an appreciation for the complexity of  what is meant by both ‘con-
sumers’ and ‘consumer organisations’ in the contemporary political context, which progresses into 
a more general discussion of  how groups have been understood in relation to the state. The chap-
ter then moves to discuss the particularity of  consumer organisations, as an interest constituency 
in ‘civil society’, this is then counterpoised with an appreciation of  the role of  business intermedia-
tion. The chapter then discusses the context of  both neoliberalism, and developments in govern-
ance – both economic and political contingencies that are not mutually exclusive. This is done in 
order to set out the argument related to how consumer organisations have developed as part of  
broader political trends. This chapter will conclude by showing how consumer organisations have 
come to play a role in contemporary politics though the arguments set out here, and therefore 
the questions that arise are: What role do consumer organisations have now? How are consumer 
organisations institutionalised by the state? To what extent do consumer organisations provide a 
counter-balance to industry and regulatory pressure? And in what respect are consumer organisa-
tions understood to impact upon policy and regulation? This will then lead into the theory chapter 
which provides the theoretical framework through which the analysis will be done, followed by the 
methods chapter that will show how these questions will be tackled empirically. 
2.1.3 Consumer Organisations Defined
As will be discussed, consumer representation more broadly can be broken down into six particular 
types: (1) the free market model, (2) the consumer co-operative model, (3) the independent con-
sumer association model, (4) the corporatist model, (5) the quasi-public consumer agency model, 
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and (6) the bureaucratic elite model (Rose, 1981). More specifically it is the intention here to bring 
clarity to what is meant by a ‘consumer organisations’, in relation to interest groups, states and the 
connections between the two. Within that, even more specifically, it is important to state that ‘con-
sumers’  are here individual end-users, not organisations or businesses. These organisations may 
well be consumers, but can more readily be seen as producers. Here I am concerned with organi-
sations that represent individual citizens in their role as consumers, and that are concerned with 
doing so as an explicit and sole intention of  the particular organisation and not as a second order 
concern. This section will now contextualise where consumer organisations fit in to the nexus be-
tween political organisations and the state. 
Theories of  pluralism suggest that political groups in various guises are the core ingredients of  
any democracy (Dahl, 1956, 1961; Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009, Truman, 1951). Political parties 
are the most institutionalised, and obviously embedded, set of  groups that matter to democratic 
systems. Parties embody the core form of  representation for citizens, and the conflict between 
them for voters could be argued to be the life-blood of  a democracy. Political parties, as groups, 
do not however exist on their own. All kinds of  groups of  individuals, with particular goals, inten-
tions, trajectories, life-spans, sizes and organisational structures populate the democratic process 
and have a varying degree of  impact on those in power. These groups and organisations all com-
pete for an audience, and for influence, with the political elites, with varying degrees of  success. 
The general term for groups and organisations involved in the political process is ‘interest group’. 
However, as Beyers et al., acknowledge there is an ‘abundance of  neologisms’ (2008, p.1006) in the 
sub-field of  interest group analysis. For example, organisations such as universities and businesses, 
form a type of  interest group – they lobby for favourable conditions in which to conduct their 
primary function (education, profit making). On the other hand, charities form a type of  interest 
group, with members forming the key constituency for the groups lobbying intentions. These are 
also often referred to as NGO’s (Non-governmental organisations), and are considered to be part 
of  ‘civil society’ – the section of  society composed of  voluntary, public interest, non-state, and non-
commercial. The variety of  group types, both public-interest spirited, and those concerned with 
private interests, is considerable. 
What sets interest groups apart from other forms of  political organisation, like political parties, 
is what Beyers et al. 2008, determine as three particular factors: ‘organisation, political interests, 
and informality’ (Beyers et al. 2008, p.1106). Organisation relates to the aggregation of  individuals 
for a particular political purpose. Political interests relate to the groups’ intentions to influence policy 
outcomes on behalf  of  a particular constituency, membership or  general political idea. Informality 
characterises the fact that these groups are not interested in gaining formal political power through 
public office, but prefer informal and extraneous channels of  influence. But as they point out: 
‘This, however, does not rule out that important facets of  state-group relations in capitalist democ-
racies can be heavily institutionalised.’ (Beyers et al. 2008, p.1107)
In this respect the relationship between interest groups and the state is significant, and forms 
one of  the core elements in the scholarship of  group intermediation, and of  this investigation. 
However, consumer organisations can be seen as a type of  interest group despite the fact that they 
are often publicly funded, and also aligned to the state in different institutional relationships, as 
Beyers et al. suggest. Furthermore, it could well be argued that any organisation that attempts to 
articulate issues from the perspective of  a consumer – and from some more extreme market liberal 
positions this would be any issues that concerned people on an individual level, could be seen as a 
consumer organisation. This could range from wheelchair users, to radio listeners, to coffee shop cus-
tomers, to health service patients. This shows the issues with the identification of  consumers that 
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Trentmann (2007) acknowledges:
The consumer is sometimes a descriptive or analytical category, at other times a normative one, 
and at yet others all at once, giving little attention to the specificity of  the consumer as a subject and 
object in public life. That this should be so is curious, not only since the category has undergone 
significant changes in the course of  the modern period, but also because who counts and who 
does not count as a consumer has implications for law and regulatory politics to the present day. 
(Trentmann, 2007, p.150)
Who are the consumers being represented is of  normative significance, as it will call into ques-
tion the legitimacy of  consumer organisations as advocates of  what seems a rather nebulous 
constituency.  However, what is important in this section is to determine what exactly a consumer 
organisation is with regard to both interest groups in general, and in relation to the state. In this 
respect to distinguish them from interest groups in general, as it is reasonably clear that they do 
by-in-large fit the predicates of  the description of  interest groups. That they are generally autono-
mous actors who are principally engaged in representing a particular constituency but not in gain-
ing public office. The  populations of  interest groups are however heterogeneous, and their make 
up greatly varied. 
Taking this into consideration it should now be important to outline a broad definition of  what 
a consumer organisation is. Consumer representation, and consumer organisations, will be exam-
ined in more detail below, but for the importance of  cogency a short definition (this author’s) will 
be provided:
Consumer organisations are bodies whose explicit and primary function it is to investigate, research 
and lobby on behalf  of  individuals as consumers in respect of  their place in the market. This 
includes a range of  consumer organisation types, which have varying independence from the state, 
but whose intention it is to lobby for fair prices, increased information, better quality products, and 
increased protections and to strengthen the ability for redress. 
There will now be a discussion of  more general scholarship on interest intermediation, and the 
relationship to democratic state theory. This will be done in order to show how consumer organi-
sations have come to have the position that they do in contemporary polities, and to show how 
consumer organisations make acute some of  the tensions between social democratic and neoliberal 
ideology and practice.
2.2 Interest Group Literature: Interest Intermediation and State-Civil 
Society Relations 
The study of  interest groups, and lobbying more broadly, has been a staple part of  political science 
since the beginning of  the 20th Century (Bentley, 1908; Truman, 1951). This scholarship continues 
today in evolving political settings – the E.U. being a prime example, and include both qualitative 
and quantitative assessments of  group intermediation and interest group populations (Mahoney, 
2008; Berkhout and Lowery, 2010; Wonka et al., 2010; Messer et al., 2011). The extent of  the 
relationship between states and groups/organisations has been a defining factor in determining 
the nature of  a polity – from the more pluralist US to neo-corporatist Austria. Pluralist states have 
been characterised as the state being an independent arbiter between interest groups competing on 
equal terms, whereas corporatist states are characterised by the inclusion of  groups into the polity. 
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Much political science has in recent history been concerned with this relationship, and the level of  
intermediation between states and groups in different polities. It is however argued to be the case 
that we have moved into a paradigm of  ‘governance’ that, to an extent, eclipses previous defining 
polity characteristics for a broader definition (Rhodes, 1996). This development will be looked at 
in greater detail below, as consumer organisations form an interesting example in regard to these 
evolutions as they connect how states have come to incorporate civil society whilst at the same time 
deferring greater responsibility to regulatory bodies – two features of  trends in ‘governance’.  
This section will now discuss scholarship concerned with interest groups as political actors: how 
they mobilise (or fail to), how they organise and the extent of  their influence. Even though consum-
er organisations have a variety of  forms, it is their intention to represent the interest of  consumers, 
and their success or failure in doing so is what is of  significance here. Interest group literature tells 
us about the characteristics of  interest representation, and the subsequent intermediations with the 
state, and literature on the state tells us how states are structured – how consumer organisations fit 
into this is a fundamental part of  this investigation.
It is conventional wisdom that to really understand the nature of  democracies one must have 
an understanding of  how groups function within the system. From early observations, including 
De Tocqueville (1838), the free association of  individuals for political ends has been a fundamen-
tal aspect of  what democracy as a political system is understood to be. This research takes this as 
axiomatic, but considers the role of  consumer organisations within this process to be of  particular 
interest as they acutely characterise some key tensions between social democracy and neoliberalism 
and the relations between the state-civil society and the market. 
Originally analysis saw the political process in a fairly ‘rose-tinted’ way. These original authors 
(Bentley, 1905; Truman, 1951) were pluralists – they saw the political process as being one where 
a multitude of  different interests would form and influence politics on an equal footing, with the 
state as arbitrator, deciding on who would, or would not, be involved in the policy process. As 
salient issues demanding interest representation would rise and fall, so would the population of  
groups accordingly. Pluralism as a school of  thought, was in this respect an explanatory theory of  
how various actors interacted with the state – it also had normative dimensions in that a plurality 
of  representation was seen as an inherently good thing in liberal orthodoxy (Dryzek and Dunleavy, 
2009, p.35). Interest  groups play a core role in this body of  theory – the ability for free association 
of  a multiplicitous range of  groups is the defining feature of  this conception of  democracy. In the 
U.S consumer organisations, originally set up as Home Economics groups in the 1930s, were seen 
as part of  this conception. They were one, amongst many, of  interest groups that represented a 
particular constellation of  citizens.
Pluralism, in political science, was the dominant frame of  thinking during the 1950s, and to an 
extent still holds authority today – albeit in a reworked fashion. Pluralism as a theory of  govern-
ment had numerous detractors, from both sides of  the political spectrum. It was, however, the 
rational choice theorists that really challenged the understanding of  interest groups in a polity. 
Rational choice theory approached political phenomena, including groups, organisations and 
institutions, from an individual perspective, instead of  a structural perspective like most theories 
of  the state had so far done. Groups were made of  individuals and it was these individuals that 
were of  significance. It is in the next section that the rational choice analysis of  group mobilisation 
will be addressed, a key element in the scholarship on interest groups. This is particularly relevant 
to public interest groups, which consumer organisations are, as it is argued, by Olson and others, 
that these groups fail to mobilise organically due to the ‘logic of  collective action.’ This will now be 
discussed in relation to consumer organisations, and advocacy groups generally, as part of  the pos-
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sible reason why it is that consumer organisations have come to be institutionalised as part of  the 
regulatory state. 
2.3 Olson and the Rational Choice Approach
One of  the most prominent theorists in the scholarship of  interest groups was Mancur Olson 
(1965), who wanted to analyse why it was that individuals joined public-spirited interest groups, 
when any rational individual would not join such a group. His general argument was that individu-
als will not want to join such groups as the groups actions will benefit all, therefore by not joining 
they will still accrue the benefits of  the group – known as the ‘free-rider’ problem. Most rational 
individuals would free-ride off  other more public spirited individuals. The puzzle was: why is it 
that anyone joins these groups despite the problem of  the logic of  collective action? Why would 
a worker join a union when the union would get a wage rise that would benefit everyone? In this 
scenario it would not be rational to join the group, and if  everyone thought like this there would be 
no public spirited interest groups. However, his explanation as to why it was that individuals joined 
these groups was that there must be certain ‘selective incentives’ to the members; these can be both 
material (in the case of  the Sierra Club), and non-material, or soft-incentives (Jordan and Maloney, 
1997, p.82). These would be explicit benefits for individual members of  the group beyond the 
more general advantages to the wider public. The logic of  collective action was in this respect 
deemed to be one in which individuals would form groups for the benefits to themselves that they 
would otherwise not get. This has been challenged (Jordan and Maloney, 1996, 1997, 2006, 2007), 
in the view that individuals are not rationally self-calculating to this extent monetarily, and that in 
fact people join public groups for many reasons both benign and public spirited, and entirely self-
serving.
This is significant, as this logic of  group mobilisation has dominated understandings of  inter-
est groups. It has also been significant in recent assessments of  civil society groups, most notably 
the analysis of  Jordan and Maloney (1997), whose assessment of  Amnesty International and their 
membership showed that people join groups for a variety of  reasons, and in the case of  these pub-
lic spirited groups, mainly noble reasons. Why is it then that consumer organisations fail to organi-
cally mobilise to any significant degree, bar a few charitable organisations aimed at a particular 
sub-set of  vulnerable consumers, and are mostly publicly funded organisations? This question is 
important as consumer organisations are, by-and-large, not member based groups, especially in 
the UK and Norway, but publicly funded, or funded through magazine subscription like Which?. 
The few that are, tend to represent consumers in niche areas, which then calls into question their 
representative scope due to the nebulous nature of  the concept of  consumers. Vulnerable consum-
ers in one area, either geographically or needs-based, may have significantly different needs from 
consumers in another. This could be argued to be the benefit of  having broader consumer organi-
sations, like Consumer Focus, as they are able to represent a variety of  interested parties, and have 
the resources and capacity to do so effectively. Unlike smaller more niche consumer organisations 
which can lack this ability. 
The public choice, and rational choice theory, approach to interest groups has held consider-
able weight since its conception but has been challenged more recently (Jordan and Maloney, 1996, 
2006, 2007). This body of  theory is mainly concerned with group mobilisation – how and why 
groups come to exist, and desist (although there is very little quantitative and qualitative research 
on group death (Berkhout and Lowery, 2010)). These perspectives, public choice and RCT, draw 
from the economics tool box – theorising the state and groups in terms of  rational self-maximizing 
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individuals. Furthermore the public choice approach promoted market liberalism as the best way 
to administer previously state owned enterprises, a core component of  neoliberalism in theory and 
in practice. It was, and still is, a perspective that has influenced the regulation of  many Western 
states, as well as post-communist countries and many developing countries – it is an approach that 
has global reach. This is important to consider here, as ‘rational choice theory’ (the more abstract 
form of  public choice), impacted upon a wide range of  scholarship due to its promotion of  analys-
ing individuals – whether they be in groups, states or civil society. As a body of  theory it was also 
used to explain institutions in terms of  how they behave, and that they are essentially made up of  
individuals behaving in a rational self-maximising way, but that they use institutions as vehicles 
through which to gain rents8.  
RCT is essentially an ontological position about human nature, and forms a foundation for, 
thus impacting upon, all forms of  analysis that draw from it. The analysis of  interest groups from 
a rational choice, market-liberal perspective, has had an indelible impact on the scholarship on 
groups. This work is essentially concerned with the fact that groups contain individuals and these 
individuals have individual goals and desires, and it is this which is of  significance. This focus pri-
oritises individuals over other forms of  social actor: ‘...whether groups (as in pluralism), elites (as 
in elite theory), and social classes (as in Marxism), or society as a whole (as in traditional conserva-
tism).’  (Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009, p.106) This perspective, although being at its peak in the 
1980s with various public and economic reforms, still resonates in contemporary political debates 
about the allocation of  resources and the regulation of  particular sectors of  society. But the theo-
ries are important to consider here, as this body of  thought recognises that groups exist, but only as 
a collection of  the individuals within those groups (Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009, p.106). The idea of  
having a more structural account of  social and political change was largely relegated to addressing 
the behaviours of  individual actors. 
What is of  significance is the vast changes that took place as a direct result of  this theorisation 
and scholarship throughout the 1980s and 90s, often referred to by the broad term New Public 
Management (NPM). This process established a perspective toward state organisation in which: 
‘Big, hierarchical public service systems should give way to more competitive arrangements de-
signed to establish individual consumers’ control over services like education, health care and social 
insurance.’ (Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009, p.105) What these developments show is the intercon-
nected nature of  both the analysis of  groups, and the analysis of  states, and why it is important to 
draw upon both, bodies of  literature in order to understand the role played by consumer organisa-
tions in this political setting. Although axiomatic, consumer organisations, as a feature of  contem-
porary policy making and regulation, are both historically and politically constituted meaning that 
the context in which they are found today is the direct result of  these neoliberal reforms. 
It should therefore be possible to see that the logic of  collective action, with regard to public 
interest groups, and the re-organisation of  public institutions along market liberal lines are con-
nected in terms of  the existence of  institutionalised consumer organisations. In this respect con-
sumer representation entails the organisation of  a population wide, and nebulous constituency, 
which would have the obvious ‘free rider’ problem. Why is it the case then that these groups exist? 
And how have they come to play such a role in public policy making, in seemingly very different 
polities? These questions will be addressed later in this chapter with regard to the changing nature 
of  the state, and after a discussion of  interest group intermediation.  
It is now important to discuss less abstract conceptions of  mobilisation, or the lack thereof, 
8 RCT analysis when concerned with institutions is part of  a body of  a body of   theory often referred to as ‘new-
institutionalism’ (Guy Peters, 2005).
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and look at some of  the other characteristics of  group intermediation, with regard to the business 
lobby, and civil society groups. 
2.4 Pressure Groups’ Power
The literature on ‘pressure groups’, another neologism for interest groups, is also important to rec-
ognise, as is the general lobbying literature. As stated before ‘interest groups’ is the broadest term 
used in analysis of  bodies concerned with the influence of  the political process. Pressure groups, 
and lobby groups, although arguably different, are used interchangeably here. The analysis of  
these groups, is concerned with their intermediation as well as their characteristics – their external 
and internal dynamics. Whereas previous analysis of  groups, from a more rational choice perspec-
tive, were concerned with questions about why groups mobilise, later literature on interest groups 
– which often referred to these groups as pressure groups, or lobby groups, where concerned with 
questions about how these groups behaved in regard to their desire to impact upon official govern-
ment policy.  One of  the important theories in this respect was Grant’s (1989) notion of  insider 
and outsider groups. This is to an extent illustrative of  a quasi-neocorporatism that is occasion-
ally witnessed in polities where particular groups are co-opted by the state for a specific reason, as 
they need particular technical expertise or some accurate information on a particular topic – they 
become insiders. It is also argued, as suggested earlier by Lindblom (1977) and others (Dahl, 1971), 
that business, in liberal capitalist democracies, have a special place as permanent insiders. This is 
one of  the fundamental aspects of  neo-pluralism as a body of  theory, that there are many compet-
ing groups but business interests are prioritised. The dichotomy between ‘insiders and outsiders’ 
has, however, been challenged by Page (1999), who asserted after significant empirical analysis 
that ‘to characterise a group as an insider or outsider in the process of  policy- making is at best 
an oversimplification, and at worst simply misleading.’ (Page, 1999, p. 212) His justification for 
this is that government departments (in the UK) consult with such a wide range of  groups, on a 
variety of  issues, on such a regular basis, and there is not a clear distinction between those whom 
get access, and influence, and those who do not. He makes a distinction between ‘big hitters, and 
small fry’, but suggests that: ‘in some circumstances small fry can be decisive and big hitters silent, 
ineffective or side-lined.’ (Page, 1999, p.122) This suggests that the strict dichotomy between insid-
ers and outsiders is not really helpful, as it presents the idea that there are some groups that always 
get heard where as others do not, when in reality it really depends on the issue and the context. 
This conception of  the interest groups in the policy process is a far more fluid one than theories 
of  neo-pluralism generally allow for, with business groups always remaining the key ‘insider’. This 
also does not take into account consumer organisations, which have been considerably active in 
both policy forums and in processes of  consultation. They could well be considered as ‘insiders’ in 
many respects, as in Norway they are an extension of  the state and in the UK have institutional-
ised forums for representation. This is the target of  this investigation; why is it the case that con-
sumer organisations have come to have a significant position in policy forums in both traditionally 
pluralist and neocorporatist states? Could this be shown to be an example of  governance processes, 
or as a result of  neoliberal developments, or an aspect of  both? In this respect does the ideologi-
cal make-up of  a state structure the way in which different groups are both included in the public 
policy process?
 So far it has been shown that some public spirited interest groups have difficulty mobilising due 
to the problem of  collective action proposed by Olson, and that there is significant heterogeneity 
in both access and resources of  groups and organisations. However, Olson only provides a start as 
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his focus on the behaviour of  individuals misses the underlying structural reasons for the lack of  
mobilisation, and does not explain why we see consumer organisations involved in the policy pro-
cess despite the low salience of  consumer issues and lack of  mobilisation. This has in some circum-
stances been challenged due to its focus on material, rather than the non-material benefits, which 
can explain the rise in membership of  groups such as RSBP and Amnesty International (Jordan 
and Maloney, 1997). In the case of  consumer organisations, however, grassroots organic mobilisa-
tion has remained a problem, yet has been deemed sufficiently important form of  representation 
to be supported by government. This is the case in both the UK and Norway; although to different 
degrees as will be shown later in the empirical chapters. 
The shift in the importance of  ‘civil society’ with regard to the state and the market, and their 
role in formal politics, is in this respect significant. The body of  theory dealing with civil society ac-
tors, which consumer organisations are understood to be a key constituent of  (Greenwood, 2007), 
concerns the importance of  non-business, non-labour, interest groups in contemporary policy 
making (Anheier, 2004; Harvey, 2005; Powell, 2007; Enjolras and Sicesind, 2009). I will now turn 
to the literature on civil society groups, with a focus on what has been written on consumer organi-
sations, and their intermediation, after which the role of  business interests will be assessed in more 
detail as counter example – as the role of  business is not divorced from that of  the consumer. This 
will in turn lead to a discussion of  the political context in which these groups operate; a paradigm 
of  neo-liberal economics and evolving governance practices (Lee and McBride, 2007).
2.5 Civil Society and Consumer Representation
Civil society, and public participation, has always been vital to democratic polities, and subsequent-
ly to political science. There has however been a recent turn to better understand the constitution 
of  civil society in terms of  its existence outside of  the state-market division. There is significant 
literature on the intention to engage with civil society (a variety of   public interest groups, from 
charities to environmental groups) in order to ‘bridge the gap between the state and citizens’, and 
in so doing alleviate what some have called the ‘democratic deficit’. This is in particular reference 
to research done at the level of  the E.U. Greenwood (2007) explores in detail the extent of  civil 
society representation at the E.U. level, and these intentions to ‘bridge the gap’ between the polity 
and citizens through use of  civil society organisations as representatives. For Greenwood ‘civil soci-
ety’ is an umbrella term that includes all groups participating in the public area, however here civil 
society is understood to be the population of  interests that exist outside of  state-market relations 
– NGOs, GROs, non-profit organisations, voluntary organisations,  environmental groups and 
citizen groups (of  which consumer organisations are a part of). This section aims to give a brief  
understanding of  what is understood to be ‘civil society’ as a constituency in democratic societies, 
and what role civil society organisations play and subsequently what role consumer organisations 
have within this community.
Understanding of  civil society as Anheier (2004) suggests is rather ‘uncharted territory in a 
world dominated by a two-sector view of  market versus state’. (Anheier, 2004, p.1) It has also been  
analysed theoretically by political philosophers in a more abstract fashion. However, the concept 
and existence of  civil society as a political force in actual existing polities is taken increasingly 
seriously by states in connection to evolving governance practices that will be looked at below. 
Civil society, and civil society groups (CSOs), are understood differently, but here is taken to be 
the totality of  non-profit groups acting between the state and individuals – intermediating public 
spirited interest groups, this is in line with both Anheier (2004) and Enjolras and Sivesind (2007). 
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Unlike Greenwood (2007) this does not include labour union and consumer orgainisation inclusion 
in policy making as a fundamental aspect. It is a redefinition of  a section of  society that would in 
a pluralist understanding have a heterogeneous character. The core aspect of  the emergence of  
‘civil society’ is that it brings with it problems of  its own, or at least puzzles for research. Much of  
the research done on this area focuses on the citizenship aspect – the grassroots participation of  
individuals in communities. It is a broad and deep understanding of  public activism, and per-
sonal connection to the political world. However, consumer organisations are, as stated, generally 
quasi-state, in that they are often publicly funded advocacy group with a professional staff  and no 
members. There are some groups that are member based, but more often than not they are either 
public bodies or charities (Hanvey and Philpot, 1996). This will be significant when the normative 
implication of  this type of  representation are discussed, but for understanding consumer organisa-
tions’ role as part of  civil society it is sufficient to appreciate that they are part of  a body of  groups 
that have a broader national and international population (Keane, 2003). Consumer organisations 
are one of  many citizen focused representatives that have been to an extent co-opted by states to 
facilitate evolutions in governance that require an engagement with various ‘stakeholders’ – and 
individuals as consumers find representation in these publicly funded groups.
What this section has demonstrated is that being part of  civil society is important to how con-
sumer organisations have been included into forums of  participation. How they are perceived is 
vital to how they are included, and ultimately what role they have. Consumer organisations have 
to an extent been co-opted as a particular type of  civil representation, only in advocacy, rather 
than grassroots form. This chapter will now move to consider the role of  business in policy making 
and governance, and will address them in relation to their role as interest groups much like that of  
consumer organisations.
2.6 Business Interests: Comparing Intermediation
From a neo-pluralist and Marxist understanding of  interest intermediation, there is no more 
powerful set of  interests than the business lobby. It is also understood that in ‘market democracies’ 
businesses are going to have a level of  privilege. It is also commonly asserted that today this busi-
ness lobby is more powerful, than it has ever been, and this is especially the case in the UK which 
some empirical studies have shown (Beetham, 2011; Wilks-Heeg et al., 2012)9. 
The acknowledgement that there was an uneven distribution of  power amongst groups changed 
both interest group theory and theories on the state in significant ways. Understanding was moved 
from optimistic pluralist conceptions, to what has been evidenced empirically - that it was busi-
ness that had considerably more power in negotiations with government than had previously been 
recognised. Although it was still the case that labour unions remained crucial, they were of  second 
order importance to the business community, especially in a market democracy, but less so in a 
more social democratic order. 
To an extent this is obvious, and perfectly understandable from a neoliberal perspective, which 
privileges the interests of  business over workers. Under present conditions growth is vital to nation-
al economies, and in order to warrant growth there has to be favourable conditions for businesses. 
It is therefore built into the fabric of  states that the business community matters, and their inter-
ests matter to such an extent that their agenda setting power is not explicit but part of  the normal 
course of  state management. Lindblom (1977), previously a pluralist, found this out in a ground-
9 The recent Democratic Audit of  the UK can be found here: http://democracy-uk-2012.democraticaudit.com/how-
democratic-is-the-uk-the-2012-audit 
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breaking study of  interest intermediation in the U.S., in which he acknowledged the superior place 
given to business within liberal capitalist democracies. In a later article he also states that in this 
respect the ‘market is a prison’ (Lindblom, 1982), as governments adapt policy in order to ensure 
favourable markets, that will in turn ensure better economic growth. This is also a fundamental 
element of  the understanding of  the neoliberal state (Plant, 2010; Harvey, 2005), in which: 
Businesses and corporations not only collaborate intimately with state actors but even acquire a 
strong role in writing legislation, determining public policies, and setting regulatory frameworks...
patterns of  negotiation arise that incorporate business and sometimes professional interest into 
governance through close and sometimes secretive consultation. (Harvey, 2005, p.76-77)
The idea of  ‘back-room’ politics, and the role of  business in agenda setting is not a new one. It has 
seen recent in-depth analysis from Culpepper (2011) who sees a significant amount of  policy mak-
ing conducted in areas of  low political salience; businesses have considerable power in this area of  
‘quiet politics’. He does however say that business power is limited with issues of  high salience, as 
politicians will go to considerable lengths to stay in office. Although this is questionable given the 
public furore at bankers in the wake of  the financial crisis, and the seeming lack of  influence politi-
cians have in responding to this particular public mood.
Other interests are therefore considered to be tertiary compared to the concerns of  business. 
This, as Dryzek and Dunleavy (2009, p.134) point out, is closer to the story that Marxists tell with 
regard to the functionalist approach to the state – the state functions as a facilitator for the accumu-
lation of  capital, and this is far from the pluralist conceptions of  the 1950s (Dryzek and Dunleavy, 
2009, p.134). Even though the power of  business in politics had been assumed for a long time, it 
was not until Lindblom’s (1977) seminal study that an appreciation of  the relationship between 
the state and business interestw was seen as significant. In the early 1980s there were a few more 
studies, following Lindblom’s lead, which brought business groups into focus. Useem’s (1984) Inner 
Circle, and Grant’s (1984) analysis of  the UK Chamber of  commerce, sought to show the extent of  
business – government relations, which all followed from Dahl’s (1959) work on the importance of  
this relationship to political science. 
It is in this respect that corporate power is seen as vital here – the relationship between the state 
and business, in the contemporary context, will provide an interesting contrast to the intermedia-
tion of  consumer interests. It is the case that numerous consumer forums include businesses, and 
there is significant discussion between consumer organisations and business in addition to their 
connections to the state. In an investigation of  consumer organisations the place of  business in the 
policy making and regulatory environment should be considered as important. This also provides 
the motivation for one of  the key research questions: To what extent do consumer organisations 
provide a counter-balance to industry and regulatory pressure? 
Contemporary analysis of  business intermediation suggests that the domination argument is not 
always the case. In addition to Culpepper’s (2011) appreciation of  the relevance of  salience to the 
role of  business, Greenwood (2007) also acknowledges in relation to the E.U., that both the mul-
tileveled polity, and the increasing importance of  ‘civil society’, have sought to curb the power of  
business to an extent – they do not have a carte blache as some may suggest. ‘Market power does not 
automatically translate into political power, as detailed analysis of  collective action among business 
interests demonstrates.’ (Greenwood, 2007, p.49) This is interesting as it suggests a space for other 
potential interest influence – that of  civil society, and the extent of  consumer organisation involve-
ment in this is of  core relevance to the policy making and regulation agenda. 
As has been shown the influence of  interests is a core concern for political science. It has to date 
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been the neopluralist view that business has considerable power in intermediation with the state in 
liberal capitalist democracies, due to the importance of  economic performance. However, oth-
ers have noted that it may not be so simple. In this respect Woll’s (2007) work on business power 
and influence is interesting as she leaves space, much like Greenwood (2007), for other non-gov-
ernmental actors to be influential in the policy process. She questions the idea that business does 
‘Lead the Dance’, and although still acknowledging the power of  business suggests it is better to 
look at resource distribution and interdependence of  interests to get a fuller appreciation of  the 
locus of  power and the multifaceted nature of  influence. However, it is still the case that much of  
the analysis on interest groups is captured in a paradigm of  ‘resource determinism’ where it is only 
the resources of  interests that really matter. It is also coupled with an overwhelming concern with 
measuring influence – something that is seen here to be to be too narrow a focus, not to mention 
methodologically complex. What this thesis investigates is the context around consumer group in-
stitutionalisation in order to build up a picture of  the complex politics at the heart of  the relations 
between the state, the market and civil society in policy making and regulation. This picture is key 
to this investigation of  the policy process, and where an in-depth qualitative analysis will work well 
as it will be able to provide a ‘thick description’ of  these complex and interconnected relationships 
in intermediation between consumer organisations, businesses and the institutions of  the state. 
It should now be possible to see that the state’s relationship to business, and the conditions in 
which that relationship exists, is vital to understanding how consumer organisations play a role 
as political actors. If  consumer organisations can be seen to be the protagonist in this story, then 
business groups provide the antagonist, a balance that will enable a comparison of  intermedia-
tion, access and organisational resource distribution. This chapter will now move to consider how 
consumer organisations as are understood to be part of  civil society.
2.7 Consumer organisations as Public Servants
As stated in the introduction consumer organisations (including NGOs, NDPBs and Ombudsmen) 
as phenomena of  Western political systems have seen relativity little academic analysis, in terms of  
in depth qualitative assessments of  their role as political actors. This excludes some more specula-
tive historical studies in regard to the American revolution (Breen, 2004), radio consumer organisa-
tions in the U.S. (Newman, 2004), and as part of  an overall research project on consumption led 
by Frank Trentmann (2007). Contemporary analysis leaves Grant’s (1993) assessment that these 
groups are ‘generally outsiders’, a brief  study by Greenwood (2007) on consumer organisations 
in the EU that refutes their ‘outsider’ status framing their inclusion in terms of  an evolution through 
events, and a short chapter by Winward (1994) on consumer organisations in the UK. Here he sug-
gests in a less descriptive assessment that it is the ‘oppositional relationship that gives consumer or-
ganizations their wider social role, acting on behalf  of  consumers against producer interests, and is 
the reason that all consumer organizations, to a greater or lesser extent, perceive themselves as po-
litical organizations.’ (Winward, 1994, p.79)  Trumbull (2006) does assess consumer organisations 
in France and Germany as part of  a wider research project on consumer capitalism. His analysis 
suggested that the culture of  consumer organisations was very different in both countries, yet there 
consumer mobilization was in general a ‘highly contingent phenomenon’ (Trumbull, 2006, p.72). 
Their success was said to depend on an array of  important variables that included institutional and 
ideological contexts. It is in this respect that this thesis seeks to analyse consumer organisations by 
unpacking these institutional and ideological contexts. Although the investigation will ask different 
questions focusing on both how consumer organisations have come to have the place the do, but 
31
also by assessing the extent to which they are perceived to have an influence and whether or not 
they provide a counter balance to industry and agency pressures.
A good place to start assessing the broader political context is Grant’s assessment that we have 
moved from ‘a politics of  production to a politics of  collective consumption’ (Grant, 2005, p.366). 
This is of  pivotal importance when considering the broader trends described in the theory on 
group intermediation. He outlines a situation in which we are ‘...concerned with the outcomes 
of  the production process rather than what happens inside the production process itself.  It is 
concerned with the externalities of  that process.’ (Grant, 2005, p.366) This is significant for this 
project, as we are concerned here with the collective representation of  individuals as consumers 
explicitly, not merely the organisation of  groups with interests outside of  the production process; 
like Fathers 4 Justice, animal rights campaigners or the hunting lobby (Grant’s examples). But, as 
it is possible to see from the examples given, the ‘politics of  collective consumption’ goes beyond 
mere consumption to include a politics of  identity. It is also the case that this assessment took place in 
a time of  relative economic strength, whether this is still the case in times of  economic prudence 
and restraint will be interesting to observe10. 
This project, however, is explicitly interested in the collective, both in advocacy and grassroots 
form, representation of  citizens as consumers – in their being represented against the interests of  
the production process, and both the market failures and negative externalities that result. In this 
respect it would be wise to consider the empirical literature on both the business lobby, and on 
social movements and other NGOs. How these groups organise and lobby, in two distinct institu-
tional settings, will provide insights into general group intermediation that can be used to inform 
an analysis of  consumer organisations in the UK and Norway. This will be significant as it enables 
Grant’s broader theory to be empirically – have consumer organisations been able to adequately 
establish themselves as both public representatives and consultees in market democracies? The 
networks and connections made with policy makers, in addition to businesses and unions, as well 
as downstream consumers and members (the constituents), are all of  significant interest to this pro-
ject – what role do consumer organisations have in the policy and regulatory process? How these 
groups establish themselves and then operate as interest organisations demands empirical analysis. 
This is in order to answer some important questions on contemporary group intermediation and 
states’ regulatory regimes. 
This chapter has shown that there has been little comprehensive analysis of  consumer rep-
resentation in the political science literature, bar brief  acknowledgement by Grant (1989) and 
Greenwood (2007), and some early work by Rose (1981) and Winward (1994), although Trumbull 
(2006) has provided some analysis of  consumer organisations as part of  research into the broader 
topic of  consumer capitalism. This is a significant gap, and research into this phenomenon may 
well be able to bring to light an area of  contestation that features numerous political develop-
ments, often encompassed under the umbrella term of  ‘governance’. These include the shifting 
of  traditional political cleavages (Dalton, 1996; Grant, 2005), the significance of  the participatory 
turn (Gaventa, 2004; Saurugger, 2010), the growth, and possible decline, of  the regulatory state 
(Majone, 1994, 1997; Moran, 2003), the importance and prevalence of  market mechanisms in 
policy making (Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009; Bevir and Rhodes, 2003), and most obviously here, 
the rise in civil society actors (non-party, and non-business) as a significant political force (Anheier, 
2004; Harvey, 2005; Powell, 2007; Enjolras and Sicesind, 2009). It is argued here that consumer 
10 The recent announcement by the UK’s coalition government to cut and merge numerous ‘QUANGO’s’ including 
Consumer Focus – one of  the leading campaigners and advisors on consumer issues, in addition to other fiscal restraints, 
may well indicate a potential return to ‘a politics of  production’.
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organisations form a nexus of  these developments, and that their existence and their actions char-
acterise some of  the most significant changes in contemporary democracies. Consumer organisa-
tions, in both UK and Norway, have developed in particular, and in some circumstances signifi-
cantly different, ways but share some essential features in terms of  the issues they cover and the 
issues they face. These will be discussed in greater detail in the empirical and analysis chapters. 
The most significant research on consumer representation was by Rose (1981), who saw that 
consumer organisations highlighted a particularly interesting phenomenon in regard to collective 
interest policy making. He determined that there are six models of  consumer representation: (1) the 
free market model – consumers act as individuals and demand quality products and services, business-
es want more business so will satisfy these demands. This is a pure business-consumer relationship. 
(2) the consumer co-operative model – this is where consumers act together in order to secure ‘greater 
market leverage...but like the free market model...is at base an alternative in which consumer 
interest are represented and protected via essentially economic means.’ (Rose, 1981, p.21) (3) the 
independent consumer association model – represents individuals in political, as well as economic spheres, 
and although their organization and methods may differ their primary devotion is to the consumer 
protection cause (Rose, 1981). (4) the corporatist model – where special issues groups co-opted by the 
government for specific concerns move to consumer interest related issues. (5) the quasi-public consum-
er agency model – specialist agency charge with consumer watchdog function, these are not exactly 
groups but would court consumer organisations along with other interested parties. (6) the political-
bureaucratic elite model – where existing regulatory bodies have concerns about consumer welfare, 
some specialist ‘individuals, offices, or departments’ will concentrate on representing consumer 
interests. 
These six types of  consumer representation that Rose (1981) sets out have a great deal to tell 
us about consumer representation today, in that the various forms of  consumer representation 
that we see today fit into the models he outlined. He also states that these are ideal-types, and in 
reality are not mutually exclusive in any one policy or regulatory context. Many of  these types of  
consumer representation will exist alongside one another. This is the situation today, with a vari-
ety of  different groups involved at varying levels of  policy making to different degrees. This also 
varies between countries too; with the Norwegian system being known as a ‘consumer family’11 – a 
tripartite system with a research body (SIFO), the Consumer Council, which sees itself  as an inter-
est group, and the Ombudsman which acts more like a general overseer – all of  whom are con-
nected but autonomous. The UK is different, with a mixture of  types of  organisation both publicly 
funded (Consumer Focus) and privately funded (Which?), but also having regulators with specific 
consumer protection roles (BIS, OFT). What is of  interest here though is how the consumer or-
ganisations have come to play the role they do in policy making? Does this represent a move to try 
and be more inclusive of  ‘a public’ in policy making, whilst remaining true to particular neoliberal 
economic principles? Or is it a general trend of  appealing to individuals in particular constituen-
cies, and not as citizens in general? What is the case is that consumers fail to mobilise collective 
interests to any significant degree autonomously, at a grassroots level, and rely on both publicly 
and privately advocacy groups and government regulators to represent them. The empirical part 
of  this investigation shows how consumer organisations have been institutionalised into particular 
policy processes, and as a result the extent to which they provide a counter balance to industry and 
agency pressures, and the influence they are perceived to have by the actors involved.
If  it is the case that consumer organisations are understood to have influence in certain contexts 
– be that through political expedience, genuine salience among policy makers, moves to reduce a 
11 From preliminary interview with Senior Researcher at SIFO, Oslo, Norway. 
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democratic deficit, or for epistemic needs – then this is of  significance to having a full understand-
ing of  the nature and extent of  interest intermediation in contemporary democracy. Extending 
questions that would arise would be whether this alters with changes in government? Whether it 
varies between polities? And more generally, what this may tell us about consumer representation, 
and influence, in contrast to business influence?
In this respect it is important to recognise at this point that the relationship between interest 
groups and the state has evolved considerably, as has the scholarship on these relationships. From 
pluralist appreciations of  the state as a neutral arbiter, to the state as active mediator, to the state as 
subservient in some more extreme accounts, to the state being a facilitator of  interest intermedia-
tion between a range of  actors. This chapter will now move to acknowledge some of  the literature 
on the more contextual aspects of  state-civil society relations, considering the connection between 
developments in governance as significant to the role of  civil society groups, and consumer organi-
sations specifically in policy making.
2.8 Governance and the Neo-Liberal State
So far the chapter has been concerned with organised interests, and these interests’ engagement 
with polities. It is now necessary to discuss how states have changed in relation to these groups, and 
what impact this may have had upon the co-option of  consumer organisations – which would in 
turn, one would assume, have an impact on the influence they have, although not necessarily. The 
scholarship on states and interest groups, especially in relation to group intermediation, are closely 
connected. They could well be seen as two sides of  the same coin – in order to fully understand 
the state one must understand the role of  interest groups in relation to that state, and vise-versa. In 
this respect, this section will more fully explore contemporary analysis of  the state, with significant 
focus on recent developments in the understanding of  governance. Governance as an evolving 
process is argued to be eclipsing traditional understanding of  the state (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003, 
2004), and in accordance state-interest group intermediation. This is relevant to a comprehensive 
account of  the role of  consumer organisations, as their co-option by states could be seen as part of  
this shift to a paradigm of  governance. The extent to which this has actually happened, and is cur-
rently happening, will be a key determinant in the empirical trajectory of  this investigation – what 
role do consumer organisations play in traditionally different states in an era of  governance? This 
section will draw out the salient aspects of  this body of  literature in relation to consumer organisa-
tions, whilst constantly reflecting on the question of  the extent to which interest groups in general, 
and consumer organisations specifically, influence the policy process. 
The argument here is that the role of  consumer organisations in policy making forums, and 
therefore the extent of  their influence and power, is context dependent. Much like Trumbull 
(2006) suggests in relation to mobilisation, consumer organisation intermediation is also contingent 
upon ideology, institutions and resources. In this respect the prevailing understandings of  the state 
should be acknowledged, especially in relation to aspects of  political economy. Lee and McBride 
(2007) summarise well some of  the key characteristics of  developments of  the neo-liberal state and 
governance:
Policies of  privatization, deregulation, and liberalization of  markets have not only given 
entrepreneurs and trans-national corporations greater freedom to innovate and take risks in pursuit 
of  profit, but also largely redrawn the boundaries between the public domain of  the state and 
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citizenship and the private domain of  the market, entrepreneurship and consumerism. (Lee and 
McBride, 2007, p.1)
These characteristics are key to how this chapter seeks to argue that the inclusion of  consumer 
organisations as significant political actors has been contingent upon numerous evolutions of  the 
state; trends in governance which promote market principles and the inclusion of  civil society into 
policy making and regulation. How the public has come to be represented in significant arenas of  
policy change is of  vital importance in better understanding the contemporary nature of  capitalist 
democracies. The state in this respect becomes the lynchpin of  the dynamic intermediations that 
occur between various interests, therefore its composition is fundamental. A state’s definition can 
be reduced to their particular relationship with interest groups, either being pluralist or corporatist 
(and the theories’ variations). Although interest group theory has undergone some changes, theo-
ries on the state have by-and-large crystallized into a broader definition of  ‘governance’. 
This chapter will now outline how consumers have become important for developments of  
governance, which is connected more generally to the spread of  neoliberalism as an economic 
paradigm. One particularly important aspect of  this, in relation to public policy making and to the 
place of  consumers, is New Public Management; a way of  organisation that sought to bring mar-
ket mechanisms to public bodies – and to treat patients, audiences, users etc. as consumers (Keat, 
2000; Aberbach and Christensen, 2005). 
2.9 New Public Management and the Role of the Consumer
An analysis of  consumers in relation to governance and public policy cannot be done without 
reference to New Public Management (NPM). NPM was12, and to an extent is, a broad range of  
reforms that sought to apply the logic of  the market to the public sector. The UK has been at the 
forefront of  some of  these reforms, but Norway and other countries have also been impacted to 
greater or lesser degrees (Christensen, 2005).  NPM identified people as consumers of  services, and 
required that previously state-owned monopolies be conceived and run as regular businesses. The 
debates on NPM and public choice theory that occurred thought the 1990s and into the 2000s 
provide a significantly fruitful analysis on the role of  the citizen as a consumer of  public services, 
ending up in New Labour policy hyphenating the identities into the citizen-consumer. 
This hybridised characterisation was often seen as the answer to efficiency problems in public 
services, by instilling market mechanisms of  competition and consumer choice into rigid bureau-
cratic structures, through the promotion of  consumer sovereignty. The creation of  this identity 
has been well addressed by Clarke et al. (2007), who analysed the public choice theory of  the early 
1990s (Dunleavy, 1991; Niskanen, 1971) and the implementations of  NPM under the New Labour 
governments: ‘...which offered an ‘economic’ critique of  public bureaucracies and provided one of  
the intellectual cornerstones for the ‘New Public Management’.’ (Clarke et al., 2007, p.30) It was 
also well analysed by Trentmann et al through the ‘Cultures of  Consumption’13 research pro-
gramme, whose work culminated in an acknowledgment of  the ambiguous and conflated nature 
of  the citizen-consumer moving beyond the binary oppositions: ‘It is wrong to see consumers and 
citizens as natural opposites, one private, the other public. In fact, it was battles over civic rights 
and duties that forged a stronger consumer identity in the first place.’ (Trentmann, 2007, p.1) In 
12 Although Dunleavy et al. (2005, 2006) have argued that NPM is ‘dead’ and that public policy is now done in an era of  
‘digital governance’.
13 More information can be found here: http://www.consume.bbk.ac.uk/news/about.html
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this respect the citizen and the consumer have come under scrutiny in terms of  how individuals 
choose to identify themselves in given situations, but in large part made (or returned) the consumer 
to an empowered political actor. This is underlined by studies on consumer politics where individu-
als are seen as agents of  change through their consumption habits (Jacobsen and Dulsrud, 2007; 
Baek, 2010). 
Although not of  strict concern here, this body of  literature draws out the specific socio-cultural 
circumstance of  the politicisation of  consumers and consumption (Mort, 1994) – which makes a 
focus on the collective representation of  these individuals apposite. Although not the direct focus 
of  this investigation, which focuses on the more formal political arena, it is important to recognise 
that consumer organisations exist in particular political contexts, and consumer capitalism involves 
phenomena beyond merely understanding the consumer as an economic entity. The role of  con-
sumer organisations in public policy is argued to be intimately linked to both ideological currents, 
developments of  the state and the problem of  collective action.
2.10 Groups, Governance, and Neo-Liberalism – Consumers at a Cross-
Roads
There are, however, numerous reasons why consumer organisations have been included to the 
extent they have in public policy forums, not to mention contemporary enthusiasm for public 
consultation, and ‘the wider trend, in which policy-making is seen in terms of  interactions amongst 
a plurality of  interested parties’ (Hagendijk and Irwin, 2006, p.168), and even more generally the 
‘participatory turn’ (Saurugger, 2008, 2010) evidenced in the contemporary language of  ‘good 
governance’. The question of  whether this is political marketing or a genuine attempt to include 
‘stakeholder’ perspectives is a different debate, but is still an important consideration (Hagendijk 
and Irwin, 2006 p.170). This chapter has argued that why and how consumer organisations have 
come to have the role that they do is primarily due to the necessity to have people as consumers 
recognised as stakeholders in the regulatory process. Their inclusion is bound to the various devel-
opments in the relationship between the state and civil society, and the broader impact of  neolib-
eral hegemony.
Harvey (2005), as well as Plant (2010), is critical of  this form of  politics, as have been others 
unhappy with the reduction of  political opposition to one of  the ability to ‘consume better’. For 
example Harvey states: ‘The period in which the neoliberal state has become hegemonic has also 
been the period in which the concept of  civil society – often cast as an entity in opposition to state 
power – has become central to the formulation of  oppositional politics.’ (Harvey, 2005, p.78) This 
is especially relevant here, as it aims to suggest that the political constituencies are determined 
by the constitution of  the state – something that is not far divorced from suggesting the role of  
consumer organisations has been determined by neoliberal policies and practices of  governance. 
This is not to suggest that consumer organisations are a force of  intervention bereft of  positive 
outcomes for individuals, but to be wary of  the possibility that this reduction could be detrimental 
in democratic terms. In respect of  the developments suggested, consumer organisations actually 
embody a solution to the problem of  collective action under market conditions which Plant (2010) 
explicates:
The question the neo-liberal has to answer in the context of  the claim that the market empowers 
people is whether individuals as consumers without having pre-market agreement on a policy could 
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as consumers, without such agreement, have come to such a strategic policy as consumers within a 
market? (Plant, 2010, p.228)
This supports the reasons as to why consumer organisations have had to have public support – that 
due to the various problems of  collective action, and the lack of  salience of  most consumer issues, 
it does not seem to be the case that these groups form long term grassroots organisations. This is 
a problem as has been suggested, oppositional politics has been today moved to the realm of  civil 
society as particular economic and political developments have cross-party support in most govern-
ment settings. The character and extent of  this representation is however called into question, as 
issues of  accountability and legitimacy arise. This will now be considered in relation to consumer 
organisations. 
2.11 Normative Concerns - Who’s Representing Who?
There are a number of  issues that advocacy groups face when addressing legitimacy, especially 
in light of  both national polities, and multi-level polities like the EU attempting to alleviate the 
‘democratic deficit’ through ‘good governance’ by including more voices from civil society (Kohler-
Koch, 2010).  This is the case with civil society groups generally, but specifically the case with 
consumer organisations as the represented constituency is so nebulous. It also forms an antagonism 
between representation and participation – as participation is understood to have better demo-
cratic credentials than representation (Kohler-Koch, 2010). In the case of  consumer organisations 
this is relevant as they are generally representative advocacy groups, rather than grassroots organi-
sations, which is from some perspectives not as ‘democratic’. This presents a normative issue as we 
have already established consumers seem reticent to form collectives, mostly due to the problem of  
collective action explored by Olson (1965) which Plant (2010) situates in a market context.
Further empirical analysis will be necessary to fully understand how these groups are structured, 
and the extent of  their influence, these are still theoretical precedents that can help to distinguish 
possible problems. This issue of  group bias in advocacy and public interest groups is well docu-
mented, and is raised from both sides of  the political spectrum. In interest group theory, in addi-
tion to more Olsonian perspectives scholars have recognized this bias in advocacy groups:
The sort of  impressions we have  about the relative power of  interest groups are dependent on the 
way in which ‘interest group’ is defined and how it is operationalised. Noting the bias to middle-class 
participation in groups, Schlozman (1984) has picked up Schattschneider’s well-known observation 
about the interest group system being congenitally biased in a middle-class way and asked ‘what 
accent the heavenly chorus?’ At least in part the answer depends on who is conducting the research 
and their conceptual interpretations – because that determines who is counted as singing. (Jordan et 
al., 2004, p.210)
This is not in fact a recent development either, as Trentmann (2008) acknowledges of  the ACLL 
(Anti-Corn Law League), a 19th Century ‘consumer group’: ‘The ACLL itself  was largely middle-
class and was viewed with suspicion as a bourgeois interest group.’ (Trentmann, 2008, p.8) This 
is significant as both sides of  the political spectrum view these groups with similar suspicion but 
for different reasons – which makes the demands on these groups ever more prescient. They both 
however regard the level of  power and influence that these groups have to be disproportional to 
the constituents they represent, thus undermining their legitimacy as advocacy participants and 
as epistemic communities. This also strikes a chord with what interest group scholars have said of  
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numerous NGOs and interest organisations, in particular Schattschneider’s well-known account, 
as quoted above. This research aims to address the issues of  representation as a ‘many-faceted 
and elusive concept’ (Sartori, 1968, p.465)  and participation that has been a buzzword of  polities 
in the age of  ‘good governance’. The importance of  addressing the extent of  representation by 
groups, especially when called upon to represent civil society, as it is argued that consumer advo-
cacy groups do, is, as Kohler-Koch (2010) states, vital. 
2.12 Conclusion
This chapter has considered various literatures on interest groups, on states, on consumer repre-
sentation, on civil society and on governance. This literature review has shown that three key issues 
emerge from the literature about how consumer organisations have come to play a role in a para-
digm of  ‘governance’ due to problems of  collective action,  neoliberal reforms and developments 
in governance that encourage inclusion of  civil society in policy making and regulation. It has 
argued that consumer organisations function as representatives of  the public in scenarios brought 
about by neoliberal economic developments, as an attempt to mitigate market failures and appeal-
ing to the need to ‘bridge the gap’ between formal politics and citizens, both for informational and 
representational reasons. Consumer organisations have become a way in which regulation can be 
put in place which adheres to certain fundamental market limitations. They provide policy makers 
with information and expertise on a range of  policy issues which will affect both the most vulner-
able consumers, and the general consumer. Due to the distinct lack of  salience of  some of  the 
issues that consumer organisations are active upon (as recognised by Grant (1989, p.157)), and the 
reticence of  citizens to form grassroots organisations, it is largely left to the government to fund 
consumer representation in the form of  quasi-autonomous interest groups. This is seen in both the 
UK and Norway and will be looked at in greater detail in the empirical and analysis chapters later. 
However, it has been noted that when there is high salience consumers can alter policy without 
formal representation. As Kurzer and Cooper (2007) show, in some circumstances (GM Foods) 
consumer activism alone (without official representation) can alter policy decisions. This is more 
than an obvious parallel with the commercial sector, where it is consumers who ultimately decide 
whether a good or service will be successful, and ultimately whether or not businesses survive or 
not. The dominance of  this form of  representation in regulatory forums in recent history has also 
been argued to be due to the particular influence of  neoliberal economic developments in which 
individuals became consumers. There are clearly normative concerns, briefly alluded to here, 
which will be further examined later in the investigation. 
However it is important to connect these theoretical concerns with the empirical aims of  this 
investigation.  This thesis now moves to consider the theoretical grounding of  the investigation 
where it will look at three dimensions: (1) the theory on the regulatory state, a particular formula-
tion of  the state with regard to its primary role as a regulator, (2) the theory on network govern-
ance, a body of  work which both intends to describe and prescribe the concept of  networks onto 
state-civil society intermediation, and (3) constructivist institutionalism which see the role of  ideas 
and discourse in politics as a principal factor.
What has been shown in this chapter is that consumer organisations are not taken into account 
as political actors in any great depth by political science, and that an investigation into their role as 
public representatives can bring insights into the character and nature of  the contemporary state, 
policy making and regulation, and neoliberalism as actually practiced beyond just theory, as Collier 
suggests: ‘we should look past neoliberal theory to show how actually existing neoliberal regimes 
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are constituted.’ (Collier, 2012, p.187) The various developments in public policy and state govern-
ance have been argued to have a direct impact on the role of  consumer organisations as they form 
the context in which these political actors operate. What this investigation does is confront this 
context through the analysis of  the role of  consumer organisations, how they are institutionalised 
by the state, to what extent they provide a counter-balance to industry and regulatory pressure, 
and the extent to which consumer organisations are understood to influence policy and regulation. 
These are the key research questions that drive this investigation. The thesis will now move to put 
this research questions in a theoretical frame.
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3. Theory Chapter: Understanding the
 State, Networks and Institutions 
in Terms of Consumers
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter I looked at three bodies of  literature and sought to address how consumer 
organisations could be understood in terms of  the literature on interest groups, civil society and 
the state. I also argued that these dimensions were necessary in order to understand consumer 
organisations, and their role in the political process today, as a particular phenomenon of  actually 
existing practices of  neoliberalism. Consumer organisations, despite being allied to developments 
in social democratic endeavours to curb the excesses of  the market, have become co-opted into 
a nexus between the state, the market and civil society which, whilst predicated on an argument 
to better the economic and political circumstances of  consumers and citizens, sees the scope of  
their importance reduced. The workings of  the market and the importance of  appeals to business 
remain the concern for states, and the input from civil society, including consumer organisations, is 
at best a way to ‘mitigate market failure’, or at worst a way to justify and entrench a particular neo-
liberal ideology towards the state and market. This chapter aims to put these broader arguments 
and literatures into a specific theoretical context by drawing upon theory on the regulatory state, 
network governance, and constructivist institutionalism. This will then move onto the empirical 
chapters where the empirical analysis will be carried out through the framework set out here. 
This chapter will outline the key theory that this research both speaks to and uses, and there are 
three elements to this: (1) theory on the state, specifically the regulatory state, but also including 
Marxist theory of  the state for its critical dimension, and (2) theory on governance networks. These 
two bodies of  theory are both principally concerned with the analysis of  the institutions, and the 
connection between these institutions, of  capitalist states. It is in this respect that this research seeks 
to understand the place of  consumer organisations in contemporary policy making. It is important 
to use the Marxist analysis of  the state as this brings together some of  the critiques of  both neo-
liberalism, and how governance, and network analysis, has developed. Third (3) a constructivist 
institutionalist approach will be used in order to assess the process of  institutional change witnessed 
in the evolution of  the use of  consumer organisations in the structure of  the regulatory state. This 
particular approach allows for a focus on, and analysis of, the discourse of  policymakers and elites. 
This chapter intends to position the research as both descriptive but also as prescriptive. This is 
where the theoretical, the empirical and the normative elements are laid out. Network theory, both 
Policy Network (PN) analysis and Governance Network (GN) theory, as Blanco et al. (2011) state: 
...take different normative stances on the democratic implications of  networks...the PN literature  
tends to stress the negative consequences of  networks – their resistance to change and their 
democratic downside...In contrast, the GN approach coincides with the normative rehabilitation of  
networks within policy-making discourse and practice...The GN literature conceives the spread of  
networks and partnerships as part of  a strategy to open up decision-making processes to interest  
groups and to citizens themselves. (Blanco et al., 2011, p.303-304)
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How these approaches contribute to investigating the role of  consumer organisations in contempo-
rary policy-making is one intention of  this chapter. That in order to understand the particular role 
of  one type of  organisation, we need to have a broader appreciation of  the state and the connec-
tions that exist between the state, its institutions, and outside actors, like consumer organisations, 
and business. 
This chapter forms the basis for a comparative and empirical approach to analysing the connec-
tions in governance networks between state, non-state and semi-state organisations and institutions 
in regulatory capitalist states, through taking account of  consumer organisations as public repre-
sentatives. This chapter will therefore outline and analyse the theoretical framework and implica-
tions of  the questions that arise from the literature review. In this respect it is a development of  the 
literature review in a relevant frame of  reference. 
This chapter serves three purposes. (1) To show that the theoretical literature, in addition to the 
literature surveyed in the literature review, does not take account of  consumer organisations as an 
instrumental part of  contemporary state structure. (2) To argue that the theory on the regulatory 
state, in not taking account of  civil society interests, has not confronted the deeply political nature 
of  the regulatory process, which some governance network theory does. (3) And also to argue that 
in trying to understand the place of  consumer organisations as a political actor, we need to focus 
on the discourses surrounding their inclusion, and perceived influence, as this can tell us a great 
deal about their role. In this respect together GN, PN, regulatory state theory, and constructivist in-
stitutionalist theory can help us to think about how the problem is framed, but can simultaneously 
be developed further through this investigation. 
This chapter will also develop the argument that consumer organisations matter to us as politi-
cal analysts as they form a locus of  contestation between markets, states and civil society. In this 
respect they can act as a litmus test on contemporary institutional change where the debates sur-
round the extent of  state power in markets. It specifically argues, in agreement with Davis (2011), 
that existing theories of  the developments of  the democratic states, that utilise concepts such as 
‘governance’ and ‘networks’, are part of  the ‘neoliberal struggle’, about ‘...transforming and enroll-
ing civil society, attempting to cultivate the connectionist ethos’ (Davies, 2011, p.151). Through 
taking account of  consumer organisations it will be possible to assess the extent to which the state 
is developing in this respect. However, the bodies of  theory brought together here each, on their 
own, possesses important insights yet are unable to adequately take account of  consumer organisa-
tions. Together, however, it is possible to develop a theoretical framework that we can use to ana-
lyse the empirical phenomenon of  consumer organisations as a core constituent of  contemporary 
capitalist states. 
In short, the theory on the regulatory state develops an account of  the state where the regula-
tion of  markets as a policy paradigm dominates over more traditional tax and spend issues. This 
links into policy network analysis and governance network theory that assess, in different ways, the 
degree to which the business of  governing is now done through a complex and diffuse network of  
organisations and institutions; that ‘call into question the monopoly of  state bodies over the policy-
making process.’ (Blanco, et al. 2011, p.304) These theoretical bodies can then be viewed through 
the lens of  constructivist institutionalism that focuses on ideas and ideologies as keys to under-
standing the process of  institutional change in a period of  disequilibrium (Hay, 2006a, p.59-60). The 
three elements are all essential: The regulatory state theory needs to be assessed in terms of  con-
sumer representation as its principal function is intended to be of  benefit to consumers. It is also 
a valuable way of  conceiving of  the changing nature of  the state in western national and supra-
national bodies. The network analysis approaches, both policy network approach and the govern-
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ance network approach, are concerned with the connections forged in the process of  government, 
and how institutions and organisations are to a greater or lesser degree reliant upon each other in 
the policy process. The place of  consumer organisations in these networks, and the institutionalisa-
tion of  consumer organisations into the state, therefore demands investigation. It is in using these 
theoretical tools, that we can also assess their deficiencies in terms of  how well they take account of  
the particular empirical phenomenon that this research is concerned with. 
This chapter will then lead into the methodology chapter which will outline in greater detail the 
particular methodological, and epistemological, distinctions of  this research. Previously the litera-
ture review has covered various scholarly approaches to understanding the relationship between 
interest organisations and the state, and the political context in which this has taken place. This 
chapter will now use three particular theoretical approaches; theory on the regulatory state, theory 
on governance networks and constructivist institutionalist theory, as a framework to analyse con-
sumer organisations in light of  the context presented in the literature review. This chapter outlines 
the theoretical frame of  reference; the limits of  the investigative strategy. The methods chapter will 
then outline the particular methodological approach taken in order to conduct an empirical analy-
sis of  the phenomenon on consumer organisations. This will principally consist of  elite interviews, 
in both the UK and Norway, on which a discourse analysis will be used through a qualitative inter-
pretive frame.
3.2 Reforming for Consumers: Understanding the State and the Place of 
Consumers 
This section will outline the theory on the state whilst taking into account consumers. It will draw 
out how consumers fit into the changing nature of  the state, and will suggest that the theory has 
yet to take account of  consumer organisations as an important aspect of  the contemporary state 
and processes of  governance. This research is not concerned with the state as an actor in interna-
tional relations but is concerned with the state as a domestic actor through a set of  institutions. It 
is therefore focused solely on understanding the characteristics of  these institutions. In this respect, 
the analysis of  consumer organisations and their relationship with the state is used as a vehicle with 
which to better understanding the contours of  the state. The primary concern of  the investigation 
is the consumer organisations, but this will be able to tell about broader developments of  the state. 
This will lead me to a more specific discussion of  regulatory state theory. 
As Hilton (2009) acknowledges, in his study of  consumer organisations, consumers have been 
of  central importance to the ways states have evolved over the last half  century: ‘...it seemed that 
the expansion of  consumption and the promotion of  consumer society  to everybody were defining 
features of  the role of  the modern state.’ (Hilton, 2009, p.9) Various policy agendas throughout the 
1960s and 1970s sought to provide a more stable consumer economy, and sought to democratise 
the consumption of  goods and services. This is also highlighted by the growth in consumer protec-
tion measures over this period. In Germany consumer protection legislation went from 25 laws im-
plemented between 1945 and 1970, to 338 between 1970 and 1978, and in France there were only 
37 laws and ministerial decrees before 1970, and 94 by 1978 (Trumball, 2006). The UK and the 
US also saw numerous major laws relating to consumer protection implemented during the 1960s 
and 1970s that applied to a variety of  sectors (Hilton, 2009, p.52). However it was with the growth 
of  neoliberalism in the US and UK during the 1980s that were to have the most profound effect in 
how consumers as targets of  legislative reform were addressed, and which this thesis argues under-
pins the continuing relationship between consumer organisations and states generally, for better or 
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worse. 
There was a change in the ideological framing of  consumers, from a more social democrat force 
concerned with issues of  access to a more neoliberal casting concerned more with choice, sovereignty 
and better functioning of  markets. The question for my research is how has the relationship be-
tween consumer organisations and the state changed alongside the changing public policy para-
digm, and how has this impacted on the extent to which consumer organisations are institutional-
ised, are an effective counter-balance to industry and regulatory pressure, and the extent to which 
they are perceived to have an impact.
The turn toward greater economic liberalism positioned the market as the best way in which 
to allocate resources. The intention being to create a better climate for business which simultane-
ously benefits consumers with lower prices and greater choice. In this respect consumers are seen 
as the ‘caretakers’ of  these reforms as consumers’ individual economic decisions police markets. 
However, it was in the area of  public policy where the debate around the role of  consumers be-
came most contentious. These developments involved the emergence of  the amalgam identity, the 
‘citizen-consumer’, which became an important part of  further reforms by New Labour after 1997 
(Clarke et al., 2007). The citizen-consumer identity is an important element in NPM and has been 
addressed elsewhere (Aberbach and Christensen, 2005), and will be analysed in greater detail later 
as part of  the more normative debate on the adequacy of  consumer representation as a primary 
focus for reform. It is claimed to have been an instrumental part of  how public policy has devel-
oped over the past few decades. Essentially if  public services follow market mechanisms and appeal 
to consumer sovereignty then citizens will more likely get what they want, be it more trains on time, 
or reduced hospital waiting lists. But what is important here is that these particular developments 
related to the policy process, have occurred alongside, and in connection to, how states are organ-
ised and function. This has been particularly acute in the UK, but is visible in other less market-
orientated states also. It is one intention of  this research to connect this more descriptive investiga-
tion of  the role of  consumer organisations in the policy process with more normative questions as 
to whether these groups should represent individuals in policy-making.
The role of  consumer organisations therefore needs to be considered in this context, and their 
place in the architecture of  the regulatory state examined with due reference to the politics of  the 
state. Analysing the role of  consumer organisations enables us to have a clearer picture of  the way 
in which states have changed in relation to policy reform, as they have been involved in policy 
making and regulation in, it is argued, an a-typical way. Consumer organisations are given a rela-
tively privileged position in capitalist states, both liberal and social democratic, in respect of  other 
civil society interests, yet still remain somewhat of  policy ‘small fry’ (Page, 1999) against established 
institutions and business. 
This chapter will now move to consider broader theory and literature on the state before mov-
ing to assess what has come to be known as the regulatory state specifically. The literature can be 
split into three broad camps: the retreatist view, the state-centric view and the state-in-transforma-
tion view. There has been considerable work on how the state has become subordinate to a variety 
of  global processes, and this is leading, and in some cases has led, to seriously under-mining of  
the power and autonomy of  states. This is mirrored by those who consider the state to be even 
more important than ever, taking into consideration recent events around the financial crisis as key 
examples of  how states are the fundamental units of  international and national politics (Schmitt, 
2009). The third perspective takes a more nuanced approach, arguing that the state is changing 
and adapting as a result of  global pressures, but still remains an important unit of  analysis. Most 
individuals, as Sørensen (2006, p.191) says, would consider themselves to be transformationalists, ‘but 
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that the devil is in the detail’. It is in this frame that this thesis wishes to address the state in rela-
tion to consumer organisations. As part of  this transformation is the relationship between state and 
markets, and it is this which the regulatory state analysis is primarily concerned with and which 
an investigation of  consumer organisations can shed light upon. In addition, understanding the 
place of  NGOs and other semi-state organisations within the regulatory and governance process is 
crucial to understanding how states have evolved both theoretically and empirically. This is why it 
is important to utilise network theory, both PN and GN approaches. 
‘The State’ as Flinders (2006) suggests is ‘...arguably an unhelpful and misleading concept in 
that it suggests a stability and homogeneity that simply does not exist.’ (2006, p.244) This is what 
will be brought out here. That although elements of  the state remain somewhat constant, there is 
much that is in flux, and the case of  consumer organisations is argued to highlight this ambiguity 
and complexity well. It is in this respect that consumer organisations could well be seen to mitigate 
the ‘legitimacy gap’ that occurs when the primary mode of  governance is carried out by regula-
tory authorities and not public representatives. They also enable civil servants to carry out regula-
tion with a better grasp of  consumers concerns than they would otherwise have. In this way they 
could be seen as a ‘go-between’ for policy makers that confer both greater legitimacy on regula-
tory and policy proposals whilst simultaneously giving them useful information on various sector 
specific concerns and technical detail. They also fit into overarching neoliberal frame – consumer 
sovereignty is still paramount with the addition that some consumers need a leg-up (provided by 
consumer organisations). They could be seen to provide an ‘adapted rationality’ that mitigates 
potential market failures. However, this concern is couched in the language of  neoliberalism that 
to some undermines the relationship between the citizen and the state. A relationship that should 
be determined by a broader understanding of  what it means to be a citizen instead of  the rather 
narrow identity of  being a consumer. This is part of  the normative debate around consumer rep-
resentation that will be considered later in this chapter. What is important to address now is how 
theories of  the state have, or have not, taken into account the consumer as a focus of  policy. The 
normative debate on whether this is a sufficient focus or not must then come later. 
In theory the regulatory state is argued to be of  benefit principally to consumers, in fact its 
primary motivation is to enable consumers a better deal, as it does not dictate the provision of  
services, but supports a framework in which private sources can provide goods and services, and 
consumers can then use their ability to choose to distinguish between worthy and unworthy pro-
viders. Consumers in this respect have become the focus of  much reform in public administration 
and policy.  The various developments in NPM, and in neoliberalism more broadly, has brought 
the consumer to the fore in terms of  political reform. There have also been calls towards ‘co-pro-
duction’, in which public services are delivered together with the input of  consumers, theoretically 
enabling a better targeted and in the end more efficient service. This has been championed by 
social-democrats as a way in which citizens are involved in the policy process in broader terms that 
merely consumers (Leadbeater, 2004, p.23). As Flinders says regarding the tensions between the 
institutions of  the state with regard to the transformations taking place, specifically with regard to 
the ‘connections’ between institutions, and with the public ‘out there’:
...the state is a rapidly evolving organism within which a severe tension exists between the centrifugal 
pressures of  management reform and the centripetal logic of  political control....the relationship 
between state structures and democratic frameworks are becoming more opaque and this risk of  
disconnectedness becomes more pressing. (Flinders, 2006, p.246)
With regard to the consumer becoming an important locus of  reform, Hilton (2009) importantly 
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notes that this was by no means just a phenomenon of  capitalist states, but of  planned economies 
too. The consumer became a powerful force in regard to the demand of  particular goods and ser-
vices, therefore consumer organisations became an important mediator between the mass of  con-
sumers ‘out there’, and the institutions of  the state.  This most importantly concerned departments 
and regulators tasked with administering particular markets and industries which have significant 
importance to citizens like the media, energy, food and telecommunications. 
This section has outlined how consumers have fitted into understandings of  the state and public 
administration. They have, by and large, been seen as individuals at the end of  the line – they are 
the ultimate recipients of  the goods or services, and will, in the neoliberal ideal, police the mar-
ket in order to ensure maximum efficiency. However, as we are aware there is significant debate 
about the usefulness of  using consumers as targets of  reform, as in the neoclassical sense at least, 
consumers are seen in a rather narrow and individualised light. The next section will outline the 
specifics of  the regulatory state thesis, and will highlight how consumers have been largely left out 
when it comes to the theory. It is not here consumers as the end focus that I am concerned with 
but how consumers are represented in the architecture of  the regulatory state; how they are part 
of  the regulatory state. However the political context, where consumers are seen as the necessary 
beneficiaries of  reform, is crucial. This is the intention of  this thesis: to take account of  consumer 
organisations as part of  the structure of  the regulatory state that sees consumers as the fundamen-
tal recipients of  policy reform.  
3.3 Consumers and the Regulatory State
This section will consider how the regulatory state as understood by both Majone (1994; 1997) 
in its European form, and Moran (2002; 2003) in its British form, is concerned with consumers, 
and by extension consumer organisations as a component of  the contemporary state. It will assess 
how their analysis has in fact left out an important element of  the regulatory state’s constellation; 
that of  the representation of  consumers by particular organisations. It will attempt to show how 
this is important in our understanding of  how the regulatory state functions by acknowledging 
work in governance network analysis. Simply put, the demise of  the involved state at the hands 
of  particular reforms gave birth to the regulatory state where markets would be administered by 
devolved agencies. These are in turn part of  a broader policy and governance network. This has 
involved the inclusion of  consumer organisations as checks on market failures in the form of  super 
complainants in the UK, but also as ways to derive legitimacy and receive technical information 
through consultation and other formal and informal processes (that together form the governance 
network). Consumer organisations have played an integral part in advisory forums, as consultees 
and in the various sector specific consumer expert panels. Although consumer organisations have 
been seen as generally outsiders to the policy process (Grant, 1989), and may consider themselves 
to be peripheral to policy process, it is argued here that they play a key role. In terms of  their status 
as organisations they are very much part of  the broader structure of  the state, especially when tak-
ing them into account through governance network theory.
I will now move to discuss the particularities of  the regulatory state, and how it has evolved both 
as a conceptual lens and as an institutional structure. The literature on regulation is vast, as Moran 
(2002) notes, and the politics of  regulation complex. So what this section focuses on is: what is it 
that we understand the regulatory state to be, how do consumer organisations fit into this under-
standing? But crucially always bearing in mind the central question of  whether they matter to the 
policy process? 
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The regulatory state is a label that has come to bring together the variety of  transformations 
that have occurred in governments across the capitalist world (Moran, 2002). It is not a catch-all, 
but a catch-much term. Its main aim is to try and take account of  the way in which states have 
evolved to adapt to processes of  governance. The theories are concerned with how regulatory 
agencies have grown to be fundamental in the process of  governance, and the important role put 
upon regulation as the way in which policy goals of  various kinds are achieved. Majone (1996), as 
Moran acknowledges, virtually invented the idea of  the EU as a regulatory state, and focused on 
three elements of  the modern state: ‘...redistribution; stabilization (for example, in the form as-
sociated with Keynesianism); and regulation (meaning promoting efficiency by remedying market 
failure). The rise of  the regulatory state consists of  the rise of  this third function at the expense 
of  the other two.’ (Moran, 2002, p.402) It is this trade-off  that concerns us, and why the idea of  
the regulatory state with regard to consumer organisations and representation is so relevant. How 
have consumer organisations played a part in a state that regulates more in a policy paradigm that 
is concerned with consumer sovereignty? How have citizens, as consumers, been represented in 
these processes? As it is clear to see, the regulatory state sits in stark contrast to the welfare state, as 
Mabbett points out: 
The paradigmatic regulatory type of  policy is market coordination, and its type of  politics 
is nonmajoritarian, technical and supranational. The welfare state has redistribution as its 
paradigmatic type of  policy, and the dominant type of  politics is majoritarian, party-political and 
national. (Mabbett, 2011, p.1) 
This is of  significant interest, as we need to understand whether it is conceivable that consumer 
welfare is maintained with the inclusion of  consumer organisations into the policy process. Or 
whether or not they play a different role in a regulatory state like the UK than in a traditional wel-
fare state like Norway. This has both interesting theoretical and empirical dimensions. The theory 
of  the regulatory state idealises the type. It proposes how a particular type of  state has come into 
existence, both in the form of  the EU (Majone, 1997), and in Britain (Moran, 2003). However, in 
Britain in particular, the welfare state has a long history, and although diminished, still exists to 
some considerable degree. In this respect consumer organisations can be seen as part of  the wel-
fare state, being conceived in a time of  social democratic reforms of  the 1950’s. They have man-
aged to survive into being a constituent of  the regulatory state although this position has been chal-
lenged by the reforms of  consumer representation and advocacy at the hands of  the Department 
for Business, Innovations and Skills14.
The development of  the regulatory state, and the appeals to civil society groups, are two dis-
tinct elements in the ‘governance’ turn, both at national and supra-national level. Which is why 
there are considerable connections between the understanding of  the regulatory state, and what 
will be discussed below with regard to policy and governance network analysis. This is the con-
nection being made in this chapter. The characteristics of  the regulatory state illustrate some of  
the developments of  capitalist states in terms of  their function, but do not make sense of  some of  
the complexity in intermediation that the network approaches do. Utilising them together we are 
14 Current (2012) BIS consultation on the future of  consumer empowerment and advocacy which has sought to rebuilt the 
‘consumer landscape’ in the UK. This will mean the closure of  Consumer Focus and a concentration on Citizens Advice, it 
will be the new Regulated Industries Unit that will take all the advocacy work on particular industrial regulation.
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able to describe a state which is moving to being more concerned with regulation, and using more 
technocratic and de-politicised methods, whilst at the same time becoming reliant upon various 
networks that have developed around particular sectoral and policy issues. Consumer organisations 
fit here as an empirical phenomenon that are not tackled by the literature. They are somewhat a 
relic of  the social democratic state that has managed to be repositioned in terms of  competition 
and choice under a more neoliberal guise. 
The difference between the EU as a regulatory state and the British regulatory state is that 
the EU can only be described in terms of  its regulative and enforcement capacity – not by tradi-
tional command and control measures, especially taxing and spending. This Britain still does, even 
though the trend maybe toward becoming a regulatory state. In this respect consumer organisa-
tions might play a key role as representatives of  civil society that have welfare concerns, enabling a 
smoother transition to a more pure form of  the regulatory state. 
However, developments of  the regultory state are not necessarily synonymous with develop-
ments in neoliberalism, and it is claimed should be more accurately called ‘regulatory capitalism’ 
(Braithwaite, 2005). As Braithwaite suggests of  states in this regard: ‘They bake cakes, slice them, 
and proffer pieces as inducements to steer events.’ (2005, p.1) But neoliberalism as a term helps 
us to appreciate the ideological dimension of  practical policy initiatives. Here ‘regulatory capital-
ist state’ is little different from a ‘neoliberal state’ in this respect; they are states that steer markets. 
What needs to be better understood is how the various formulations of  the state are born out 
empirically, and what this means for consumer representation, as it is consumers (who are citizens) 
that are the recipients of  the outcomes of  these events. This is important as in this new formula-
tion of  states it is consumers that become both the focus and the beneficiary of  the developments 
(Aberbach and Christiensen, 2005). The way in which institutions are arranged in policy networks 
and governance networks, in respect of  consumer issues and concerns, is therefore of  interest when 
wanting to understand how consumers are actually being represented in the formal, and informal, 
processes of  governance. This also shows the complexity  and contextual nature of  capitalist states’ 
development. This matters for a variety of  reasons, both empirical and normative, and this is what 
this research is concerned with; what are the particularities of  institutional arrangements in terms 
of  consumer organisations and consumer representation?
The idea is that through the logic of  the market the state would be freed from responsibilities 
that it was never able to fulfil, and would reduce government failure simultaneously. This is a well-
trodden neoliberal argument against state intervention, and one which according to many (Harvey, 
2005) dominates as the policy paradigm today, even after the 2008-2009 crisis (Crouch, 2011), both 
ideologically and in practice (albeit to differing degrees (Simpson, 2008)). This policy paradigm is 
bound to understandings of  the regulatory state, even though there are discussions of  a neoliberal 
state (Plant, 2010), as these conceptions often exist in parallel depending on the particular charac-
teristic being discussed. Here it is how the state functions as a regulator of  markets, where markets 
play an increasingly dominant role, but which takes place in a broader political context where the 
regulation is conducted on particular terms. These demand that the state acknowledges the place 
of  producer groups (both business and labour), but also that of  consumers. Traditional under-
standings of  the state with regard to interests have been broadly divided into pluralist and corpo-
ratist conceptions (Truman, 1951), but have all been concerned with the ‘iron triangle’ between 
states, labour and employers. This leaves out consumers, who are seen as having an increasingly 
important role in the formulation of  regulation, at the hands of  various policy and governance net-
works, within the context of  neoliberal regulatory state. As has been suggested, these theories were 
updated to take account of  the empirically suspect stylisation of  the theories into neo-pluralism 
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and neo-corporatism. They told a similar story but acknowledged that some interests were more 
equal than others, mainly that of  business in pluralist democracies and that of  labour in corpo-
ratist ones (Lindblom, 1977). However, the literature tends to focus on consumers as active only 
within-markets, and what is of  interest here is how their role outside of  markets, as constituents of  the 
state, and in this respect they have not really seen much analysis at all. This is especially important 
if  we consider the broader notion from Grant (2005) that we are seeing a shift in politics (both 
empirically and theoretically) away from capital vs. labour, to producer (both capital and labour) 
vs. consumer, or a situation in which these interests are triangulated (Crouch, 2011), which also 
reflects the triangulation of  politics generally away from state versus market, to state versus market 
versus corporation (Crouch, 2011). It is in this respect that civil society becomes such an important 
element. Consumer organisations are not, in this regard, taken account of  in understandings of  
the regulatory state.
As an empirical phenomenon the regulatory state is tied to the politics towards the state that has 
been evident in most countries as a result of  neoliberal ideology. This is the political context of  the 
regulatory state. Moran (2002) does acknowledge that in the case of  the UK the idea of  the regula-
tory state cannot be divorced from the developments of  NPM (2002, p. 404), but says that this does 
not mean that regulation was absent from Britain before the Thatcher years. The UK has had a 
long tradition of  regulatory practice in various sectors, and has had a culture of  self-regulation in 
many too which has had significant problems: ‘much of  this growth of  self-regulation turned on 
appropriating public authority while evading mechanisms of  accountability for the exercise of  that 
authority.’ (Moran, 2002, p.405) The regulatory state is now regarded as a key determinant in the 
evolution of  capitalist states across the world (Moran, 2002). Whether this is an empirical phenom-
enon or merely theoretical is as yet unresolved, even though analysis continues to exist for both 
camps. Majone’s original conception of  the regulatory state, as witnessed in European states, is a 
state that has shifted from being concerned with taxing and spending to rule making, the second 
at the expense of  the first (Majone, 1997). It is important to keep this in mind as understandings 
of  the regulatory state have become increasingly complex, but still orbit around this central prem-
ise. That there is something that has changed in the way states behave that is less interventionist 
and reactionary, more hands-off, allowing circumstances to evolve under set conditions where 
regulatory authorities unsure that the limits are upheld. This is the strict definition of  the regula-
tory state, which is often found in various guises and to differing degrees. The regulatory state is 
therefore more of  a conceptual lens (Humphreys and Stimpson, 2008), useful in understanding 
some of  the broader developments in processes of  governance with regard to how states function 
specifically. It can therefore be seen as a characteristic of  processes of  governance in that they are 
principally concerned with devolution of  power away from central government, and with form-
ing networks with civil society organisations. Do consumer organisations therefore matter to these 
developments? Why do we see them as included as part of  many policy networks, yet they often 
seem themselves as peripheral?
What is particular about the institutional design of  regulatory states is the devolution of  power 
to regulatory agencies, which are in turn responsible for upholding the rules set out by the legisla-
ture. This is a fundamental part of  the move to a regulatory state. The increasing use of  what have 
come to be known as ‘Quangos’ (Quasi Autonomous Non-Governmental Organisations) is also 
part of  this development. These bodies range in their distance (determined by ‘arm’s-lengthness’) 
from the central ministry or department, but who are given particular roles and responsibilities 
with regard to the upholding of  rules and regulations. Quangos also play a crucial part in the 
policy process when determining policy and the implementation of  regulation. 
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However, the regulatory state is in some corners now thought to be in crisis itself. Lodge and 
Wegrich (2010) suggest that the financial crisis, although seeing a reliance on the state to sure up 
problems of  deregulation, has been weakened into a ‘naked state’ – unable to call upon previous 
interventionist authority due to the weakening to its position as a regulatory state. 
What is important to appreciate here is that a variety of  interest groups are still involved in the 
increasingly complex policy process under an evolving regulatory state. It is also important not to 
divorce these developments from the evolving ‘governance paradigm’ and neoliberal ideology. The 
emergence of  the regulatory state has occurred in line with policies of  DLP, where regulators are 
tasked with overseeing deregulation, as in the case of  Ofcom. This particular regulator was cre-
ated by bringing together various authorities under one name, as part of  the Communications Act 
2003. As Smith says, the creation of  Ofcom was: ‘...[a shift] away from the allocation of  relatively 
scarce spectrum to achieve public service objectives and towards the control of  market power to 
facilitate free market competition,’ (Smith, 2006, p.929). This also reflects the ‘paradigm shift’ of  
media regulation as suggested by Van Cuilenburg and McQuail: ‘The emerging policy paradigm 
for media and communications is mainly driven by an economic and technological logic, although 
it retains certain normative elements.’ (Van Cuilenburg and McQuail, 2003, p.198) This is a shift 
in policy that has dominated the last few decades, and continues to do so. What is important is 
that regulators, and by extension the regulatory state, are integral to this, as is the role of  consum-
ers and therefore consumer organisations. Consumers become the way in which the markets are 
policed in terms of  public interest without the moralising overtones of  government, if  it sells then 
it works and consumer welfare is maximised. This neoliberal tenet underpins these policy develop-
ments, including the emergence of  the regulatory state.
In a specific UK context much of  these developments can be seen in the creation of  the media 
regulatory Ofcom. Ofcom has as its mandate to regulate in the interests of  ‘consumers and citi-
zens’, as did Ofgem, the energy regulator. But both have been criticised for a lack of  attention to 
the needs and wishes of  consumers: ‘OFTEL, too, under its various Director Generals (DGs) could 
be seen in general to be on the side of  the consumer. In spite of  this in the first five to ten years af-
ter privatization it was not apparent that the consumer’s lot was improving in terms of  lower prices 
or better standards of  service.’ (Young, 2001, p.55) Young also suggests that privatisation has been 
of  benefit to consumer organisations, and by logical extension consumers. This is of  significant 
interest, as it is the suggestion that consumer organisations have become more relevant with DLP as 
consumers are the target interest: 
Under nationalization, consumer bodies were weak and had little influence (Ogden, 1997, p. 535).  
Those established at privatization developed a much stronger role, each with its own individual  
structure and modus operandi. Other organizations such as the PUAF, NCC, CA and the National  
Association of  Citizens Advice Bureaux (NACAB) have also been instrumental, through lobbying  
parliament, Whitehall and the regulatory offices in gaining improvements for all categories of   
customers. (Young, 2001, p.64) 
However, the complexity of  the regulatory environment is not given justice by simple calls about 
it all being neoliberal, and that consumer organisations have had across the board success. It is 
certainly the case that this particular ideology has driven much of  the changes we have witnessed, 
but the place of  the public interest is still implicit in the need to regulate markets in consumers’ in-
terests, even though the particular discursive language may have changed. This is where consumer 
organisations become relevant. They can be seen as potential mitigators of  market failure – they 
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represent consumers outside of  markets and are thus called upon by policy makers as important 
consultees. This will be discussed in greater detail in the next section, but suffice to say that the ar-
gument here is that consumer organisations play a key role in the apparatus of  the regulatory state 
but their specific impact is not considerable. 
This section has outlined the main tenets of  regulatory state theory, and how this body of  theo-
ry has, to a greater or lesser degree, been concerned with consumer organisations and representa-
tion more generally. What has been argued is that although the theory on the regulatory state, as a 
way of  conceiving of  contemporary capitalist states, is a useful one, it does not adequately account 
for consumer representation. It is useful as it enables a reasonably accurate understanding of  the 
state in a process of  transformation, as an entity that exists primarily to ensure the proper function-
ing of  markets. This encapsulates both ideas around regulatory capitalism but also more pejorative 
ideas on the neoliberal state. It is also useful to my research as it is essentially concerned with the 
politics of  regulation and the state, the connections that exist between institutions and organisa-
tions. This is where network analysis, both policy network and governance network approaches, 
come in and what will now be discussed.
3.4 Network Theory – Principals, Policies and Governance
This section will outline the current thinking on networks in relation to governance and the state. It 
will show how the concept of  the network has numerous dimensions, both descriptive and pre-
scriptive, and will set out how the organisation of  government and the state is now understood in 
terms of  ‘networks’. This forms the second part of  the theory chapter and develops some of  the 
aspects discussed previously in relation to the regulatory state, most importantly how the state has 
devolved power to regulatory agencies, and how these agencies have sought to include the interests 
of  civil society. It specifically looks at how these theoretical bodies are connected, in that they both 
seek to take account of  contemporary changes in state organisation, but also what they might have 
missed empirically; how consumers are represented in the process. First this section will consider 
the broader thinking on networks as a contemporary paradigm, it will then move to discuss the two 
variants of  network analysis in political science: policy network theory and governance network 
theory. It will then finish by focusing on how governance network theory can help to form a foun-
dation for this research by adapting the elements of  the regulatory state theory and using them in 
combination to take account of  consumer organisations at part of  the structure of  the contempo-
rary capitalist state.  
However, before we delve into the particularities of  network theory, there will be a short over-
view of  some Marxist theory of  the state. This is done in order to try and overcome some of  the 
dichotomies that exist in the theory between hierarchy and network, ideational and material inter-
ests, and empirically between state and market, labour and capital and consumer and producer. 
This is important as network theories, although describing some of  the processes of  governance, 
do not outline the social and political context as Marxist analysis does. In trying to understand 
consumer organisations and their place in the policy process (as a meeting point between the state, 
civil society and the market) it is necessary to take account of  the social political context, which 
Marxist analysis can help to do. As Hay suggests, in relation to Jessop’s work: ‘All social and politi-
cal change occurs through strategic interaction as strategies collide with and impinge upon the 
structured terrain of  the strategic context within which they are formulated.’ (Hay, 2006b, p.75) In 
this respect Marxist accounts take seriously the particular vested interests, both class and capital re-
lated, in the production and reproduction of  the state in a capitalist society. This is not to say that 
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in this research the argument essentially boils down to the economic structures alone, that is what 
is explicitly not being said, but that to fully understand the policy process today we need to both take 
account of  the interconnections and relationships between institutions and organisations (network 
approach) and the political economy of  the policy process including the ideological and material 
dimensions (Marxist approach). 
3.5 Marxist Understanding of the State – Regulating in the Capitalists’ 
Interest?
In this respect, where Marxist theories of  the state largely concern simplistic (and somewhat con-
spiratorial) aspects of  class and the state as the ‘ideal collective capitalist’ (Altvater, 1973), network 
theory can better help us understand the complexity of  the issues at stake. That is not to say that 
Marxist theory has nothing to say but that some of  its conclusions beg serious questions and it does 
not go into enough detail. Here governance and network theory can help us, as it enables a greater 
appreciation for the contours of  the state, and here that includes the place of  consumer organisa-
tions in the policy process. It is not enough to simply say that it’s all the capitalists’ fault: (a) capital-
ism is much more complicated than that, and (b) that does not really tell us anything anyway. But 
as Hay suggests: ‘The state thus emerges as a nodal point in the network of  power relations that 
characterizes contemporary capitalist societies and hence, a key focus of  Marxist attention,’ (Hay, 
2006b, p.63) and that: ‘The state presents an uneven playing field whose complex contours favour 
certain strategies (and hence certain actors) over others.’ (p.75) 
It is in this that it is possible to see the advantages of  combining governance network analy-
sis with a Marxist approach, as we are then able to take account of  the relative power relations 
between actors in a particular network and how the particular social and political context may 
impact upon this. In relation to the cases examined in this investigation, the UK and Norway have 
distinct polities (pluralist and neo-corporatist), capitalist systems (liberal market and co-ordinated 
market) and ideology (neo-liberal and social-democrat), but share similarities in various institutions; 
like the consumer organisations which are non-governmental bodies, and regulatory bodies, al-
though they are different as will be shown later in the empirical and analysis chapters. It is the way 
that these institutions are arranged (the character of  the networks) and the place of  the consumer 
organisations in these networks that is of  interest, in addition to the various social and political 
conditions in which these networks exist. To understand whether consumer organisations matter in 
the contemporary policy process we need to understand where power lies in regulatory capitalist 
states, and to do that we need to have a detailed and in-depth understanding of  the character and 
contingent contexts of  governance networks. In the next section this chapter will outline and detail 
how governance network theory can help us, in combination with aspects of  Marxist state theory, 
in understanding the particularities and details of  the contours of  capitalist states.
Additionally, although the issues concerning the role and place of  consumer organisations in 
contemporary policy making and regulation is largely an empirical concern, there is also a norma-
tive dimension. Marxist theory, that of  considering the importance of  the political economy of  
policy making in relation to the reproduction of  capital and the structure of  the state, can also help 
in trying to understand the normative dimensions of  consumer organisation inclusion. Consumer 
organisations, and their place in the policy and governance networks of  the state, can in this re-
spect help us to better understand the politics of  policy making which include the reproduction and 
contestation of  a particular neo-liberal hegemony, something that will be considered in the empiri-
cal analysis chapter. They also demand that we ask questions such as: are consumer organisations 
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part of  the state or part of  civil society? And as a consequence do they empower or disempower 
citizens and consumers? Although not a primary focus of  this investigation, these questions will be 
considered in the conclusion chapter.
However, now we will move to consider governance network theory and its relevance to this 
research. This section of  the chapter will start by considering the rise of  network analysis as a 
paradigm in social and political theory generally. It will follow by considering how governance net-
work theory differs from the policy network approach. The section will then argue that governance 
network theory can benefit, as suggested, from Marxist understandings of  the state in trying to 
take account of  the complexity of  contemporary policy process. It will then conclude by suggesting 
that together regulatory state theory, governance network theory and Marxist underpinning can 
combine to provide a forceful and compelling framework to understanding the role of  consumer 
organisations. Furthermore, this can help us to better appreciate the characteristics of  contempo-
rary capitalism and the relationship between states, markets and civil society. 
3.6 Understanding Networks
The use of  networks, in both the understanding of  contemporary social and political phenom-
ena, and in practical application as an organisational mode, is paradigmatic. The analogy of  ‘the 
network’ is used to describe both the meta-level social processes (Castells, 1996) and the micro-
level processes like those illustrated by social networking technologies. What is important to note is 
that the idea of   ‘the network’, that is a de-centred and nodal form of  organisation with multiple 
connections between constituting parts, is both a way of  understanding social phenomena and an 
organisational practice. Furthermore it has both descriptive and normative dimensions. It has also 
been argued to be ideological in its own right (Deleuze and Guttari, 1988; Hiltz and Turoff, 1993) 
evidenced in ideas  as diverse as free-market globalisation and the progressive dimensions of  par-
ticular social movements. However, for this research I am concerned with the concept of  the net-
work in policy and governance scenarios as a way of  understanding connections in and between 
institutions of  the state and civil society organisations. This is what is referred to as the meso-level 
(Marsh and Rhodes, 1992) in that it is not concerned with meta-level developments like globalisa-
tion nor urbanisation, nor micro-level concerns like voting behaviour patterns, but is concerned 
with groups and how groups and institutions of  the state intermediate. These are the boundaries 
of  the networks that this research is concerned with. This section will now outline the theory on 
both policy networks and governance networks, and consider how they differ and why governance 
network theory is more relevant here.
3.7 Networks and the Policy Process
The policy network approach, which is both distinct from and which came about prior to govern-
ance network theory, was developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a way of  explaining the 
increasingly complex institutional arrangements and intermediations between interests. It was 
intended to move the debate beyond both the ‘advocacy coalition approach’ (Sabatier, 1987) and 
the concentration on ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas, 1992), and to try and have a more general 
theory on the policy process (Dowding, 1995). All of  these approaches were ultimately concerned 
with getting under the skin of  the ‘policy community’ (Jordan and Richardson, 1979) and trying 
to take account of  the various dimensions that led to policy change; mainly concerning the con-
nections between interest groups and civil servants. These were however largely considered to be 
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concentrated communities, or networks, around specific policy issues. This is where the element of  
‘epistemic community’ is important in taking account of  how various elites with particular knowl-
edge sets congregate around policy issues relevant to their particular specialisation. The ‘policy 
network’ concept then came to be an important way of  describing the various conditions witnessed 
in the policy process, and was loose enough to encompass the variety of  relationship between vari-
ous actors, both institutions and organisations. However, as Dowding pointed out in 1995: ‘Whilst 
the metaphors are heuristically useful, as they have to be if  they are to be metaphors, they are inca-
pable of  explaining transformation.’ (Dowding, 1995, p.139) Whatever the intricacies however the 
‘network metaphor (Dowding, 1995) is a recurring theme in most attempts to analyse or theories 
contemporary governance.’ (Blanco et al., 2011)
Dowding, although largely critical of  theories of  the state, does concede that Marxist theories 
(along with rational choice theories) avoid the problem of  not being generalisable, as they posit 
that it is essentially the same mechanisms which underpin capitalist states. The discussion is then 
about difference in degree rather than kind; it is about the particularities of  capitalist states and 
the various characteristics that determine both the institutional arrangements and intermediations 
with interest organisations. An analysis the role of  consumer organisations can help us to do this, 
and understanding the extent to which they matter can help to better understand where power lies 
in the process. It is in this respect that using a combination of  governance theory, underpinned by 
some observations from a Marxist perspective, can be of  significant benefit. 
The key figure in the development of  the policy network analysis governance network theory is 
R.A.W. Rhodes. His thinking progressed the more contained and policy specific thinking on policy 
networks, to try and take account of  meso-level developments and structures more generally across 
polities. What is essential to make clear, and which Blanco et al. (2011) insist upon, is that these 
approaches, both policy network (PN) and governance network (GN), should not be used inter-
changeably and are distinct: ‘...the PN and GN perspectives should be seen as coexisting, offering 
distinctive interpretations (and research strategies), resonant with – but not dependent upon – any 
particular empirical context’ (Blanco et al., 2011). 
The next section will now directly outline the important aspects of  GN theory, and some of  the 
criticisms. It will show that GN theory provides a framework for understanding how some of  the 
ideological, and ideational, dimensions of  governance impact upon practices and institutions. The 
chapter will then move to consider how a constructivist institutionalist framework can help us in 
trying to better understand these institutional changes and developments. 
3.8 Governance Network Theory 
As said the network metaphor has been adopted in a wide range of  academic disciplines, for both 
descriptive and normative purposes. What needs to be understood here is how a particular form of  
network theory, governance network theory, helps us in understanding some of  the developments 
that have occurred in democratic states. What needs to be made clear is that governance networks 
are in principle a mode of  organising that exists somewhere between neoliberal marketisation in 
line with the ideas of  New Public Management, where private forces and the market take over 
the provision of  public services, and top-down hierarchically controlled state facilitated services. 
Here services are provided, and markets regulated, with the input from a broad range of  actors, 
often called ‘stakeholders’, who are all part of  a governance network. The academic work on these 
forms of  policy making is relatively novel (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007, p.3), but has gained signifi-
cant attention in the area of  public administration. It is also bound with the broader literature on 
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governance in general, in which the literature on the regulatory state also exists. Governance has in 
this respect become an umbrella term for a variety of  phenomenon associated with the changing 
dynamics of  the state in the last four decades. This has become pivotal for contemporary political 
science as a whole range of  phenomena have been attributed to processes in governance; this is ev-
ident in the fact that a two volume encyclopaedia of  governance was published in 2007 (Bevir (ed.), 
2007). Bearing this in mind this investigation wants to focus upon governance networks specifically. 
This is in order to take account of  the intermediation between organisations and institutions as this 
can help in understanding the role of  consumer organisations as a particular political body in the 
process of  policy making and regulation. 
Where the policy network approach can be characterised as being concerned with ‘...how 
policies are really made,’ (Blanco et al., 2011, p. 298, original emphasis) and takes account of  how 
various actors have always come together in ‘policy domain-specific subsystems’ (Blanco et al., 
2011, p. 298), governance network theory is different. GN theory attempts to take into account the 
wider, and more meta-level, developments in society and how traditional bureaucratic government 
is attempting to adapt to these by appealing to both an array actors and shifting norms. These 
norms include both an emphasis on increased legitimacy in policy through a constant deliberative 
engagement with ‘stakeholders’, but also the reduction in hierarchy that is meant to result from the 
development of  the regulatory state. This is supposed to challenge both ‘...the hierarchical forms 
of  governance associated with social democratic welfare states,’ but also importantly ‘...the mar-
ket reforms of  the neo-liberal ‘new public management’’. (Blanco et al., 2011, p. 299) It is in this 
respect seeing consumer organisations as part of  governance networks becomes so interesting, as 
on the face of  it they directly appeal to these developments. They are organisations representing 
individuals, often vulnerable, in particular markets that have seen, or could be seen, to have certain 
failures. But which at the same time conform to a particular ideological emphasis on the primacy 
of  markets as a progressive mode of  organisation. 
Governance network theory is built upon the idea that the state has changed, and is continuing 
to change, moving away from a command and control monolithic entity to conduct itself  through 
the increasing use of  networks, and that much of  these developments have been the result of  neo-
liberal policy practices. Bell and Hindmoor (2009) suggest that the general governance approach is 
‘society-centred’, and that the focus on the ‘hollowing out of  the state’ that has occurred as a result 
of  governments wanting to devolve power, and NGOs and interest groups wanting a greater say, is 
greatly over-stated. This is why this chapter has also looked at the theory of  the state, as the under-
standing of  the regulatory state places some of  these dimensions concerning de-centralisation and 
devolution of  power away from the executive, and governance network theory, as these two dimen-
sions are key in trying to understand the extent to which consumer organisations exist as part of  
this governance network. Is it the case that Bell and Hindmoor are correct and that the state in fact 
plays a far greater role than the general governance literature suggests, and what implications does 
this have for consumer organisations? This will be addressed in the empirical and analysis chapter 
when discussing the question of  the extent to which consumer organisations have been institution-
alised, and the extent to which they are understood to have an impact on policy and regulation. 
What the GN literature does is bring together the broader understanding of  the importance of   
the network metaphor and the argument that we live in a period of  ‘governance not government’, 
in that ‘the cultivation of  networks by policy makers as a preferred paradigm for governance has 
thrown up new phenomena for study.’ (Blanco et al., 2011, p.305) What the theory is trying to take 
account of  is how policy and regulations are made in a period where the state has enabled other 
organisations and institutions to have decision-making power other than the core executive. This 
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is why the regulatory state, as a theoretical frame for understanding the development of  capitalist 
states, is useful, and also why they are brought together here. The regulatory state theory frames 
how we understand developments in governance from a state-centric perspective, and governance 
network theory enables an appreciation of  the connections and relationships built up between 
institutions and organisations.
What is pointed out in the GN literature (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007; Blanco et al., 2011) is 
that governance network theory is concerned with taking account of  the more diffuse and mal-
leable connections and relationships between agents and organisations in the governing process.  
In addition to various formalised procedures, including regulatory forums and consultations with 
stakeholders, other more informal connections between actors emerge. This, in more traditional 
accounts like policy network analysis would be more difficult to pin point as they are not evidenced 
in the formal settings, yet could have significant impact on the nature of  the connections and 
relationships between institutions and organisations. In this way the GN approach acknowledges 
the complexity of  the policy process: ‘...network-based governance is a complex and potentially 
chaotic process in which numerous interests, identities and rationalities fuse and collide.’ (Sørensen 
and Torfing, 2007, p.25) What GN theory does is try to take account of  policy processes that have 
grown up in parallel to the significant changes of  the state, and how public policy is achieved with 
various partnerships between the state and other bodies; private, NGO, charities and semi-state 
NGPBs. What GN literature does is to: ‘...conceive[s] the spread of  networks and partnerships as 
part of  a strategy to open up decision-making processes to interest groups and to citizens them-
selves.’ (Blanco et al., 2011, p.304) This is, on the face of  it, crucial to understanding the role of  
consumer organisations in the policy process and their institutionalisation – they are organisations 
whose sole intention is to represent the interests of  consumers in the decision-making process. 
These developments in governance are seen to be a way to bridge both the gaps in the ‘democratic 
deficit’, that brings decision-making closer to citizens, but also which has a more pragmatic impact 
of  making policies and regulation that actually function in the interests of  those whom it is intend-
ed for. As Sørensen and Torfing also say: ‘The inclusion of  relevant and affected groups and or-
ganisations in governance networks help to overcome problems in terms of  societal fragmentation 
and resistance to policy change, and thus tends to make the governing processes more effective.’ 
(Sørensen and Torfing, 2007, p.4) The extent to which the ‘effectiveness’ can be assessed in prac-
tice is difficult to know; however what can be done is to investigate the extent to which the actors 
involved, both in the organisations representing consumers and in the institutions (regulators and 
government departments), perceive the importance of  the connections with the other, combined 
with the more formal institutionalisation of  forums and consultations. In this respect GN theory, 
as outlined here, provides a framework, and background, for which these relationship and connec-
tions can be analysed. However, there are issues which will now be considered before moving on to 
look at constructivist institutionalism that will be the third element in the theoretical framework. 
As outlined above, it is widely acknowledged that the contemporary policy paradigm is one in 
which elements of  what has been termed ‘governance’ feature. The extent to which this is, or is 
not, the case is still contentious, but most literature acknowledges that the moves to decentralise 
the state through various techniques is also bound up with neoliberalism as a policy practice. One 
of  the contentions around governance theory, and governance network theory by extension, is that 
it is itself  ideological. Most importantly, from a constructivist perspective, these theoretical models 
are themselves contributing to and reproducing a particular way of  looking at relationships in the 
policy process. Whether or not the descriptive and normative dimensions can be neatly separated 
when considering a GN approach is contentious. Especially when the ‘governance’ paradigm is 
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argued to have ideological dimensions to it (Davis, 2011). This concurs with more post-structuralist 
analysis that sees theory as a determining practice itself. The argument is that by being confined 
to a particular theoretical position, the researcher is predetermining the outcomes, or at least the 
boundaries of  the outcomes, from the start. This will be considered in more detail in the next 
chapter on methodology, but it is important to take note here of  one of  the criticisms of  govern-
ance theory, that it itself  is ideological. 
Davies, using Marxist and Gramscian perspectives, takes a critical look at governance theory 
in general. He argues that ‘actually existing governance networks appear dysfunctional ...tending 
to replicate practices they were meant to surpass.’ (Davies, 2011, p.101) That instead of  govern-
ance network practices actually enhancing the democratic integrity of  policy making and regula-
tion, they undermine them by re-introducing inequalities and hierarchies. This is made worse 
for the fact that institutionally there is a semblance of  participation where in reality it is limited. 
The elements of  practices of  participation, that have been largely accepted into the rhetoric of  
governance at the highest levels, including in the UK and Norway, have also, Davies argues, been 
part of  the way in which neoliberalism has attempted to co-opt oppositional forces (2011, p.74). 
This also chimes with what Harvey (2005) suggests of  the neoliberal state’s relationship to civil 
society organisations – that they make up the bulk of  contemporary oppositional politics. In this 
way governance networks, Davies argues, have become ‘hegemonic’, and exist in combination 
with a ‘connectionist ideology’, which ‘...lent vision and promise to the global capitalism renais-
sance, transposed by governments into the language of  opportunity and inclusion and strategies for 
cultivating governance networks.’ (Davies, 2011, p.151) What is important about this perspective 
towards the otherwise rather optimistic accounts of  governance network theory, is that it takes a 
critical stance towards the rhetoric about participation and connectivity and asks probing questions 
about the extent to which these processes genuinely transform practices of  government. This inves-
tigation adopts the perspective outlined by Davies, in that although the governance network theory 
provides a framework, as does the theory on the regulatory state, these are not seen as necessarily 
progressive developments but bound up in the ideology of  neoliberalism. In this way analysing the 
connections between organisations and institutions, the institutionalisation of  organisations, and 
how actors within these processes perceive their relationships with other bodies can tell us a great 
deal of  the extent to which this governance process is challenging hierarchical forms of  organisa-
tions or reproducing them.
This section has outlined the theory on governance networks, and shown that there is conten-
tion as to the extent to which these networks exist as a necessarily positive development that some 
commentators might suggest.This chapter has outlined two key aspects of  the theoretical frame-
work through which the analysis of  consumer organisations in policy making and regulation will 
take place: the regulatory state and governance network analysis. The chapter will now outline a 
third aspect, constructivist institutionalism, which will provide a  more epistemological dimension 
to the framework. When investigating both the state and governance networks it is also impor-
tant to frame what the analysis focuses on in understanding institutions. This will be provided by 
constructivist institutionalism which is concerned with the ideas and discourses of  actors in institu-
tions.
3.9 Constructivist Institutionalism
This chapter has so far outlined the theory on both the regulatory state, and governance network 
theory. It has shown that there are key elements of  both of  these theoretical approaches, the in-
creasing importance of  regulators, the encouragement of  civil society participation in the policy 
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process, and the overall move towards ‘governance’ over government. This chapter will now dis-
cuss and outline the third dimension in the theory that guides this thesis, constructivist institution-
alism. This will be done to provide both a framework for what is considered as important in both 
the regulatory state and governance network theory, but also will provide a bridge to the methodo-
logical aspects of  the thesis which will be outlined in the next chapter. This is due to the fact that 
it is the ideas and norms that are framed by broader ideological structures of  the people involved 
in policy making and regulation that this investigation sees as fundamental to an understanding of  
consumer organisations role in policy making and regulation. This is in addition to the fact that 
in investigating consumer organisations, and their relationship to the state, what is being looked 
at is the institutions of  the state and their relationship to each other. This is then combined with 
the more epistemological concern with the role of  ideas, norms and discourses in how institutions 
perceive themselves and others. Therefore a constructivist institutionalist theoretical framework 
makes most sense. In order to investigate these institutions and their relationships to each other, 
the people that make up the institutions need to be asked about how they perceive and understand 
the role of  consumer organisations, which is why elite interviewing is chosen as a research method. 
This will be explained further in the next chapter. Now this chapter will look in greater detail at 
constructivist institutionalism as a way of  understanding institutions and institutional change. 
The concern of  constructivists with the ideational and discursive aspects of  policy making, and 
institutional change, are what this investigation sees as the most interesting phenomenon in un-
derstanding the role of  consumer organisations. The ways in which consumer organisations have 
developed, and how they have come to be institutionalised and part of  the state, lends itself  to be-
ing approached through a constructivist institutionalist frame, as it is the discursive and ideational 
dimensions, evidenced in elite actors thoughts that is argued to be most vital in understanding 
political life more generally. 
Constructivist institutionalism is part of  the body of  theory that makes up ‘new institutional-
ism’. This combines a variety of  perspectives on the study of  institutions – what many see as 
the ‘roots’ of  political science (Guy Peters, 2005, p.1). Other parts of  ‘new institutionalism’ are: 
rational choice institutionalism (RI), that sees institutions made up of  primarily self-interested 
individuals; historical institutionalism (H), that sees institutions being more the product of  a path 
dependant history; and sociological institutionalism (SI), which sees institutions as part of  wider 
society and therefore impacted by it. In terms of  sociological institutionalism this includes values 
and norms held in society, in addition to population ecology models and symbolic dimensions of  
institutions (Guy Peters, 2005). Guy Peters suggests that discursive institutionalism (DI), as a way 
of  understanding institutions through the ‘use of  discourse analysis’ (Guy Peters, 2005, p.115), is 
under the umbrella of  sociological institutionalism as it is essentially targeting values and looking 
to see how they are evidenced in wider discourses. However, others (Hay, 2006a; Schmidt, 2008, 
2012), see both constructivist institutionalism (CI), and discursive institutionalism, as separate 
ways of  analysing institutions as they prioritise the place of  ideas and arguments of  agents above 
merely instrumental motivation (Rational Choice Institutionalism), or path-dependency (Historical 
Institutionalism): ‘...change is seen to reside in the relationship between actors and the context 
in which they find themselves, between institutional ‘‘architects,’’ institutionalized subjects, and 
institutional environments.’ (Hay, 2006, p.64) In this respect this theoretical frame see arguments 
and ideas as of  principle interest in understanding the political institutions that are the focus of  
much political science. Furthermore, it is these ideas that have a reproductive quality: ‘it is not just 
institutions, but the very ideas on which they are predicated and which inform their design and de-
velopment, that exert constraints on political autonomy.’ (Hay, 2006, p.65) It is possible to see then, 
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that although insights from RI, HI and SI are all of  interest, they do not take seriously enough the 
ideas and arguments that have a structuring impact on the institutional contexts. CI and DI do.
Guy Peters (2005) notes that discursive institutionalism shares the concern with ideas that his-
torical institutionalism does, but ‘differs in that it is less concerned with the equilibrium conditions 
that may result from the initial selection of  ideas to guide policy.’ (Guy Peters, 2005, p.115) Bell 
(2011) goes further to suggest that discursive institutionalism, and institutional theory concerned 
with understanding the role of  ideas does not need to be a new, separate, institutionalism, like 
Schmidt suggests, but can be targeted using an adapted version of  historical institutionalism. Bell’s 
argument is that scholars like Hay and Schmidt are ‘over emphasising’ the alleged problems in un-
derstanding institutional change through other new institutionalist perspectives. Bell suggests that 
constructivist institutionalists and discursive institutionalists have returned to a more agency cen-
tred approach, which they originally criticised in the other new institutionalisms. Their idea was to 
bring institutions ‘back-in’, but ‘now run the risk of  taking institutions ‘back out’.’ (Bell, 2011, p.2)
What is clear is that there is contention in the theory on the analysis of  institutions about focus 
– what it is that can best help us to describe institutional change. Despite the calls for construc-
tivist institutionalist approach to be incorporated into the other forms of  new institutionalism, it 
is adopted in this investigation as it is seen to still have significant value in targeting the ideas of  
individuals active in institutions. This is due to the fact that although Bell (2011) has an important 
point about new institutionalism becoming too focused on individuals at the cost of  not taking ac-
count of  the broader structures, the importance of  how elites perceive and understand the rela-
tionships between institutions and their impact on policy and regulation is vital to taking account 
of  the role of  consumer organisations. This is due to the fact that influence is difficult to measure 
objectively, as will be discuss in the methods chapter next, and that actors and organisations that 
are understood to be important in policy making and regulation are re-enforced in that position. 
Although actors’ perceptions, ideas and norms are not everything, the broader structures like ideol-
ogy, organisational culture, and elements of  path-dependence are also important factors, they are 
in the context of  this investigation seen to be most important. This is why constructivist/discursive 
institutionalism is the most suitable theoretical frame for assessing these dimensions, as Schmidt 
says of  discursive institutionalism: ‘Three elements--ideas, discourse, and institutions--all need to 
be considered in terms of  the institutional context.’ (Schmidt, 2012, p.105) 
What this investigation wants to better understand goes above and beyond more material con-
cerns like access to resources, which typically denotes the extent of  institutional leverage. It wants 
to address the important factors in understanding the more intricate questions of  the role that par-
ticular organisations play in particular political context. In this case what is the role of  consumer 
organisations in policy-making and regulation in a neoliberal context, assessed by taking account 
of  individual agents’ motivations, ideas and arguments in a particular structural context. The 
agents are considered important, their discourses providing evidence through which the analysis 
of  broader processes like institutionalisation, influence and intermediation can be achieved. At the 
same time the institutional and structural context is seen as important too – there is a relationship, 
or a feedback, between the agents and the structures that surround them.
3.10 Conclusion
One thing that becomes apparent in the analysis of  the various constituents of  the contemporary 
state is not only the complexity of  the interdependence, but also of  the interconnectedness of  the 
phenomena (Hay, 2010). A discussion of  consumer organisations can quickly become one about 
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regulation, and a discussion on regulation can quickly become one on institutional design and state 
structure. In investigating the role of  consumer organisations it is both impossible and undesir-
able to ignore this complexity as it all matters in our understanding of  contemporary policy mak-
ing and regulation, and capitalism more broadly. How the rules of  the game are developed, and 
who determines the rules, are fundamental questions in an understanding of  contemporary policy 
making and regulation, and in this respect an analysis of  consumer organisations can draw out the 
particular contours and details that elude the more general theory.
What this chapter has shown is that the three core bodies of  theory, regulatory state theory, 
governance network theory and constructivist institutionalism together provide a framework for 
analysing consumer organisations as constituents in contemporary policy making and regulation. 
The theory on the regulatory state (principally Majone, 1994, 1997; Moran, 2002, 2003) pre-
sents a picture of  a state changing in the face of  developments in neoliberalism – De-regulation, 
Liberalisation, and Privatisation (DLP). It is a state which whilst employing regulatory agencies to 
administer particular industries and markets, also demands great inclusion of  civil society organisa-
tions in order to inform regulation and policy. At the same time NGOs and civil society organisa-
tions have proliferated, giving rise to the argument that:
The period in which the neoliberal state has become hegemonic has also been the period in which 
the concept of  civil society – often cast as an entity in opposition to state power – has become 
central to the formulation of  oppositional politics. The Gramscian idea of  the state as a unity of  
political and civil society gives way to the idea of  civil society as a centre for opposition, if  not an 
alternative, to the state. (Harvey, 2005, p.78) 
Therefore the regulatory state theory presents us with a state whose principal concern is with 
ensuring the working of  particular markets through regulation, where legitimacy is gained through 
discussion with civil society.  
In more specific detail, and what the governance network theory approach helps with, is that 
the connections that have come to exist in how this regulatory state has developed can be under-
stood as part of  a broader governance network – where the various institutions; consumer organi-
sations, NGOs, business, regulators and government departments interact within the gaze of  the 
state but separate from it. These organisations operate at arm’s length from the central govern-
ment, but under the rules set out by it. In addition, governance network theory allows an investiga-
tion into the more nebulous aspects of  these connections as it recognises both the informal and for-
mal aspects of  the connections and intermediations between actors, organisations and institutions. 
This brought me to the third dimension in the theoretical framework, constructivist institution-
alism, which recognises the importance of  agents’ ideas, arguments and perceptions in maintain-
ing, and changing, particular institutional structures. It was argued that this particular frame was 
insightful as it took seriously the ways in which actors understand, and reproduce through their 
discourses, the institutions that they collectively make up. 
Through this approach a comprehensive framework for taking account of  consumer organisa-
tions as political bodies can be achieved. All of  the dimensions discussed are of  importance; the 
state, the networks, and the agents, and in trying to understand the role of  consumer organisations, 
as a feature of  contemporary politics, all of  these dimensions need to be taken seriously: the meta-
level aspects of  the state, the meso-level aspects of  the networks and intermediations, and the more 
micro-level aspects of  the individuals and their ideas and perceptions. 
This chapter has sought to build this investigation on a theoretically rigorous framework, it will 
now move to consider the methodological dimensions – how, using this theoretical foundation, will 
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the investigation be carried out?
The next chapter will outline and detail the important methodological aspects of  the investi-
gation, it will cover why a comparative study was chosen, the importance of  interviews and will 
overview discourse analysis as a methodological tool. The methods chapter will then move into the 
empirical aspects of  the investigation with an overview of  the states, and then into the investigation 
of  each country, the UK and Norway. 
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4. Research Methods
4.1 Introduction – Methodological Strategies and Epistemological Positions
This chapter will now set out the research methods of  this investigation. It will look briefly at the 
epistemological dimensions, where the research locates itself  in the corpus of  political science 
methodology, and will then detail the specific research strategy of  this thesis and the reasons why 
this strategy was chosen. This will involve what method was used in (1) the overall framing of  the 
thesis; a comparative investigation of  the UK and Norway, in (2) the collection of  data; through 
interviews, and then (3) how the data was subsequently analysed; through discourse and argument 
analysis. The chapter will then set out the case selection, why the UK and Norway were chosen, 
and what particular policy areas were considered. The chapter will then finish by outlining the 
research questions and their justification in light of  the methodological discussion; what the ques-
tions address in respect of  the limitations that have been acknowledged. It will then conclude by 
considering how this type of  interpretive policy analysis is a valuable contribution to understand-
ing contemporary politics. The thesis will then move to the next chapter where the characteristics 
of  the two different states under analysis, the UK and Norway, will be outlined, before moving on 
to the empirical and analysis chapters. This chapter will now situate this investigation in the corpus 
of  political science as a discipline. 
4.1.1 Situating the Thesis: Philosophy of Social Science
Debates around methodology are as acute in political science as they are in many disciplines, 
especially in the social sciences more broadly,  with the concept of  a ‘social science’ itself  being a 
contested one (Hutchinson et al. 2008; Winch, 1990). By extension the term ‘political science’ is 
also a contested one – its basis as a ‘science’ challenged by those less interested in the more positiv-
ist/empiricist dimensions of  the discipline. However, despite the debates around the dominance 
of  positivism/empiricism in political science, which saw the publication of  Perestroika!: The Raucous 
Rebellion in Political Science (Monroe, 2005) at its apex, it is by-and-large now held that so long as 
scholars are reflexive about the limitations of  their chosen approach, are aware of  the potential 
biases in research strategies, and are humble about their ability to reflect the complexity of  the so-
cial world accurately (Hay, 2010, p.19), then we can progress the discipline in a variety of  fashions. 
This chapter is written in this reflexive tradition, and fully acknowledges and engages the debates 
surrounding methodological practice in social science, whilst also describing in detail the particular 
research strategy of  this investigation – the principal intention of  this chapter. In this respect this 
chapter will now position this investigation in relation to the various research traditions in political 
analysis – quantitative, qualitative and interpretive (Yanow, 2003). Or, as Yanow also suggests, that 
we should move beyond the two part taxonomy of  quantitative/qualitative, to recognise the three 
dimensions of  political and social research: quantitative, positive-qualitative, and traditional quali-
tative (interpretivism) (Yanow, 2003, p.8).
Typically research in political analysis has been split into either quantitative methods, using 
principles and models drawn largely from economics that calculate the relationship between varia-
bles using statistics and often large data-sets, or qualitative methods, which utilise less numeric data 
like interviews and texts in order to make other claims about social and political reality. However, 
as King et al. suggest, both are derived from ‘the same underlying logic of  inference’ (King et al., 
1994, p.4), something which Yanow (2003) sees as different from the ‘interpretive’ approach which 
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is less positivist in its epistemology. In Yanow’s mind there are three branches of  investigation, and 
that interpretive research is not a sub-field of  qualitative methods – due to the underlying logic of  
inference that is not shared, and the ontological and epistemological differences (Yanow, 2003, p.2 
and 6).  Additionally it should also be recognised that it is understood that ‘all empirical scientists 
interpret their data’ (Yanow, 2003, p.3), but that constructivist-interpretivists do so explicitly as the 
particular research questions that they address require them to do so. The research questions for 
this investigation can be found at the end of  the introduction chapter (section 1.3).
Which research strategy is taken is argued to be dependent on the question at hand – particular 
questions pertaining to the empirical relationship between specific phenomena require different 
research tools. There is also the epistemological dimension, and epistemological assumptions are 
often smuggled in even to the duopoly of  the quantitative/qualitative divide. That is to say that 
despite the research strategies, there are always underlying assumptions about truth claims – and 
these concern themselves with epistemology. Epistemology is not concerned with the nature of  
the world, like ontology, but with what we can hope to know about the world (Furlong and Marsh, 
2010, p.184) – the limits to our knowledge about the world. Questions about epistemology are 
often shirked. This is done at our peril, as in order to reach the rather optimistic goals that Hay 
(2010) sets out, we at least need to be open about the fundamental assumptions about claims to 
truth that underpin scholarly research.
This thesis comes from a constructivist ontology, which means that the social and political phe-
nomena under analysis are understood to be socially constructed – the individuals that make up 
the institutions and organisations analysed embody them through ideas, perceptions and practices. 
The institutions exist principally due to the individuals, and the ideas, desires and perceptions of  
those individuals, and it is these that we need to take account of  in trying to better understand how 
these bodies function in contemporary politics. For example, this investigation is concerned with 
how individuals in the policy and regulation process understand the role that consumer organisa-
tions have, and to what extent they perceive themselves to have, or not have, influence. Therefore, 
in order to address consumer organisations as a contemporary political phenomena, and as a 
constituent of  policy and regulatory networks, the questions that are asked are ones which we can 
make a reasonable attempt at trying to answer, as well as pertaining to what is crucial to under-
standing the policy process: understanding the values and arguments that individuals within these 
scenarios adopt. In this respect it is the ideas and arguments that are taken seriously, and therefore 
why discourse analysis will be utilised in analysing the interviews with political actors. 
The epistemological position of  this research is one of  methodological interpretivism, and more 
specifically interpretive policy analysis. This is done very much in the tradition that Yanow (2000; 
2003) sets out, a tradition that is:
  
...based on the presupposition that we live in a social world characterized by the possibility of  
multiple interpretations. In this world there is no “brute data” whose meaning is beyond dispute. 
Dispassionate, rigorous science is possible – but not the neutral, objective science stipulated 
by traditional analytic methods (as represented by the scientific method). As living requires 
sensemaking, and sensemaking entails interpretation, so too does policy analysis. (Yanow, 2000, p.5)
Although this thesis is not concerned with a particular policy, but with a policy context – the insti-
tutional and structural circumstance of  policy and regulation with specific attention on the role of  
consumer organisations.
It is also the case that interpretivism in political science has seen a recent renaissance in the 
publication and success of  Bevir and Rhodes’s ‘Interpreting British Governance’ (2003), which 
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brought together the theoretical perspectives that saw a move from government to governance, 
with a methodological departure from more empiricist ‘Westminster Model’ perspectives, to more 
interpretive ones. Bevir and Rhodes (2004), in a symposium on interpretivism in political science, 
make this link between theory and method, between governance and interpretivism, and suggest 
that:
The governance narrative is a valuable corrective to the traditional Westminster model. It is an 
exercise in ‘edification’. The governance narrative offers the hope of  finding ‘new, better, more 
interesting, more fruitful ways of  speaking about’ British government (Rorty, 1980, p.360). It does so 
by decentring networks and exploring how their informal authority supplements and supplants the 
more formal authority of  government. We use the notion of  governance to develop a more diverse 
view of  state authority in its relationship to civil society. (Bevir and Rhodes, 2004, p.136)
Although this passage concerns the British government system specifically, there is no reason why 
this theoretical and methodological approach cannot be used to study other government systems in 
a comparative fashion. The principles are that the way in which political systems are analysed must 
take into account the developments in governance, and the importance of  ideas, beliefs and values 
in trying to better understand contemporary politics. This thesis is concerned with doing this with 
regard to the role of  consumer organisations, and their place in the policy and regulatory system, 
and looking at what this tells us about the character of  the state in regard to neoliberal and social 
democratic ideology. 
Therefore an interpretive research design requires a particular form of  data collection, and 
a method of  analysis. This research design intends to be able to bring ‘thick description’ to the 
meso-level of  institutional analysis, in order to be able to explain in detail firstly how it is the case 
that these groups have come to be institutionalised, but also, when they have been institutionalised, 
understand the role that they play. What this thesis aims to bring is an interpretive approach to the 
study of  the state-civil-society relations, and the intermediation between different institutions and 
organisations through looking at consumer organisations in the UK and Norway. 
This section has sought to place this thesis in a philosophical and theoretical tradition which, 
like all approaches, has methodological implications – that by having a constructivist and interpre-
tivist approach this has a direct impact on the methods of  analysis that will be used. This chapter 
will now move to look at these methods by considering the overall framing, the case selection, the 
method of  data collection, the method of  analysis, the limitations of  this approach, before moving 
on to some concluding remarks about the overall intentions of  the research design.
4.2 Overall Framing – A Comparative Analysis
Comparison is a vital part of  scholarship or investigation. To compare one similar phenomenon 
to another, in different contexts, can tell us a great deal about each. The most simplistic example 
being ‘spot the difference’ puzzles – you only know there are particularities about each picture due 
to the comparison with the other. In this way when comparing political phenomena in different 
contexts it is also possible to highlight particularities and therefore gain a greater understanding 
of  the phenomena. In this regard the comparative approach in political science is considered to 
be ‘one of  the primary means for establishing social scientific generalizations.’ (Ragin et al., 1996, 
p.749) However this thesis is principally concerned with uncovering the dynamics of  the inclusion 
of  consumer organisations in different contexts, and not with concrete generalisations, but the 
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comparative method is still useful – even for constructivists. As Moses and Knutsen say:
...when constructivists employ comparisons, they do so in a way that is designed to preserve the 
qualities associated with thickly descriptive narratives. More to the point, constructivists regularly 
use comparisons to develop associations along two related fronts: in hermeneutic exchanges between 
the particular and the general and in their interrogations of  simplistic dichotomies used to separate 
Them from Us.’ (Moses and Knutsen, 2007, p.222)
The comparative method can also be widely used to determine broader, cross-national, trends. 
This thesis is concerned more with comparison as a way to make characteristics of  two particu-
lar political systems more acute, and therefore aid our in-depth understanding of  contemporary 
state-civil society relations, and not to make broader generalisations about facts pertaining to these 
relationships. The intention, like Moses and Knutsen suggest, is to try to understand the role of  
consumer organisations in two different contexts in detail, and to try and show that the simplistic 
assumptions about how consumer organisations might function in two different ideological con-
texts are not the full picture –  consumer organisations cannot be simply cast as either neoliberal 
apologists or as an example of  a burgeoning state; it is more complicated than that. Comparison is 
here used to show difference and gain clarity. 
In this respect the UK and Norway were chosen in order to assess two different liberal demo-
cratic states, with different histories, cultures and ideologies. Even though this investigation is done 
in a constructivist vain, and does not seek, like more naturalist perspectives, to provide generalised 
hypothesis or theories on consumer organisations as political phenomena, it is still important to 
compare polities which share some common features – both countries are capitalist liberal de-
mocracies, albeit different versions. Through comparing and contrasting the role of  consumer 
organisations in the policy making and regulation of  the two polities the particular features of  each 
country can be compared and insights about both gained. Although general theories may not be 
reached – which state in a determinist way that ‘consumer organisations tend to behave like x’, but 
to try and create more loose taxonomies that may help us to better understand consumer organisa-
tions in different contexts; to try and take account of  the political complexity and competing per-
spectives at the heart of  policy making. This investigation sets out these taxonomies in the analysis 
chapter 8. However, what is of  concern is to investigate the extent to which neoliberalism, as an 
ideology, plays a part in the narratives of  the development and institutionalisation of  consumer 
organisations in both countries, and therefore to try and better understand the characteristics of  
contemporary neoliberalism through assessing consumer organisations role in policy making and 
regulation. 
The most notable explanation of  the different ways the comparative method can be utilised is 
by J.S. Mill (1843), who distinguishes between comparisons ‘most similar’ and comparisons ‘most 
different’. He is also, as Moses and Knutsen (2007) observe, critical of  the comparative method 
as a way to ‘uncover’ universal laws of  politics or society. This thesis is more, as outlined, of  a 
comparison between cases ‘most different’ – the UK and Norway are both liberal capitalist de-
mocracies but are otherwise, in theory, very different: ideology (market liberal/social democratic), 
parliamentary system (majoritarian/non-majoritarian), state (pluralist/neo-corporatist), interest 
groups (actively exclusive/actively inclusive), economy (liberal market/co-ordinated market) and 
relationship with the EU (member/non-member). This is in addition to other more determined 
differences like population size and language difference. The difference between the two polities is 
important as it always for the role of  consumer organisations to be understood in two very differ-
ent contexts and to  try and describe the similarities and differences of  consumer organisations. 
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This chapter will now move to consider the way in which evidence was collected, before moving on 
to the method of  analysis (section 4.4).
4.3 Method of Data Collection – Elite Interviewing as an Interpretive 
Technique
The intention of  this section is to briefly reflect on the interview as a technique for data collection 
and why it is of  value to this research project. 
Elite interviews are for interpretive political science, and much sociological research, one of  the 
core practices in understanding ‘the world out there’. The social world is composed of  individu-
als, and in political arenas they are often referred to as ‘elites’, and it is these individuals that have 
the knowledge about the processes, connections and events that take place in said arenas.  One 
important aspect to point out, which reflects the researcher’s particular epistemology and the 
target of  research, is the extent to which the interviewee is actually seen as part of  the research. 
For post-structuralists the social make-up of  the particular interviewee, and the interviewer, would 
be important, as their socialisation and the cultural norms of  the elites are significant for their 
analysis due to institutions being socially constituted – localism (Alvesson, 2011). However, for 
other research the interviewee is more a conduit, or gate-keeper, of  information about institutions 
and processes – that there is a ‘truth’ about consumer organisations out there and we just need 
to get access to it – neopositivism (Alvesson, 2011).  What this thesis is concerned with is some-
where between these two positions, understood as romanticism (Alvesson, 2011), where ‘Through 
closeness and depth we can find the authentic and true, which are simply being expressed in our 
talk.’ (Alvesson, 2011, p.14) Here I am concerned with arguments – what are the arguments and 
perspectives about consumer organisations, and their place in policy making and regulation, do 
involved political actors have. It is through understanding the particular forms of  discourse uttered 
by elite actors that can bring us a greater understanding of  what the role of  consumer organisa-
tions is. For example, when discussing the formal and informal relationships between a consumer 
organisations and regulatory and government officials, how individuals describe these relationships 
is important – their perception of  the proximity of  their organisation to the wheels of  power is as 
important, if  not more important, than knowing how many times they met with a particular indi-
vidual, department or division. It is only through interviews that this information may be accessed.
The controversy surrounding interviews as a source of  information relate both to the idea that 
eye-witness accounts are notoriously unreliable, and that the interview itself, which questions are 
asked and how, has a determining effect on what the interviewee says thus undermining the objec-
tive nature of  knowledge collection. However, despite these potential problems ‘talking to people’, 
which is essentially what interviewing is, is the most obvious way to try and investigate political and 
social phenomena, especially when you are concerned, as I am here, with the largely socially con-
structed nature of  a particular phenomenon. Taking account of  resources or of  measuring activity 
like consultation responses or press releases can also tell us something, but it will not tell us the role 
that consumer organisations have in the policy and regulatory process – this is something more 
complex and difficult to grasp, which, despite the issues, requires that interviews are conducted. 
As said, there are traditionally, as Alvesson sets out (2011), three major approaches to inter-
viewing: neo-positivism, romanticism, and localism.  Alvesson’s main question is: ‘Whether the 
interview reveals the truth about some external reality or stable personal meaning/experience, 
or whether it reflects more the local dynamics and contingencies of  the interview situation?’ 
(Alvesson, 2011, p.27) Alvesson is pretty critical of  the interview as a method of  investigation, 
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but mostly concerning its application – so long as interviews are used with due knowledge of  the 
impact that the situation, interviewer and interviewee can have, the answers one can expect to get 
and the potential problems of  interviewing. The claims about political ‘reality’ are limited to a 
particular set of  questions – the ‘truth’ is in this respect conditional. The questions that this thesis 
is concerned with are by and large not ones that require me to make claims about a causal rela-
tionship between specific phenomena, but more to problematize a particular political phenomena, 
and at most suggest that broader ideologies maybe seen to be evidenced in the ways in which the 
individuals involved in organisations and institutions understand themselves. This thesis therefore 
has a more ‘romanticist’ approach to the interviewing – taking the interviewee as a way to access 
data about the particular institutional, organisational and policy context that they have experience 
of: ‘...in order to be able to explore the inner world (meanings, ideas, feelings, intentions) or expe-
rienced social reality of  the interviewee.’ (Alvesson, 2011, p.14) What it aims to do is not to make 
generalisable justifications for consumer organisation involvement in policy making but to outline 
the complex and varied nature of  competing perspectives towards consumer organisations, both 
normatively, and descriptively in terms of  whether they are understood to be core or peripheral to 
the policy and regulatory process. Interviews of  the actors involved in these processes are therefore 
the best way in which to understand these perceptions. 
 By taking this approach the scholarship essentially comes down to my ability, as a scholar, to 
interpret the interviews in a way in which is ‘reasonable’, and can be seen to provide evidence of  
particular social, political and cultural trends. It is this on which I hope this investigation is judged 
– on the ‘reasonable-ness’ of  my assertions regarding the information gained from interviews and 
its contextualisation with both broader developments set out in the literature review, theory chapter 
and analysis chapter. 
This thesis will use semi-structured interviews in order that the subject of  investigation can be 
kept reasonably focused across interviewees, but also allowing for particular experiences and stories 
to be heard by not being too restrictive. In this respect two interview transcripts were used, one 
for individuals in consumer organisations and one for individuals working in other organisations: 
policy makers, ministry officials, regulatory officials and independent advisors. These can be found 
in appendix 2.1 and appendix 2.2 respectively.
4.3.1 Problem of Language 
Of  course, especially when doing a comparative study in a context where English might not be 
peoples’ native, or working language, there may be issues with judging, or interpreting, discourse. 
In attempting to ‘uncover meaning’ in language, if  individuals lack the sufficient skills to explain 
themselves. However, if  the focus is on arguments and trying to gain an understanding of  how the 
individuals, and thus the organisations which they represent, understand their position it is less im-
portant. This really comes down to how the interpretation is done. I am not trying to uncover deep 
meaning, but to see, through the arguments and perceptions of  elites, the extent to which they un-
derstand the role of  consumer organisations in a particular context. In so doing they will marshal 
various arguments about the relationship between the state and civil society, their responsibility 
to citizens, their place as an institution or body, and these will be both descriptive and normative. 
This is not reliant on their grasp of  English language per se it is the deeper arguments that they are 
explaining that is of  interest not the particular utterances that they speak. For example, if  they use 
particular words or phrases I am not going to suggest that that is in itself  evidence of  the impact 
of  a particular political ideology. More accurately I want to see how they position themselves and 
their organisation as a political entity more generally as part of  the policy and regulatory system, 
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and assessing the arguments, thoughts and perceptions that they display. This is not ideal, as that 
would be the interviewer being able to fluently speak the language of  the interviewee, but even 
in the case of  two people speaking the same native language there are language issues – ‘perfect’ 
communication is never possible. However, if  it is recognised that the utterances of  interviewees 
are spoken in a language not native to them then the investigator should be reasonable in their 
assessments of  the data, and look for arguments and discourse more generally, and not pick up on 
specific utterances as evidence alone of  a broader claim.
With this in mind this chapter will now turn to the third dimension in the methodological 
framework – how the data is analysed. 
4.4 Analysing the Data – Discourse Analysis and the Argumentative Turn
There are many ways to study public policy and the dynamics of  political institutions. Some of  the 
various options have been mentioned here, and they differ greatly, from Large-N cross-national sur-
veys to in-depth ethnographic studies. This thesis, in keeping with constructivism and interpretiv-
ism, is however concerned principally with how agents in political contexts understand themselves 
and their organisations. From this we can gain a greater understanding of  these political contexts. 
This is not to deny other factors, such as resources, but to focus on a particular dimension of  the 
policy process. This way of  analysing politics has a heritage, some of  which has been discussed 
earlier in this chapter, and earlier in this thesis, but which will be expanded upon in this section. It 
is this respect that political context should be acknowledged as being of  vital importance to policy 
analysis, as it is the arguments and discourse which are situated in particular political contexts. It 
is these contexts, through a ‘thick description’ comparative account of  consumer organisations, 
enabled by analysing the discourse and arguments presented by elite actors, which can help us 
better understand, and problematize, contemporary governance. More broadly political context is 
what this thesis seeks to better understand – not the decisions of  policy makers themselves, but the 
broader context in which decisions are made. In this respect Tilly and Goodin say: ‘We pursue the 
hope that political processes depend on context in ways that are themselves susceptible to system-
atic exploration and elaboration. The hope applies both to description and to explanation.’ (Tilly 
and Goodin, 2006, p.6). For this thesis understanding politics is about understanding the context 
in which formal ‘politics’ (technocratic decision making) occurs – this is politics. This is here lim-
ited to the context of  the regulatory state and the governance networks that operate in the policy 
making and regulatory environment. Within this the research is concerned with the relationships 
between instituions and how consumer organisations fit into this political context. In order to do 
this I need to investigate the wider perceptions and arguments of  individuals involved in the pro-
cesses and set them against the theories about broader political developments like the relationship 
between the state and civil society and the impact of  neoliberalism as an ideology. In order to do 
this I undertake a discourse analysis which this chapter will now outline.
Discourse analysis has a long tradition but in principle concerns the analysis of  language, in text 
and speech, in order that we can gain an understanding, and in some cases explain, the social and 
political world. Discourse analysis is in principle: ‘...the study of  language at use in the world, not 
just to say things, but to do things.’ (Gee, 2011, p.ix) Within this there are a variety of  approaches 
that come under the umbrella of  discourse analysis, from more post-structural (PSDT) accounts 
that see all of  social and political reality as embedded in frameworks of  meaning (Howarth, 2000; 
Laclau, 1990), to the critical discourse analysts (CDA) for whom language is saturated by power 
relations and ideology (Fairclough, 1989; Wodak, 1989; Van Dijk, 1991, 1997), to more techni-
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cal linguistic approaches that are concerned with how the language is structured grammatically. 
Each approach to discourse offers us different tools for analysing language, and privileges different 
factors in the analysis, but no one approach has any claim to being able to tell us all we need to 
know about the social and political world. Therefore the approach that one takes depends on what 
the research questions are, and therefore what the investigation prioritises. In trying to understand 
the role of  consumer organisations in policy making and regulation, and the extent to which they 
provide a counter-balance to industry and agency pressures, I am concerned with unpacking the 
ideas and arguments, in the form of  discourse, that elite actors practice, as it is this discourse which 
is seen as important in manifesting the institutions in which they are uttered. The agents, and their 
discourse, are both determined by and determining of  the institutional structures around them – 
there is a feedback between ideas, material factors and the outcomes – both particular policy and 
regulatory decisions and the overall make up of  institutions. In this respect the type of  discourse 
analysis that will be used here is closer to CDA as it is concerned to: ‘...systemically explore the 
often opaque relationships of  causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events 
and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures relations and processes,’ (Fairclough, 1995, 
p.132). Fairclough continues to say that CDA is to: ‘...investigate how such practices, events and  
texts arise out of  and are ideologically shaped by relations of  power and struggles over power,’ 
(Fairclough, 1995, p.132). What CDA is aimed at doing is uncovering subjectivity that is constitut-
ed in language, and through analysing discourse we can discover how individuals constitute them-
selves both socially and politically, and that discourse can reveal broader ideological trends at work 
that manifest themselves in the arguments and perspectives put forward by political elites. 
PSDT and CDA are essentially two perspectives on the role played by ideas, PSDT being con-
cerned with only the relationship between ideas and outcomes, and with critical discourse analysts 
being concerned with the relationship between ideas and material factors, and their subsequent 
impact on outcomes (Hay, 2002, p.205-6). It is the latter to which constructivist institutionalists (or 
discursive institutionalists) are more closely aligned. Although though Schmidt, a predominant ad-
vocate of  the discursive institutionalist approach, has recently been criticised for her ‘narrow con-
cept of  discourse’ (Panizza and Miorelli, 2012, p.7). This thesis is concerned with understanding 
institutions and their relationship to each other, and so taking an approach that acknowledges that 
there is a feedback between the ideational and material dimensions, and their subsequent impact 
on outcomes is crucial. In this respect a more CDA approach is taken, but one which privileges the 
role of  arguments marshalled in political utterances in order to uncover the core motivations, per-
ceptions and perspectives of  agents embedded in particular political contexts15. In this way ideas 
are understood to be present in a multitude of  forms as Schmidt suggests:  
In the representation of  ideas, any given discourse may serve to articulate not only different levels 
of  ideas (policy, programmatic, and philosophical; see Hajer 2003) and different types of  ideas 
(cognitive and normative) but also different forms of  ideas—narratives, myths, frames, collective 
memories, stories, scripts, scenarios, images, and more. (Schmidt, 2008, p.309)
This thesis seeks to understand and analyse interview texts by looking to see how agents describe 
the political context they inhabit – as it is through these understandings, and discourses, that at an 
aggregate level, institutions are manifest. Therefore to take account of  consumer organisations in 
15 It is also the case that there is, traditionally, a normative dimension to CDA in that it ‘openly committed to political 
intervention and social change,’ (Machin and Mayr, 2012, p.4). The normative dimensions for this investigation are 
addressed in the conclusion chapter (9)
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contemporary policy making and regulation I need to understand how political actors involved 
in policy making and regulation understand consumer organisations, and this is done through an 
analysis of  their discourse. This is not to say that material factors are not important, like the re-
sources that institutions and organisations have, but that I want to understand consumer organisa-
tions irrespective of  their relative financial resources. It is all the other dimensions – the less easily 
‘measured’ aspects like ideas, arguments and perceptions that this thesis is concerned with. 
More specifically I am concerned with looking at arguments – what arguments in both de-
fence and attack of  political phenomena do individuals marshal, and what does this tell us about 
the ideas that characterise the institutional make-up? For example, Fairclough and Fairclough 
(2012), suggest an important place for argumentation in the analysis of  discourse: ‘‘Political dis-
course analysis’ ...views political discourse as primarily a form of  argumentation, and as involving 
more specifically practical argumentation, argumentation for or against particular ways of  arguing, 
that grounds decision.’ (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012, p.1) It is in this respect that this thesis 
analyses the discourse of  political actors – to understand the arguments and perspectives they put 
forward in relation to consumer organisations and their inclusion in policy making and regulation. 
To take the perspectives of  actors from various parts of  the policy making and regulatory  system 
and try to understand what role consumer organisations play, the extent to which they are institu-
tionalised and whether or not they provide a counter-balance to industry pressure and are under-
stood to have an impact on policy. Although I am not concerned with individual policy outcomes it 
is still important to take account of  what Majone (1989) says about arguments and discourse:  ‘We 
miss a great deal if  we try to understand policy-making solely in terms of  power, influence and 
bargaining, to the exclusion of  debate and argument. Argumentation is the key process through 
which citizens and policy-makers arrive at moral judgments and policy choices.’ (Majone, 1989, 
p.2) Political actors have positions and perspectives, normative and descriptive, towards the inclu-
sion of  consumer organisations in the policy process, and it is the intention of  this investigation to 
understand these, and to try and set them against the broader political back-drop of  developments 
of  neoliberalism. 
In order to analyse the interviews an approach toward the analysis needs to be taken, and in 
this regard I have chosen to use discourse analysis. It will be loosely connected to the CDA ap-
proach, but will focus more on actors’ arguments and the underlying political positions toward the 
inclusion and institutionalisation of  consumer organisations into the policy making and regulatory 
process. In this respect language is seen as constitutive of  political perspectives and ideology, and 
through analysing the discourse of  political actors in a variety of  contexts a greater understanding 
of  that political context can be gained, as Gee suggests:
...language is a key way we humans make and break our world, our institutions, and our 
relationships through how we deal with social goods. Thus, discourse analysis can illuminate 
problems and controversies in the world. It can illuminate issues about the distribution of  social 
goods, who gets helped, and who gets harmed. (Gee, 2010, p.9-10)
Discourse analysis therefore provides a framework for interpreting text in order that political 
phenomena can be understood in a more in-depth manner, to appreciate the particularity of  
consumer organisations, but also to try and situate the institutionalisation of  consumer organisa-
tions in a political context. One way in which neoliberalism can be evidenced in practice is in the 
constitution of  the relationships between states, civil society, markets and corporations. Under 
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different ideologies different relationships are prioritised, and neoliberal ideology concerns making 
these relationships solely about the better functioning of  markets. Consumer organisations play an 
important role in this context as they are able to represent individuals as consumers in policy and 
regulatory contexts that concern ensuring markets work better. This thesis seeks to focus on how 
elite actors involved in this context make arguments about, have perspectives on and formulate 
ideas on the role of  consumer organisation today.  Therefore discourse analysis can help us to bet-
ter understand the extent to which individuals, and institutions, display neoliberal characteristics. 
As was suggested in the previous chapter (3) in the section on constructivist institutionalism (3.4) 
the analysis of  discourse and discursive practices in trying to understand institutions and institu-
tional change has seen a recent resurgence. This was originally referred to as the ‘argumentative 
turn in policy analysis’ (Fischer and Forester (eds.), 1993), and has of  late seen a number of  schol-
ars develop this approach to the study of  institutions and policy making (Hay, 2006c; Schmidt, 
2008, 2012; Hajer, 2003, 2009). This has culminated in the recent publication of  The Argumentative 
Turn Revisited: Public Policy as Communicative Practice (Fischer and Gottweis (eds.), 2012), that, as the ti-
tle suggests, looks at the ways in which the focus on arguments and discourse has enabled a greater 
understanding of  the policy process and political institutions more generally.  One of  the most 
important dimensions of  this ‘argumentative turn’ in theory and method is the position that: ‘...
argumentative policy enquiry challenges the belief  that policy analysis can be a value-free, techni-
cal project.’ (Fischer and Gottweis, 2012, p.2) This is vitally important for two reasons: (1) that it 
lays bare the notion that policy practice and policy analysis are connected, the connection between 
theory and practice – in post-structuralist and constructivists perspectives this rings true as theory 
has a determining impact on the world that it theorises – it does not sit outside of  it. But also (2) 
that in choosing a method through which to study the role of  consumer organisations as part of  
the policy process one is chosen which takes account of  the politics that underpin ‘depoliticised’ 
contexts – the politics is evidenced in the discourse of  actors. This is therefore not to supply ‘the 
answer’ to policy makers but to problematize and critically question the contexts in which policy 
making happens, and discourse analysis allows this to be done in depth. 
This section has outlined the principal method of  analysis that this investigation will conduct 
on the interview data – discourse analysis. It will use discourse analysis as a tool to analyse the 
arguments, perceptions and ideas of  elite actors in regard to consumer organisations in the policy 
process. This is done in order to examine and illuminate the both the ideological currents that are 
manifest in individuals speech but also see the complexity of  political arguments made by elite ac-
tors with regard to consumer organisations and their institutionalisation. To understand consumer 
organisations role in the policy process we need to understand what role they are understood to 
have by the individuals that populate the institutions, bodies and policy processes that are of  inter-
est, and this can be achieved through using discourse analysis.  
4.5 Case Selection – Countries and Policy Areas
In conducting a comparative study, in a constructivist and interpretivist approach, ‘cases are not 
selected to try and uncover the hidden and universal patterns of  the social world,’ (Moses and 
Knutsen, 2007, p.233). What is of  interest, through using a ‘cases most different’ approach, is 
to compare and contrast two particular political contexts in order that each can be seen more 
starkly. In the process of  investigation and analysis the comparative dimension is important as 
although generalisable laws are not the intention it is still the case that to investigate two contexts 
would provide more information than investigating just one. Although Moses and Knutsen go 
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on to say that ‘issues of  sampling and case selection are simply not methodologically relevant or 
interesting,’(Moses and Knutsen, 2007, p.234), it is here taken to be an important dimension, not 
because of  the applicability for making claims about generalised laws, but in order that the role 
of  consumer organisations can be analysed in two different contexts and therefore to see how they 
differ. 
The reason that the UK and Norway were chosen was due to access to elite actors, and because 
both countries have similar, but in some respects essentially different, characteristics. Both are 
capitalist liberal democracies, but with the UK being neoliberal, and Norway being more social 
democratic – this ideological dimension is important as it forms the dependent variable. To what 
extent do consumer organisations role differ in different ideological contexts, and does this impact 
on both their institutionalisation and whether they form a counter-balance to industry and agency 
pressure?  The countries are also similar in that they have both gone through a process of  neo-
liberalisation with the privatisation of  various industries and the creation of  markets where there 
previously was none – utilities and telecommunications sectors being two important areas. In this 
respect the various policy areas that were looked at were ones which where the ‘consumer inter-
est’ was explicitly taken most seriously – in the UK in the case of  Ofcom. Ofcom, and the media, 
was chosen in the UK as Ofcom is the only regulator to have both the citizens and consumers 
interest in its principal duty of  operation as set out in section 1.3.1 of  the Communications Act 
200316. They are also the most recently set-up regulator and have actively made moves to include 
consumer organisations, and consumer representation, into their functioning in an explicit way. 
Ofcom was therefore taken as a case example of  how consumer organisations have been institu-
tionalised in the UK. However, there are many other policy areas that revealed themselves prior to 
and during the interviews with policy makers and consumer organisations: e.g. product placement, 
energy, consumer rights, food-labelling, smart meters. All of  these policy areas were considered but 
as consumer organisations’ campaign focus changes all the time it was difficult to anticipate what 
owuld be the most important. It was therefore left fairly open as to which policy areas would be 
discussed, apart from looking at Ofcom in the UK – other non-sectoral consumer organisations 
have a range of  priorities and it was their general role and institutionalisation that I wanted to 
investigate, in addition to seeing the extent to which they understood themselves to impact vari-
ous policy. It was therefore important to leave this open. As a result I was able to see both how 
consumer organisations were institutionalised in one context in the UK, and how they had been 
institutionalised differently in Norway, through less close contact with regulators and more contact 
with government departments, and to see how their policy priorities were reached and acted upon. 
A variety of  consumer organisations were chosen to interview, and these included the principle 
organisations in each country, Which? and Consumer Focus in the UK, and Forbrukerrådet and 
Forbrukerombudet in Norway, in addition to other sectoral and research organisations. The open-
ness with which policy areas were dealt with was to investigate not specific policy processes but a 
more general sense of  these organisations role more broadly. 
4.6 Limits to this Approach
Although the particular research design chosen, a comparative interpretive investigation using 
discourse analysis, is deemed to be the most suitable way to assess both how organisations have 
been institutionalised, and the extent of  their influence, as has been argued throughout, it is still 
the case that this type of  research design will fall short in some respects. It is beneficial for research-
16 This can be seen here: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21/section/3
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ers to reflect on these shortcomings in order that they can make sure that the problems are mini-
mised throughout the research process. The most commonly attributed problem with interpretive 
research is that the results are ‘in the eye of  the beholder’ – there is little that is ‘scientific’ about 
the few observations the scholar makes, and the subsequent inference that they make in the analy-
sis. Although this criticism would of  course be valid if  the investigation were to be trying to claim 
general laws about political reality that would aid future prediction. However, what this research 
intends to do is to attempt to better describe the contexts in which consumer organisations have 
become a feature, and to illuminate an otherwise under researched aspect of  contemporary politi-
cal life. In doing this there can be a range of  procedures taken, and through an interpretive inves-
tigation using discourse analysis knowledge about the ways in which consumer organisations are 
understood to have a role in the policy and regulation process by political actors involved in them 
is gained. An in-depth ‘thick description’ account of  political contexts is a valuable exercise. 
Furthermore, for some social scientists making generalisations is vital to the very process of  
science as an intellectual endeavour. It is also stated that having only a few cases undermines the 
potential significance in that it reveals less, and therefore has less force as research, as Gerring says: 
‘...there is no guarantee that a few cases, chosen randomly, will provide leverage into the research 
question of  interest.’ (Gerring, 2008, p.645) Both these critiques of  the small-N case approach 
should be recognised, but it is still the case that in-depth studies can provide us with significantly 
useful data, analysis and conclusions that larger-N studies could not. It is here that this procedure 
has its advantages - different scales give different results and in the spirit of  methodological plural-
ism this is only positive for social science. 
The other significant issue is concerned with selection bias. Is it not the case that in this particu-
lar research design the cases have been selected on the basis that they will elucidate the problem 
presented. This is however also an issue with epistemology, as the level of  understanding about a 
particular phenomenon is attributable to the scale of  analysis but to the accuracy of  the analysis 
in terms of  the question asked. In this respect this research project aims at gaining a better under-
standing a particular phenomenon rather than comprehensively explaining its existence in toto. 
Even though these two significant shortcomings should be recognised as such, as Moses and 
Knutsen (2007, p.109) suggest, it does not make the approach taken invalid as a scholarly endeav-
our. As has been stated above, it is vital when conducting research in whatever fashion that rigour 
and consistency is key. 
For this investigation the scholarship is in the interpretation, the ‘reasonableness’ of  the infer-
ences made of  the interview data in the discourse analysis, and the drawing together of  various 
theories in order to best understand the role of  consumer organisations in contemporary politics. 
Through this procedure, as is shown in the analysis chapter 8, both a normative typology (fig.7) 
was made to show the perspectives towards consumer organisations, and hence the politics that 
underpin regulation and policy making, and also a description of  the extent to which consumer 
organisations are understood to be either peripheral or core to policy and regulatory processes 
(fig.5 and fig.6). Together these descriptions are used to show that there are commonalities faced  
by consumer organisations despite the differences in context. Therefore although not generalising 
about consumer organisations in a determined fashion, through an in-depth analysis, frameworks 
can be drawn up in order that a better understanding of  them can be gained.  
What this investigation does not provide is measurable, determined and generalisable explana-
tions of  the role of  consumer organisations, this is a significant limit to some. But hopefully this 
chapter has sought to successfully argue that there is still significant value in trying to better de-
scribe political phenomena. 
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So although there are limitations to this approach, in that there is much left to interpretation, 
this is not so damaging as to undermine the central goal of  this investigation – greater understand-
ing of  consumer organisations, and the policy and regulatory processes more generally. 
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the various methodological dimensions of  this investigation. This is vital 
in order for the scope and limitations of  the intended analysis to be clear, and also to show how 
theory and methodology are connected. This is both so that I remain modest about the potential 
of  political analysis, to avoid hubris, but also to make clear that despite this great understanding 
about a particular feature of  contemporary democratic polities can be gained which has otherwise 
not been examined. This chapter has covered five dimensions; (1) the overall philosophic perspec-
tive of  constructivism which sees political phenomena as largely socially constructed, (2) the broad-
er framing of  the investigation as a comparison between the role of  consumer organisations in the 
UK and Norway, (3) the method of  data collection through elite interviews, (4) subsequently how 
these interviews were analysed through looking at discourse and argument, and (5) the limitation to 
this approach. In this way these elements create a rigorous, yet flexible, framework for which to in-
vestigate consumer organisations as a feature of  the contemporary policy and regulatory processes. 
This investigation is systematic and rigorous through, as Yanow (2003), quoting Bevir, says ‘“philo-
sophical rigor” – a rigor of  logic and argumentation – rather than merely a procedural “rigor”’ 
(sic.) (Yanow, 2003, p.7). 
As has been shown through-out there are a number of  authors whose work this investigation 
draws upon, and is influenced by, and it is broadly in the area of  critical policy studies. Hajer’s 
(2003) idea that policy-making is not the result of  politics but constitutive of  politics, and it is the 
nature of  this constitution that this thesis is concerned with unpacking. Also Majone’s (1989) asser-
tion that in order to understand the policy process, and how some policies are adopted and others 
not, we need to understand arguments and discourse marshalled by the participants, is also useful 
here – not in particular policy setting but in understanding the institutionalisation of  a particular 
set of  interests – what arguments are marshalled in the defence of  their position, what discourse is 
displayed in their justification and the perceptions of  their activities? This is not to mention the fact 
that the inclusion of  consumer organisations into policy discussions is part of  a move to increase 
deliberation in processes of  governance – showing the connection between normative and theoreti-
cal arguments. These are just two perspectives towards the study of  political phenomena that this 
thesis draws upon – a tradition which has, as said before, been cast as the ‘argumentative turn in 
policy analysis’ (Fischer and Forester (eds.), 1993), and which has been recently re-assessed (Fischer 
and Gottweis (eds.), 2012) in light of  other studies with a new collection of  authors (for example 
Hay, Schmidt and Howarth).
In this respect this investigation is an interpretive account of  governance, which looks at a par-
ticular feature of   contemporary governance; organisations that are located somewhere between 
the state, the market and civil society, and pertain to be an influence on policy that, in theory, pro-
vides a counter-balance to producer, industry and regulator pressure, on behalf  of  the consumer. 
In so doing it uncovers some of  the political dimensions of  processes of  governance – which are 
argued to have been depoliticised, and become technocratic processes that find ‘solutions’ to policy 
problems. This thesis sets itself  against these perspectives in problematizing processes of  govern-
ance, including the emergence of  the regulatory state, and showing that, as processes, they are 
ideologically encumbered. 
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This thesis will now, having considered the literature around consumer organisations and states 
(chapter 2), and the theoretical and methodological underpinning of  the investigation (chapter 3 
and 4), move to look at a brief  over view of  the case political systems – the UK and Norway (chap-
ter 5). This is done in order to expand upon some of  the elements mentioned in the comparative 
sections of  this chapter (sections 4.2 and 4.5), and to make clear the distinctions and similarities 
between the UK and Norway as political systems, both synchronically and diachronically. The 
thesis will then move to consider the empirical cases, starting with the UK  (chapter 6) and moving 
on to Norway (chapter 7), before the analysis chapter (chapter 8) where the evidence presented in 
the two empirical chapters will be analysed together. 
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5. Overview of Cases: 
The Political Systems
of the UK and Norway
  
5.1 Introduction
In order to make sense of  the way in which consumer organisations have the capacity to act, we 
need to think of  them in their context. As such this chapter will provide an overview of  the politi-
cal systems in the UK and Norway, and this will be structured thematically, looking at (1) the polity, 
(2) regulation, (3) welfare, and (4) ideology.  This investigation, as stated in the methodology chap-
ter, is a comparison of  most different cases. This is done in order to disaggregate the particularities 
of  each case. The core focus of  this chapter is to gain an overview of  the different political systems 
in order to contextualise the evidence in the following chapter – to give a national context to the 
policy context. The particularities of  the political systems, and the literature on the differences, be 
that between the focus of  the state, the institutional design, or just that there are different driving 
ideologies, can help in providing an important foundation on which to analyse consumer organisa-
tions. What must be remembered is that the political systems cannot be described as one ‘thing’ or 
another with complete conviction; these are theories about the political systems in question, and 
they are theories about different dimensions of  the systems analysed. It is in this respect that vari-
ous theories regarding these different dimensions have been selected for reasons of  both considered 
accuracy, but also that they focus on what this research considers to be the more salient aspects 
in trying to understand consumer organisations in contemporary policy making. These theories 
include how the UK and Norway, as states, are understood in terms of  interest groups (pluralist/
neocorporatist), their primary function (regulatory/welfare), the political economy (liberal market 
economy/co-ordinated market economy) and ideology (neoliberal/social democrat). There are, of  
course, elements of  the state’s structure and history which are established facts, like, for example, 
when utilities markets were privatised, and these will also be outlined. The purpose of  this chap-
ter is in this respect to provide a political context to the policy context of  consumer organisation 
institutionalisation.
As stated, the dimensions to be covered will be (1) the more institutionalised structure of  the 
state as a functioning system and how it interacts with civil society and interest groups (section 5.3), 
(2) how regulation has come to impact upon the structure of  the state (section 5.4), (3) the extent 
to which welfare provision is a characteristic of  the political system (section 5.5), and (4) the over-
arching ideological paradigm (section 5.6). In all four dimensions the UK and Norway, as under-
stood in the literature, are most different. As was previously explained in the methodology chapter, 
studying cases ‘most different’ is a strategy aimed at the disaggregation of  the constituent parts. 
In order to best highlight, and to analyse, the various aspects of  a phenomenon, such as the state 
of  consumer organisations in each respective country, one country’s characteristics must be seen 
alongside a dissimilar case in order that the particularities maybe shown most starkly. All four of  
the dimensions of  political systems overviewed here (state-civil society, regulation, welfare, and ide-
ology) may tell us about the particularity of  consumer organisations in the respective countries. But 
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in comparing how these bodies of  literature take account of  consumer organisations, we can gain 
a much greater understanding of  what the role of  consumer organisations are in contemporary 
policy making. It is also important to note that the four dimensions examined here are not entirely 
distinct. There is overlap as the four dimensions are clearly linked. The polity, the state, the capital-
ism and the ideology are clearly interdependent features of  political systems, one impacts upon the 
others and vice-versa. However, it is clear that there are distinctions between the more concrete 
structures of  the state, and the more abstract concepts concerning the particular ideology, and in 
this way this chapter aims to delineate between dimensions.  
5.2 Understanding Political Systems: UK and Norway
The intention of  this section is to overview the UK and Norway as political systems. It will cover 
the various dimensions important to the analysis of  consumer organisations, and will detail how 
the UK, as a political entity, differs from Norway. Norway is of  course different in many ways to 
the UK; geographically, economically, sociologically and culturally. Politically it is also different, 
but it still remains that both countries are two different types of  capitalist democracy, and it is this 
that binds this enquiry into the role of  consumer organisations. This section will outline, as with 
the UK above, the key distinguishing features of  the Norwegian political system. As will be shown 
typically understood characterisations of  Norwegian politics is becoming out-dated in the face of  
global neoliberalism, but that the changes that are occurring are done in a particularly Norwegian 
fashion (Østerud, 2005, p.705). Norway is noted for being a resource rich, sparsely populated 
democracy on the edge of  Europe which consistently comes top in various polls concerning the 
general well-being of  the populace (Happiness index, Peace index, equality index etc.). It is often 
alluded to as an example of  how countries should be run, in respect of  many of  the positive indi-
cators including importantly gender equality and income inequality: ‘It [Norway] has a society 
with striking egalitarianism, a strong public sector, and a culture of  cooperative institutions which 
merges private with public interests.’ (Østerud, 2005, p.705) However, the regulation of  the econ-
omy and the extent to which consumer organisations are part of  the policy process also need to 
come under scrutiny in order to assess the extent to which they play an active role.
It will be argued in this chapter that the theories regarding the polity, the principal function of  
the state, the political economy and the ideology, although helpful, do not assess the subtleties of  
consumer organisation involvement as a part of  the state and a constituent in the policy process. 
Therefore in analysing the role of  consumer organisations in contemporary policy making we can 
also gain a greater understanding of  some of  the subtleties of  contemporary capitalist democra-
cies. One of  the purposes of  doing an interpretive investigation, of  the role of  consumer organi-
sations in policy making and regulation, is to gain a more in-depth ‘thick description’ account of  
the institutionalisation of  particular interests, and the intermediation between the state and civil 
society. In this respect this chapter will help to provide a back-drop to the empirical research and 
analysis which looks in greater detail at consumer organisations specifically.
5.3 Theories of the State and Interest Groups
Theories of  the state idealise the ways in which states, and the various institutions and ideologies 
which constitute them, function. In a critical analysis it is essential to take these assumptions to 
task, but also in order to contextualise the empirical analysis. This section will outline some of  the 
core features of  contemporary liberal capitalist democracies; starting with the broader theories of  
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the state. It will then situate the UK and Norway within this debate, and consider how consumer 
organisations are taken into account. 
There have been a variety of  theoretical foci for the study of  British Politics, as Gamble (1990) 
outlined in his review essay. These start with the original Westminster Model, which ‘...is taken 
as meaning that the Prime Minister and their Cabinet, backed by a majority in Westminster and 
a devoted but politically neutral civil service is able to rule as it wished throughout the area of  its 
authority, the United Kingdom.’ (Duggett, 2009, p.1) But progress through a variety of  twists and 
turns, including a focus on the New Right and Public Management theory, to the more contem-
porary analysis of  governance networks which this research is principally concerned. Here I am 
concerned however, with how the British polity deals with interest groups and whether this takes 
account of  consumer organisations sufficiently. As shown in the literature review (chapter 2), little 
is understood of  the relatively privileged place that consumer organisations hold in policy forums, 
with respect to other civil society organisations. 
The more dominant liberal theories paint a picture of  the British state as fitting to a more plu-
ralist conception. In this it is suggested that the three domains of  power, the executive, the legisla-
tion and the judiciary, work together to address complex policy issues with democratic mandate. 
This theory of  pluralism is one which underpins studies of  British politics (Marsh, 2002, p.14), and 
is a theory that characterises the system as one where the freedom of  association enables groups to 
form around collective interests, be that community-led or corporate, and where the government 
is a neutral arbiter amongst these competing interests. It is also a normatively held belief  amongst 
political scientists in that: ‘Pluralism has become common sense in Anglo-American political 
thought and there is, it seems, a palpable sense in which ‘we are all pluralists now’’ (Wennan, 2008, 
p.158). The debate is, as Dryzek and Dunleavy suggest, merely about the extent to which this is the 
case empirically: 
...some believe the real number of  groupings that matter is small, others that it is large. Some point  
to profound inequality across groups (with business corporations dominant), others see rough  
equality in access and influence. Some stress essentially cooperative relations among groups and  
between groups and government officials; some stress conflictual relationships both within the state  
and across the boundary between state and civil society. Some believe that the ultimate locus of   
collective decisions can be found in the formal institutions of  the state, others that it has devolved  
into more informal networks. (Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009, p.131)
In respect of  the UK, the debate is therefore about the extent of  ‘pluralism’ rather than whether 
or not the UK is a pluralist democracy; it is a debate about degree rather than kind. This has been 
developed into ‘neo-pluralist’ thinking (Dahl, 1961), which is a reformulation of  pluralist thinking 
that takes account of  the power of  business interest in the policy process.
What is important to outline here is that contemporary thinking about British politics asserts 
that despite the developments taking power away from central government (Europeanisation, 
governance etc.), the state is still seen as the arbiter amongst a variety of  groups and competing 
interests. What this research aims to assess is if  this is the case with consumer organisations? Are 
they merely an interest among many, or do they hold a special position? And does their position 
indicate a greater or lesser degree of  importance to the policy process – are they central or periph-
eral to the process?
Norway, on the other hand, is typically presented as an ideal case of  a neo-corporatist state with 
regard to its relationship with interest groups (Crepaz, 1992; Katzenstein, 1985; Lehmbruch 1982, 
1984; Schmidt, 1982; Schmitter 1982). Norway is generally understood to have a neocorporatist 
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structure to its polity. Unlike the more pluralist polities that arbitrate amongst competing groups it 
is the executive where the power lies and groups are all seen as outsiders. Neocorporatist polities, 
on the other hand, have institutional structures in which decisions are taken, often concerning la-
bour rights and wage bargaining, where the various parties (employers, employees and the govern-
ment) discuss and come to arrangements in a more deliberative manner, whilst still recognising the 
authority of  the executive (Streeck and Kenworthy, 2005). The Scandinavian countries are often 
said to typify this type of  structure. This is compounded by the fact that 70% of  Norwegians are 
members of  an interest organisation (norway.org, n.d.), and as a result these organisations are able 
to exert significant pressure on the government: ‘Close contacts between the standing parliamen-
tary committees, ministries and interest groups mean that Norwegian policies are oriented towards 
segments such as the industrial segment, the agricultural segment or the educational segment.’ 
(norway.org, n.d.)
There has also been some interesting research on the relationship between political parties and 
interest groups, focusing on the Norwegian system (Allern, 2010). Allern suggests that there are 
some strong links between interest organisations and parties, but that these are wide ranging de-
pending on the party in question. Allern also mostly focuses on producer groups (both labour and 
industry interests). She finds that, as might be expected, the parties to the left have stronger associa-
tion with labour groups, and the parties to the right with business groups, but that these ties may 
have weakened (Allern, 2010). This indicates that links between organisations and political parties 
exists outside of  government, but that it also compounds the idea that in neocorporatist systems 
groups remain an important, if  not integral, part of  the political system. 
However, corporatism in Norway is argued to be on decline (Østerud, 2005, p.715) making way 
for more professionalised lobbying activity like in the typically pluralist polities. This development 
excludes the fact that organised interest groups and the state still come together to negotiate wages 
and other aspects of  economic conduct, but the number of  corporative institutions is being radi-
cally reduced, and the old corporative structure is being made irrelevant as public enterprises are 
transformed into market-oriented businesses. (Østerud, 2005, p.715) This is particularly interesting 
with regard to consumer organisations, as it would suggest that as neo-liberal policies develop they 
become more relevant as individuals are cast more in terms of  consumers.  
5.4 Regulation and the State 
As alluded to earlier, the state as a focus of  study has come in and out of  favour both as a focus of  
international analysis, and as domestically important (Schmitt, 2009).  However as Schmitt argues 
in order to really understand political life, and more specifically the particularities of  capitalist 
states and institutional change, we need to understand the role of  the state. The state in this re-
spect forms the collection of  institutions that govern. The state here is understood as the structural 
apparatus that provided the fora for the playing out of  the pluralism outlined above, and what this 
investigation concerns is how the institutions are structured, and what determines them (e.g. ideas).  
This section is important as it is in the form and function of  the capitalist state that this research 
wants to locate itself. In looking at the role of  consumer organisations in contemporary policy 
making, it is intended that we can better understand some of  the particularities of  the contempo-
rary capitalist state – specifically how consumer interests have been institutionalised and what this 
tells us about the development of  neoliberalism in practice.
However, it still needs to be outlined how the British state is conceived, be that as ‘a Neo-liberal 
state’ (Plant, 2010), ‘Shumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime’ (Jessop, 2002), a competition 
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state, or as a ‘Regulatory State’ (Moran, 2007). Here Moran’s and Jessop’s theories on the British 
state are outlined, as together they give a detailed overview of  the key elements of  what this re-
search is concerned with. Ultimately what role do consumer organisations play as part of  the struc-
ture of  the state, taking into consideration how the state is changing in terms of  its structure? 
Moran’s analysis of  the British state as a regulatory state is particularly useful in that regulation 
and the regulatory bodies are a fundamental part of  the contemporary structure of  the state, and 
therefore demand significant attention. His argument is that the structures of  the British state, set 
out in the ‘club government’ of  the Victorian era, have continued through to today despite many 
calls to the contrary about the retreat of  the state (Moran, 2007).
In addition Jessop’s focus is concerned with describing, not necessarily the more strategic di-
mensions of  the state, but how the state, as a meeting point of  ideologies and policy, has devel-
oped, and is continuing to develop. He suggests that we have moved from a post-war ‘Keynesian 
Welfare National State’ (KWNS), which was concerned with full employment and provision of  
infrastructure to support mass production and consumption (Keynesian), collective bargaining and 
state help generalise norms of  mass consumption and the expansion in welfare rights (Welfare), 
and the relative primacy of  national economic and social policy (National), and that the state was 
there to compensate for market failures in a ‘mixed economy’ (State). (Jessop, 2002, p.59) This has 
moved through being a ‘Schumpeterian competition state’ which dealt with the crisis of  KWNS 
seen in the 1970s through enabling a greater flexibility in the labour market and the liberalisa-
tion and deregulation of  economies, to a ‘Shumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime’. This 
he sees as the dominant form of  capitalist state which focuses on innovation and competitiveness 
(Schumpeterian), the subordination of  social policy to an expanded notion of  economic policy, 
a downward pressure on ‘social wage’ and an attack on welfare rights (Workfare), the role of  the 
nation state is important but relative to international scale (Postnational), and the increased role of  
self-organising governance to correct market and state failures, state gains greater role in exercise 
of  meta-governance (Regime). (Jessop, 2002, p.252) Jessop provides an historical account of  the 
development of  the state in a neoliberal context. He also suggests that capitalist states adopt one of  
four strategies to promote or adjust to global neoliberalism: Neoliberalism, Neocorporatism, Neostatism 
or Neocommunitarianism.(Jessop, 2002, p.62) The UK, although predominantly neoliberal in its focus 
on liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation, also shows elements of  Neostatism, in the focus on 
regulated competition, and Neocorporatism, in the expansion and importance placed on ‘stakehold-
ers’ in drawing up and implementing regulation. What Jessop is doing is setting out the various 
conditions and characteristics of  contemporary capitalist states, and this is important in relation to 
seeing where consumer organisation fit as political entities. 
What is argued here is that they, Moran and Jessop, both describe important elements of  the 
British state. The focus of  the state on regulation and the move to giving more power to regulators 
can be seen as a distinct, and even characteristic, development of  neo-liberal states attempting to 
deal with the complexity of  contemporary capitalism. The UK becomes an interesting case in this 
respect as it is seen as an ‘innovator’ when it comes to the development of  its state with regard to 
the regulation of  the economy. 
The UK is argued to have become a regulatory state in large part due to the increasing use of  
regulators to facilitate the governance of  the economy. They are often given statutory duties to 
regulate on behalf  of  citizens and consumers, as is the case with Ofcom. It is also suggested that 
they help in the administration of  regulation as they are ‘depoliticised’, in the sense that they are 
separate from the political battles in Westminster. However, this is argued to be a very narrow 
understanding of  what is political, as this research will discuss in the analysis chapter (chapter 8). 
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Regulatory agencies are setup in order to uphold legislation on behalf  of  the executive, either that 
of  public goods or to ensure that markets run efficiently. There are 58 different regulators in the 
UK, covering a wide range of  duties and responsibilities from upholding standards in advertising, 
to ensuring best practice in various professions, to ensuring that markets work in the interests of  
consumers.  
What is of  distinct interest to this research is how regulators have developed and the extent to 
which they have engaged consumer organisations in the development and upholding of  regulation. 
Some regulators have special consumer forums in which consumer organisations are invited to 
participate in a dialogue with regulatory officials and civil servants. The parent ministries are also 
often involved in these procedures. 
5.5 Welfare and the State 
As with all of  these different features, they are of  degree rather than kind. Although Norway is of-
ten termed a ‘welfare state’, as the UK is termed a ‘regulatory state’, it does not mean that the UK 
does not have a ‘welfare state’, and that Norway does not have regulatory characteristics. These 
theories of  the state suggest that these particular forms are the dominant character of  the particu-
lar state in question.  
The various positive indicators attributed to Norway, have to a great degree, been the result of  
the importance placed upon the welfare state as a fundamental part of  Norwegian life. Although to 
an extent seeing similar pressures on it from developments in neo-liberalism it is still a considerable 
strength. The state in Norway, albeit it a capitalist one, is very much characterised by the strength 
of  welfare provisions. This is in large part due to the significant wealth accumulated as a result of  
the careful management of  the proceeds of  the North Sea oil reserves. This is also not to say that 
the UK does not have a welfare state, which it does, but that the state is not defined by its provision 
of  welfare, as is more the case in Norway.   
However, the state in Norway has a significant history in terms of  both its egalitarianism and 
the importance placed on welfare provision, examples being both the abolition of  noble titles in 
the 19th century, and the strong ties between the state and the centre-left since the early 20th centu-
ry. The labour movement has always been a powerful force in Norwegian politics, and the Labour 
party has held both minority and majority governments for much of  the 20th century. It is still the 
case that the majority of  elites support the present model of  welfare provision, even if  they are less 
egalitarian than the majority of  the population (Gulbradnsen and Englestad, 2005). 
What has become known as the ‘Nordic Model’, or the ‘Scandinavian Democratic Model’, 
concerns both the corporatisation of  various constituencies, but also the significance placed on the 
provision of  welfare through a progressive tax system. This particular model was said to really offer 
‘capitalism with a human face’: ‘...a redistributive welfare state that eliminated poverty and that 
was based on a privately owned, market economy.’ (Einhorn and Logue, 2003, p.ix) There are also 
two elements which distinguish the Norwegian welfare state from others: ‘They are generally uni-
versalistic, in the sense that they cover all citizens qualifying for support, and they are fairly gener-
ous. The first distinguishes them from the German tradition, the second from the British.’ (Heidar, 
2001, p.118)
5.6 Ideology and the State 
Clearly there are a variety of  political ideologies that exist in the UK today. For the most part these 
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are manifest in the different political parties, but also in the activities of  various groups outside of  
Westminster. This investigation is not concerned with this. What does concern us is the particu-
lar hegemony; the overarching ideology that underpins much of  the political, social and cultural 
life. In much research ideology is often seen as merely an endogenous factor that is easily counted 
out as being part of  a trend, or paradigm, or that it is connected to the ruling party of  the day. 
However, here I will draw upon the literature that sees ideology as something manifest in the 
everyday practices of  individuals, both at an individual level but also at a policy level. This comes 
from a typical neo-Marxist tradition, specifically Gramscian, in the way that governing ideology is 
seen as a vital part of  how political structures and institutions both function and develop. But also 
importantly how they dominate. This is not to blindly say that this is always the case, but that by and 
large there are hegemonic orthodoxies which determine both the boundaries of  debate and also 
institutional priorities: ‘...rather than just treating specific institutions and apparatuses as technical 
instruments of  government, Gramsci was concerned with their social bases and stressed how their 
functions and effects are shaped by their links to the economic system and civil society.’ (Jessop, 
2000, p.5)
In this respect the UK exhibits many neo-liberal characteristics, both in terms of  policy change 
and concrete developments. As Gamble (2006) has accurately suggested, neo-liberalism has two 
faces; both that encouraging various forms of  DLP (deregulation, liberalisation and privatization) 
and letting the market operate with as few impediments as possible, but also it labels various state 
interventions concerning the regulation of  markets, corporation social responsibility and good 
governance: ‘Neo-liberalism, in common with many other ideologies, is made up of  contradic-
tory ideas and principles, which are used quite freely to construct a range of  different discourses 
(Freeden 1996).’ (Gamble, 2006, p.22) It is clear, as has been suggested that the UK, in Europe at 
least, is at the forefront when it comes to neo-liberal reforms (Christensen, 2005, p.736)
As set out in the section previously, the ideological backbone of  Norwegian politics is very much 
egalitarian and social democratic: ‘Egalitarianism has been a strong force in the normative fabric 
of  Norwegian society. The state has been closely tied to centre-left forces for more than 100 years, 
first to the farmer (earlier peasant freehold) movement, then national movements and the labour 
movement.’ (Østerud, 2005, p.707) This egalitarianism is also evidenced in the importance placed 
on the welfare state. 
But as has also been suggested the welfare state, and the more social democratic nature of  the 
Norwegian state, might well be under threat from both a global neo-liberal paradigm which places 
significant power in the hands of  multi-national corporations, as well as in the finance houses of  
Frankfurt, New York and London (Einhorn and Logue, 2003, p.x). Even though it is still the case 
that both the welfare state, and the connections to unions, sees significant support even from elites 
(Gulbradnsen and Englestad, 2005). Additionally consumer organisations are argued to have been 
a product of  the social democratic movements of  the post-war years (Hilton, 2009). This can be 
seen in the fact that numerous consumer organisations were set up in the early 1950s, including 
most of  the organisations from both the UK and Norway. 
5.7 Conclusion
One thing that is clear from an overview of  the literature describing the political systems I am 
interested in is that there is little to no mention of  consumer organisations. This, I argue, is a fail-
ing as it is clear that in understanding the place and role of  consumer organisations some of  the 
questions that spring from an overview of  political systems may well be able to be addressed. The 
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dynamic of  capitalist democracy is changing in both the UK and in Norway, and the formulation 
of  the state, the type of  polity, the focus of  the economy and the underpinning ideology is signifi-
cant in this. How consumer organisations have come to play a role in both systems, in their differ-
ing ways, and how they are changing will therefore be able to help us better understand some of  
the intricacies of  this dynamic. Consumer organisations form a locus between the state, the market 
and civil society and can therefore potentially act at a litmus test to the on-going developments in 
both countries. 
What is clear from the overview is that the UK and Norway are seen, in politically at least, as 
distinct opposites (not to mention various geographical, historical and sociological differences). 
This table sets out these dimensions:
UK Norway
Polity Pluralist Neo-corporatist
State Regulatory Welfare
Political Economy Liberal Market Economy (LME) Co-ordinated Market Economy (CME)
Ideology Neoliberal Social Democrat
Fig.1 Table of comparative dimensions between UK and Norway. 
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6. Empirical Chapter 1: Consumer 
Organisations in UK Regulation
 and Policy Making
6.1. Introduction
This chapter investigates consumer organisations in the UK through interviews with elites involved 
in consumer organisations, and in policy making and regulation. It specifically concerns itself  with 
the two main consumer organisations, Which? and Consumer Focus, and with Ofcom, the media 
regulator. This is done in order to address the research question regarding the institutionalisation 
of  consumer organisations, as Ofcom has been active in the institutionalisation of  consumer inter-
ests into its activities, but also to investigate the role that consumer organisations play in contempo-
rary policy making and regulation. 
The chapter is split into five main sections that follow the themes analysed in the interviews 
which directly correspond to the research questions: what role do consumer organisations play in 
policy making and regulation, do they provide a counter-balance to industry and agency pressure, 
and what impact might they have on policy? In addressing these questions the chapter considers 
the social and political context (section 6.2 and 6.3), the characteristics of  organisations (section 
6.4), the institutionalisation of  organisations (section 6.6), the intermediation of  organisations (6.7), 
product placement as a policy issue (section 6.8), and then concluding with some provisional analy-
sis and an overview of  the chapter (section 6.9).
The chapter will first consider a broader overview of  the political and social context; what has 
occurred in the last decade of  domestic and global politics that may have influenced the place of  
consumer organisations in politics. The chapter will then consider trends like neoliberalism that 
have had a determining impact on the way politics is conducted (Harvey, 2005; Lee and McBride, 
2007; Plehwe, Walpen and Neunhöffer, 2006; Pretchel, 2007; Plant, 2010; Steger and Roy, 2010; 
Crouch, 2011). It will also address the trends in governance that demand governments both del-
egate responsibility to regulators (Majone, 1997; Moran, 2003), as set out in the literature review 
(chapter 2) and theory chapter (chapter 3), whilst at the same time demanding more inclusion from 
civil society (Powell, 2005; Enjolras and Sivesand, 2009; Davies, 2011). This is done in order to 
both locate the analysis in a political context in which neoliberalism is a dominant force, but also to 
make clear the connections between broader trends in neoliberalism and the way that institutions 
are structured with regard to the state, civil society and governance networks. This also connects 
the empirical work to the literature review (chapter 2), and the literature on states, civil society and 
liberalism, and the issues raised in the theory chapter (chapter 3) with regard to the regulatory 
state, governance networks and institutionalism.  
First, the two case countries will be considered separately, the UK and then Norway. This will 
be followed by a comparative analysis chapter (chapter 8) in which what has been outlined in 
the empirical chapters (chapter 6 and chapter 7) will be critically assessed. What should be made 
explicit from the start is that, as also shown in this previous chapter on political systems (chapter 5), 
the UK and Norway are, in numerous respects, very different, yet both seem to share a commit-
ment to the inclusion of  consumer organisations in policy making and regulation, even despite the 
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various changes occurring in the UK17. Both political systems do this in remarkably different ways, 
but which are underpinned by similar values concerning the inclusion of  consumer perspectives 
in policy making and regulation. The UK has implemented structural reforms, in the communica-
tions sector especially, that enabled consumer organisations to play a core role. While in Norway 
the consumer organisations have had a more stable position, they are relatively peripheral to the 
broader policy and regulatory processes. What will be shown here is how specifically these two po-
litical systems differ in the way in which consumer organisations, and by extension consumer rep-
resentation, play a role in the policy and regulatory system. Consumer organisations have grown 
to become more than just social movements, to having a seemingly permanent place at the policy 
making table. The relationship with regulators and central government, however, is very much 
determined by both ideology and the values of  individuals involved. On balance it is found that 
consumer organisations play a peripheral role in the regulatory and policy making process, despite 
the significant importance placed on them by Ofcom in particular in the UK context, and the rela-
tively secure position they hold in Norway in policy making more generally. They are hindered in 
providing an effective counterbalance to industry pressure through both lack of  resources and that 
the ‘consumer perspective’ is often taken as one voice, whereas industry is many. However, regula-
tors, government departments and consumer organisations have come to have close ties due to a 
variety of  contextual reasons, most crucially the increasing importance of  markets in the provision 
of  goods and services in parallel with the demand to be more consultative for both practical and 
principled reasons. 
The investigation will then move to look at the other case country, Norway, and will investigate 
the consumer organisations there with regard to the role they play in policy making and regulation 
(chapter 7), which will be followed by an analysis chapter (chapter 8). At the end of  the two empiri-
cal chapters (chapters 6 and chapter 7) it should be clear what consumer organisations are exactly, 
how they fit into the policy making environment in both countries, and what the most important 
issues regarding their role as political actors are. This will then lead me to assess the extent to 
which they can be seen as a counterweight to producer and agency interests in the analysis chapter 
(chapter 8), where evidence from both the interviews and the policy developments are assessed in 
terms of  whether or not consumer organisations made significant gains, and whether or not they 
were core, or peripheral to the process. From this the more normative concerns about consumer 
organisations role can all be addressed; what are the arguments around them having power at all? 
This chapter will now continue with an overview of  some important consumer organisations in the 
United Kingdom which will provide some political context to their place in the system.
6.2. Government: New Labour to Coalition (1997-2012)
In this section I provide a political background to some of  the governmental changes that have 
occurred since 1997. The intention is to give a context to the developments in both ideology and 
policy making. This, albeit brief, overview will help to set the scene for some of  the developments 
that have occurred with regard to regulation, regulators and consumer organisations. It will then 
move on to talk more specifically about ideology and the role this has played in UK politics, regu-
lation and government over the last decade. This will be done to make clear the importance that 
ideology plays in determining the various structures and institutions of  government. Neoliberalism 
as a doctrine has played a significant part in how governance in the UK is orchestrated; it therefore 
17 As will be addressed below there has been a significant rupture in the consumer advocacy landscape recently, with an Act 
passed by government allowing them to abolish, merge and amend a variety of  public bodies, and a consultation process that 
has resulted in the abolition of  one of  the core constituents of  the consumer advocacy landscape, Consumer Focus. 
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requires understanding more specifically how neoliberal ideas and discourse construct policy mak-
ing and regulation, and also consumer organisations and civil society representation.
The New Labour government, which lasted from 1997 until 2010, has had an indelible impact 
on the architecture and functioning of  the UK political system. This is especially the case with 
how policy and regulation is made, and with how civil society groups and organisations are en-
gaged. It is also argued that the welfare state has seen a dramatic transformation, with a reorienta-
tion of  the state towards the provision of  services through market, and quasi-market, competition 
(Jessop, 2002; Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009). The British state is also argued to be characterised by 
‘hyper-innovation’ (Moran, 2003): ‘Through liberalisation and privatisation Britain led the way in 
redefining the boundaries between the public and the private’ (Moran, 2003, p.2). However, since 
the Thatcher governments in the 1980s there has been a radical repositioning of  what the state 
is responsible for, which has required other civil society organisations to take up the slack (Powell, 
2007; Harvey, 2005). It is argued here that consumer organisations have been very much a part of  
this. From the research I have done it is possible to see a general increase throughout the recent 
Labour government of  the inclusion, and support for consumer organisations, with a number of  
interviews suggesting that the relationship between consumer organisations and authorities had im-
proved significantly. This is also shown in the interviews and questionnaires outside of  the UK in 
both Norway and Brussels. This helps inform the argument in this thesis that the engagement with 
consumer organisations is greatly dependant on both the ruling ideology but also on the values of  
agents involved. The core mandate for some regulators is to uphold the interest of  consumers, and 
consumer organisations are especially important as they provide a direct consumer perspective as 
well as appreciating that regulators are there to police markets. Consumer organisations in effect 
therefore police the police, they watch the watchmen. 
However, as will be addressed in the discussion of  the normative dimensions, this could be 
seen to be problematic due to the possible tendency of  organisations constrained by a neoliberal 
paradigm – they can only represent people so far, and can be seen to be ‘capitalist apologists’18. In 
addition to the fact that consumer organisations can also be seen as ‘shadow regulators’, and that 
the issue of  ‘Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?’ arises (who regulates the regulator?). However, in the UK 
the two most important consumer organisations to consider for policy making and regulation are 
Consumer Focus and Which?. These are referred to here as ‘generalists’, having a broader set of  
interests than the sector specific organisations. 
During the Labour years, it is therefore fair to say, that both regulators, and consumer organisa-
tions were strengthened, whilst at the same time markets were de-regulated and liberalised. This is 
most clearly apparent in the establishment of  Ofcom whose principal mission statement is: ‘Ofcom 
exists to further the interest of  citizen-consumers through a regulatory regime which, where ap-
propriate, encourages competition.’ (quoted in Lunt and Livingstone, 2012, p.43) This is typical 
of  a social democratic ideology that embraced neoliberalism; the market was seen as the best way 
to secure the public interest, but there should be substantial powers available if  this did not hap-
pen. It is also argued by Lunt and Livingstone, that the new regulator embraced the language and 
discourse of  New Labour, preferring the citizen-consumer identity over the more ambiguous ‘audi-
ence’ label used by the BBC (Lunt and Livingstone, 2012, p.43). 
Consumer Focus, the principal non-departmental public body with responsibility for repre-
senting consumers, is soon to be abolished with some responsibilities to be merged into Citizens 
18 As once referred to in peronal communication with Senior Economist at Eon.
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Advice, enabled through the new Public Bodies Act 201119. The plans for the changes were set out 
in the response to the 2011 BIS consultation ‘Empowering and Protecting Consumers’20 which 
sought to review and reform the consumer advocacy landscape, including both consumer organi-
sations and institutions, as it stated that: ‘The current landscape of  bodies responsible for these is 
inefficient and confusing, leaving consumers uncertain who to turn to for help and advice when 
things go wrong.’ (BIS, 2012, p.1) What is of  significant interest here is that publicly-funded con-
sumer advocacy will be transferred to Citizens Advice, and that there would be a regulated indus-
tries unit (RIU) setup to represent consumers in the regulated sectors (BIS, 2012, p.3). Consumer 
Focus had been given both statutory powers to conduct investigations into businesses that it 
thought to be behaving against public interest21, in addition to being a ‘super-complainant’. On the 
other hand Which?, due to its independent status, has been able to bypass this process of  reform. 
During the vairous Labour governments since 1997 various regulators were set up both by 
bringing together previously separate regulators (Ofcom) and as new entities entirely (Food 
Standards Agency). But New Labour also looked ‘to capitalise on the deregulatory tendencies of  
the previous neoliberal Conservative government while modernising governance and asserting 
revised social democratic objectives alongside the management of  markets.’ (Lunt and Livingstone, 
2012, p.35) The general change over the last decade, has been to adopt participatory practices 
into governance. To the extent that some have even suggested that there is a participatory norm 
(Saurugger, 2009). In this respect what New Labour were doing with Ofcom, fitted into the ‘third 
way’ (Giddens, 1998) philosophy perfectly. It acknowledged the importance of  the market, but 
also acknowledged the vital nature of  regulation to steer the market. The inclusion of  consumer 
organisations plays an important part of  this story, as they become both a technocratic tool, and 
a democratic ideal, as will be shown later in the analysis chapter (chapter 8) and the conclusion 
(chapter 9). Consumer organisations, in this respect, provide both information to get ‘better regula-
tion’, but also appeal to a ‘participatory norm’. These tensions were not, and are not, necessarily 
easily brought together though: ‘Ofcom was an instantiation of  these principles and as such rep-
resented an uneasy compromise between those who supported free markets and those who valued 
democratic control over economies through government intervention.’ (Lunt and Livingstone, 
2012, p.35) So what has been witnessed over the last decade is a slow increase in the importance 
of  consumer organisations and consumer representation, to a sudden decline in their institutional 
importance with the change in government. The specific nature of  both the increasing importance, 
in terms of  the institutional design and intermediations, and the more recent decline, will now be 
addressed. 
6.3 Ideology and the British State 
In assessing the ideational and normative dimensions of  public administration and policy making it 
is crucial to take account of  ideology with respect of  both countries under investigation. In a con-
structivist institutionalist study, ideology and ideas are assumed to play a distinct role in how policy, 
regulation and institutions both function and change (Hay, 2006a). Therefore here I will draw out 
some of  the most salient aspects relating to the UK. Specifically, that despite the incorporation of  
19 This Act has enabled giving considerable power to government to abolish, merge and alter a variety of  public bodies.
20 This document sets out the intentions of  government in light of  a consultation of  Sept. 2011.
21 Their duties and responsibilities are set out in The Consumers, Estate Agents and Redress (CEAR) Act 2007 through which 
the organisation was formed. 
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consumer interests into the regulatory and policy process, consumer organisations are understood 
to be peripheral actors. It is also evidenced that issues matter, the extent to which consumer organi-
sations are seen as core to the process is dependent upon the appropriateness of  the issue at hand 
in addition to the values of  those involved. Which? is in a considerably more favourable position 
due to its independence, and although generally well respected still suffers from the fact that it can 
be seen to serve its members who are generally the better-off  middle classes, as stated by an inter-
viewee from Which? (JH, Interview, 2011)22, and suggested by Hilton (2009, p.51) with regard to 
member-based consumer organisations more broadly. However, this is seen to be a weak accusa-
tion empirically as they work on a range of  issues and debates that impact all consumers, and seem 
to do so in a way that appeals to the general public interest. This is shown in their conscientious 
effort to have broad appeal by addressing issues such as energy which affects all citizens. 
What is interesting in what has happened in the last decade in the UK, is that despite having 
a social democratic party in government, there were numerous concessions made towards align-
ing policy with more neoliberal tenets. This is epitomised in the explicit  ‘third way’ agenda that 
attempted to marry the benefits of  free market capitalism with a progressive social agenda. In 
this respect ‘the consumer’ became a poster-child identity in the form of  the hyphenated identity 
‘the citizen-consumer’ (Clarke et al., 2007). The citizen-consumer: ‘...provided a framing populist 
discourse that articulated the ‘consumer interest’ against the power and interests of  ‘producers’, 
(Clarke et al., 2007, p.143). Here free individuals could police markets where there was a regulato-
ry framework that ensured the rules of  the game were set in the interests of  consumers, and, what 
is argued here, where  consumer organisations were utilised to make a connection between individ-
uals and the state in this respect. This was an ideological commitment, albeit an uneasy marriage: 
New Labour’s neo-liberalism is an uncomfortable and strained construction rather than an essential 
political character. New Labour initially worked to distinguish itself  from the vulgar marketisation of  
the preceding Conservative governments, insisting on the importance of  the ‘social’ and the ‘public’. 
(Clarke et al., 2007, p.146)
This said, one of  the focuses here is that of  Ofcom, set up in 2003, in ‘the interests of  citizens and 
consumers’, but with a deregulatory agenda (Lunt and Livingstone, 2012). These tensions be-
tween the political representation of  consumers in policy making and regulation, and their place 
as merely economic identities, is core to this research. Ideologically many who followed the New 
Labour project were committed to the ‘third way’ idea, that the benefits of  markets could be uti-
lised in the interests of  citizens and consumers. Consumers in this regard were seen as the people 
on the ground for whom regulators would act on behalf  of. Ideology in this respect is important, 
as it frames how individuals understand concepts and the world around them (Gramsci, 1971). 
Neoliberalism, in theory, sees the free market as the most effective form of  organisation, which 
guarantees increased freedom for individuals, both positively in terms of  the choice of  products 
and services available economically, and negatively from inefficient, and elitist, government in-
tervention. What consumer organisations therefore provide is a perfect form of  representation 
that appeals to dimensions of  neoliberalism, in that they cast individuals as consumers. As will be 
shown in the next chapter on Norway (chapter 7), there are similar tensions with regard to con-
sumer representations’ relationship to the state and civil society, witnessed there, albeit shifted more 
towards a more social democratic ideology. 
However, as has been suggested, that the UK, in Europe at least, has been one of  the pioneers 
22 See Appendix 1.1 (p.159) for a list of  interviewees and interview dates. Interviewee initials used in main text. 
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when it comes to neo-liberal reforms (Christensen, 2005, p.736; Harvey, 2005). This is witnessed in 
both the general deregulation that occurred during the 1980s and the privatisations that occurred 
at the end of  the 80s. Since then there has been an increase in the use of  marketisation, from 
private finance initiatives, public-private initiative and a broader use of  New Public Management 
schemes (Moran, 2003; Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009), and delegated governance (Flinders, 2006).
What needs to be made clear here, is that the identification of  people as consumers exists in 
a context that is value-laden. Neoliberal ideology, and the current ideological paradigm, posits 
the market as the best way to secure efficiency and the best outcomes, and regulation is used as a 
tool to ensure that the public interest is upheld. It is in this respect that neoliberalism constructs 
consumers, and consumer organisations, as functioning inside of  markets, not outside of  markets 
where the potential agency lies. 
This chapter will now move to consider the empirical evidence on the various organisations and 
institutions that represent consumers in UK policy making and regulation. This is done in order 
to show the role consumer organisations have in regulatory and policy making processes, and to 
outline the structures and institutional design which determine the extent of  their inclusion and 
activity. 
6.4 Organisations: 
6.4.1 Consumer Organisations 
This section will now assess the important consumer advocacy organisations in the UK. These are 
split into two types; ‘generalists’ that concern themselves with a variety of  sectors and policy issues, 
and ‘sectoral’ organisations whom concern themselves with very specific policy and regulatory 
domains. It is important to make this distinction, as this thesis is primarily concerned with the gen-
eralists and their role, as the specialist sectoral organisations can be seen in a similar light to single 
interest pressure groups. What is interesting about consumer organisations, is those organisations 
which claim to represent consumers as a whole constituency. It is this relationship between indi-
viduals, consumer bodies, and regulators and government that is of  interest, as it is these groups 
who have more of  an ‘insider’ role in the policy process than single interest organisations. It is also 
the case that the term ‘consumer organisation’ can be used as a bracket term for any organisations 
representing different constituents of  ‘consumers’. These include charities, like Age Concern and 
the Royal National Institute of  Blind People (RNIB), and pressure groups like Voice of  the Listener 
and Viewer (VLV) and International Broadcasting Association (IBA) in media issues, among many 
others. 
Although this may seem an obvious point, it is important to say that what are termed ‘consumer 
organisations’, are different to what determine themselves as ‘consumer organisations’. It seems to 
be the case that regulators and policy makers, in the current paradigm, determine anything rep-
resenting individuals in forums and consultations which deal with regulation as ‘consumers’; they 
are the ‘end users’ and are one of  many ‘stakeholders’. It could well be argued that this is of  course 
the case as soon as an individual is evolved ‘in a market’ then they become ‘a consumer’, regardless 
of  whether or not there are social or political dimensions to the decision.  This research is primar-
ily interested in those organisations which explicitly see themselves as ‘consumer organisations’. 
This was outlined at the start, but is repeated here to make clear that there is a difference between 
organisations – there is a heterogeneity in organisations that might not be clear when looking at a 
block of  ‘consumer interest’, in the same way that there are a multiplicity of  identifying features 
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for individuals; young, old, rich, poor, man, woman, able-bodied, disabled etc. The question of  
the extent to which these other organisations, who do not explicitly identify with being consumer 
organisations but are charities, citizen organisations or pressure groups, have become ‘consumer 
organisations’, is an important one but which cannot be addressed here. 
This section will now consider two of  the most important consumer organisations in the UK 
with regard to regulation and policy making over the past decade; Which? and Consumer Focus. 
In line with the definition set out in chapter 2 (p.22) these two organisations conform to the idea 
of  a ‘generalist’ consumer organisation, and Consumer Focus is the only one situated in the sturc-
tures of  the state as an NDPB. In addition Which? is the most high profile independent generalist 
consumer organisation in the UK. It will then look at the variety of  other organisations bracketed 
under the term ‘consumer organisations’ by the regulatory structure, but who would not necessar-
ily identify with that label in their day-to-day activities.  
6.4.2 Consumer Focus
Consumer Focus is a non-departmental public body, created under the Labour government 
through the merging of  the National Consumer Council, Postwatch, Energywatch and the re-
gional consumer councils in 2008 as part of  the Consumers, Estate Agents, and Redress (CEAR) 
Act 2007. It was set up as the ‘consumer champion’, and was tasked with promoting the interest of  
consumers across the economy through both broad campaigning, lobbying of  business and govern-
ment to ensure consumers are always taken into consideration, and utilising their statutory powers 
(Consumer Focus, n.d.). The intention was to have a far stronger consumer representation body, 
as suggested by Lord Whittey, the Chair at the time: ‘Bringing consumer advocacy work into one 
statutory body will guarantee consumers a powerful voice.’ (Mayo and Whittey, 2007) What would 
have the weight were the statutory powers. These included the ability to conduct investigations 
into consumer complaints, with the ability to force businesses to hand over information, but they 
were, along with Which?, also designated as a ‘supercomplainant’ by the government. These pow-
ers were given to a range of  consumer bodies that were able to bring a complaint to the Office of  
Fair Trading that would be fast-tracked. These complaints, under section 11 of  the Enterprise Act 
2002, enables consumer bodies to make: ‘...a complaint to the OFT [or other sectoral regulator] 
that any feature, or combination of  features, of  a market in the United Kingdom for goods and 
services is or appears to be significantly harming the interests of  consumers.’ (Enterprise Act, 2002, 
p.5) In this respect Consumer Focus had two mechanisms with which it could pursue investigations 
into markets, both the statutory powers and investigation powers, but also their position as a super-
complainant. 
Consumer Focus has responsibilities with regard to specific sectors, like gas, electricity and 
post23, and also has a general advocacy function. There are various campaigns that Consumer 
Focus concentrates on, like consumer rights, financial services, digital communication, and pub-
lic services, but they also contribute to consultations on a wider range of  policy and regulation 
that concern consumer issues. This includes their regulator reports on salient consumer issues, 
which are the result of  some significant research. Recent topics include: Smart meters (Aug, 2011), 
Understanding Localism (March, 2012) and Trading Standards (June, 2011) (Consumer Focus, 
n.d.3). 
Consumer Focus is what Rose (1981) would refer to as an  ‘quasi-public consumer agency 
model’, in that they are a ‘...special agency which are, at least in part, charged with consumer 
protection watch-dog functions, thereby serving as an explicit instrument for the representation of  
23 See fig. 2 below.
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consumer interest.’ (Rose, 1981, p.22) 
What is important to note about Consumer Focus is their relative independence, access to 
resources, and that they are somewhat ‘on the inside,’ (RH, Interview, 2011). Their place as part of  
‘arms-length government’ gives them access to particular networks which are unavailable to more 
peripheral organisations. In this respect they could well be seen as ‘gatekeepers’, in that they share 
many of  the concerns of  more independent consumer organisations, but have access to other parts 
of  government like ministries, regulators and agencies. In the words of  one director Consumer 
Focus is the ‘best of  both worlds’, as they ‘...do not sit with in direct control of  government like a 
regulator would be... [and] have statutory powers,’ (RH, Interview, 2011) Furthermore: ‘...we do 
have a latitude and a freedom to express whatever views we want to express that is not either nec-
essarily in line with what the regulator is saying, or what the government, or relevant government 
department, is saying on a particular issue.’ (RH, Interview, 2011)
This corroborates what Rose (1981) says of  these types of  organisation, that their removal 
from direct political control can: ‘...exercise a fair degree of  autonomy under the terms of  their 
mandate.’ (Rose, 1981, p.22) This is seen as a positive development, as it overcomes some of  the 
problems with resources that beset collective action organisations, yet does not unduly impact on 
the relative independence necessary for an effective body. This situation, in which you have gov-
ernment funded lobbying of  government, has however recently come under some criticism, and 
these organisations have been termed ‘sock puppets’ (Snowdon, 2012). Although this criticism is 
primarily focused at charities and NGOs, the activities of  NDPBs, like Consumer Focus, could be 
seen in a similar light. However, Consumer Focus is directly answerable to parliament and has to 
report to government with its yearly financial reports (RH, Interview, 2011). Here we can see that 
the idea of  ‘a fair degree of  autonomy’ is ambiguous,  in that although the organisation has free-
doms to pursue areas of  interest, it is ultimately the government that hold the purse strings. This 
has been made most apparent in the BIS consultation on the consumer landscape (Sept, 2011), 
the subsequent response (Apr, 2012), and the Public Utilities Act 2012, which has, in addition to a 
wide range of  restructuring of  various ‘quangos’, resulted in the closure of  Consumer Focus, and 
the merging of  its responsibilities with Citizens Advice as of  early 2013. This transition, and the 
closure of  Consumer Focus in 2012, will be discussed more in the analysis chapter (chapter 8), with 
regard to how consumer representation, and its institutionalisation, is changing in the UK.   
However, what can be appreciated is that Consumer Focus acts much like any other consumer 
organisation, despite its relative proximity to the state. It responds to a wide range of  consultations 
(348 between 2008-2012) (Consumer Focus, n.d.2), publishes many reports on a variety of  topics 
(95 between 2009-2012) (Consumer Focus, n.d.3), it is an active member of  BEUC, the European 
umbrella consumer organisation, being on the board for a number of  sectoral units, and is active 
in both its contact with consumers, and its lobbying role. What is particularly interesting about 
Consumer Focus is the extent of  their statutory powers, as set out by Roger Hammond, Director 
of  Post and Regulation at Consumer Focus:   
We have duties and responsibilities, but we  have certain powers that enable us to investigate any 
market as we see fit beyond our statutory roles around energy and post. We have in the CEAR Act, 
our section 24 powers [that] are extremely strong, which enable us to be able to gather evidence 
from any business, any market participant, provided it is in pursuance of  any of  our functions.24 
(RH, Interview, 2011) 
24 This can also be found in the ‘What We Do’ manual, which can be found here: http://www.consumerfocus.org.uk/
files/2009/06/CF-What-we-do.pdf
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In many respects Consumer Focus is very much like other independent consumer organisations, 
but it is these statutory powers, and their relative proximity to policy makers and regulators (they 
share an office building with the OFT for example), that set them apart. The ability to be both a 
supercomplainant, and to conduct their own investigations on behalf  of  consumers, is significant. 
Their proximity is also important as they become a connection between other consumer organisa-
tions and the policy makers. In this respect Consumer Focus is in some way a corporatised interest, 
which will be seen when Norway is addressed in the next chapter. However, where in Norway re-
sponsibilities for lobbying, research, investigation and compliance are tasked to different organisa-
tions, in the UK it is Consumer Focus that is given all these. Of  course other organisations are also 
engaged in these functions, but not with the same responsibility that Consumer Focus has. This will 
be challenged in the ‘New Consumer Landscape’ that will see the closure and subsequent merging 
of  Consumer Focus with Citizens Advice. What will be put in place is a Regulated Industries Unit 
RIU), an idea proposed by Consumer Focus to ensure that the significant knowledge that has been 
built up around the regulated industries is not lost, and that the unit can benefit from sharing ideas 
and issues that occur across sectors. This was originally set out in the BIS consultation response 
(BIS, 2012, p.9), and has been further outlined by Consumer Focus themselves (Consumer Focus, 
2012). However, from all of  the interviews conducted for this investigation, in could be argued that 
there is significant danger that the ad hoc connections and relationships that have built up through 
the processes of  governance will be lost, despite the RIU keeping some of  this expertise together. 
The ‘bonfire of  the quangos’ becomes a burning of  bridges. 
6.4.3 Which?: The Consumer Association
Which? is an independent consumer organisation, which neither receives funding from govern-
ment nor industry. It is funded through its own business and membership subscriptions. Its finan-
cial, and therefore political, independence has given the organisations good standing nationally 
and internationally (IT, Interview, 2011). ‘It’s a not for profit commercial business which is also a 
charity, so we fund ourselves solely through subscriptions and our products,’(JH, Interview, 2011). 
Their principal services are a selection of  comparison magazines in which consumers can see 
products and services tested against each other. This type of  product testing became popular across 
Europe in the 1950s (Hilton, 2009), and Winward (1991) describes this model of  ‘organised con-
sumer’ as an ‘ideal type’ as they exhibit five crucial characteristics:
- Funded wholly or partly through membership
- Revenues gained from sale of  magazines that take no advertising.
- Comparative testing is a central tenet.
- Non-profit making, and use surplus’ for advocacy work, both lobbying and information.
- Acting as general representatives of  consumers in policy making and regulation, in giving evidence 
 to parliamentary enquires and specialist forums, and through initiating legislation.
(Winward, 1991, p.70-71)
What is crucial to the success of  Which? as an organisation, in that it has survived for so long, and 
has grown, whilst also contributing to policy debates, is its ability to be self-funded and not reliant 
on either government or industry.  As John Holmes, Senior Economist at Which?, says: ‘We are 
independent and not for profit...We don’t take any money from government, we don’t take any 
money from business, apart from taking a fee for Which? best buy stickers,’ (JH, Interview, 2011). 
This, they believe, gives it both financial independence, but also crucially, political independence. 
The political independence also has two dimensions; that it does not need to answer to anybody, is 
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not at risk from being closed down (as in the case of  Consumer Focus), and can claim to represent 
actual members rather than the more nebulous community that other organisations represent. As 
John Holmes says: ‘...because we have this independent revenue we are not subject to being blown 
off  course or otherwise influenced. We don’t need to worry about the government deciding to take 
our funding away, or abolishing us. We have been here since 1958...700, 000 members is useful 
but we tend to do advocacy work on behalf  of  all consumers,’ (JH, Interview, 2011). This does not 
necessarily disqualify organisations that do not have a membership, but it certainly helps secure 
Which? weight  when dealing with regulators and policy makers.  As has been shown recently with 
regard to Consumer Focus, and their abolition, they are hindered by the fact that the government 
hold the purse strings. 
Which? also has a reputation internationally, which was brought up in interviews both in 
Norway and in Brussels. Which? themselves suggest this, as they often have visits from other 
European organisations enquiring particularly about their business model. This is possible to un-
derstand logically, as they are not reliant on anybody in terms of  resources, so long as they ensure 
there is some market for the various products they produce, like the magazine, they are then able 
to carry out their advocacy function. As one advocacy officer at Which? said:
We are the biggest member of  BEUC. We’ve had several consumer organisations not just in Europe, 
but internationally, who have come and spent a day here and are really keen to hear about our 
testing and the magazine, and our campaigning. We have quite a strong reputation just because 
we have been around for so long, and we are so involved in lots of  different things, I think other 
consumer organisations are interest in our model. (AS, Interview, 2011)  
As said this is corroborated by some of  the interviews in Norway and Brussels that brought up 
Which? as an example of  an ‘ideal’ consumer organisation. In Rose’s (1981) ideal-type models of  
consumer representation, Which? would be regarded as an ‘Independent Consumer Association 
Model’. They are explicitly political, rather than merely economic, in that they have: ‘...a primary 
devotion to the consumer protection cause.’ (Rose, 1981, p.22) This is shown in what the interview-
ee from Which? said that the organisation’s mission was: ‘To make consumers as powerful as the 
organisations that they deal with day to day,’ (JH, Interview, 2011) So Which? as an organisation is 
characterised by its independence, in addition to its business model, and a strong focus on con-
sumer advocacy. It is an explicitly ‘generalist’ consumer organisation but is separate from the more 
corporatist models like in Norway, and the quasi-public consumer agency model like Consumer 
Focus, by its fiscal independence.  
6.4.4 Others: Sectoral and Specific 
As can be seen from the table below (fig.2), there are a variety of  sectoral advocacy groups 
working across various industries in the UK. These include Consumer Focus who work in a num-
ber of  sectors, and the Communications Consumer Panel (CCP), which is specific to communica-
tions and works alongside Ofcom the media regulator. The CCP will be looked at in greater detail 
below when we look at how regulators have tried to adapt to consumer representation. What is 
interesting to note is that these organisations listed in the table below all exist in the various utili-
ties industries that were once nationalised, and are funded through a combination of  industry 
levies and public funds. They are organisations put in place to ensure a consumer’s voice is heard 
in policy making and regulation, in the various industries that do not experience the full benefits 
of  a fully functioning market, where consumers have a wide choice, plenty of  information and the 
ability to access different goods and services. In this respect there is an acknowledgement that some 
92
regulated industries require a ‘consumer champion’ to remind both the relevant regulator, and the 
industry more generally that there is a powerful voice for consumers that exists over and above the 
aggregated voice of  individual consumers. Due to the clear collective actions problems associated 
with nebulous constituencies like consumers, as mentioned in previous chapters, problem indus-
tries and sectors require a strong, and reinforced, explicit consumer presence in the policy and 
regulation system. In the very need to have such organisations shows that it thought that regulators 
themselves need regulating. This is the classic issue of  ‘Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?’, or ‘who 
regulates the regulators?’, which these consumer organisations could be seen to face.
PUAF is one organisation that should be mentioned here that acts in the interest of  consum-
ers in the regulated industries mentioned in the table above, but is also more of  a ‘generalist’. The 
Public Utilities Access Forum (PUAF), set up as a consumer advocate in 1989 as the major priva-
tisations  of  the previously nationalised industries were taking place. In their ‘Consumer Charter’ 
they state:  ‘PUAF has a particular concern for consumers who are on a low income, face discrimi-
nation, have particular needs or are excluded from power. PUAF believes that everyone requires a 
basic level of  provision to ensure an adequate standard of  living.’ (PUAF, 2004)25 They are specifi-
cally concerned with the extent to which consumers are represented, and have power over the 
decisions which will impact on them in the regulation of  the various industries. As an organisation 
they are particularly concerned with ‘affordability’. This is much more of  a concern with ‘access’, 
rather than ‘choice’. Choice for PUAF is of  secondary importance to individuals’ ability to ac-
cess essential goods and services, like many of  the utilities. PUAF is however, a broader alliance of  
organisations, which pay a membership to PUAF. It is both a talking shop for concerned organisa-
25 The PUAF Consumer Charter can be found here: http://www.puaf.org.uk/docs/news/PUAF%20consumer%20charter.pdf
Fig.2 Table of Sectoral Consumer Representatives from BIS consultation: 
‘Empowering and Protecting Consumers’ (BIS, 2011, p.40)
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tions, in addition to being able to develop policy that favours those on low incomes, or who are in 
some way disadvantaged. 
As Young (2001) has suggested, all of  these groups, Consumer Focus (previously the National 
Consumer Council), Which? (AKA Consumers Association), and PUAF, had a much stronger 
role after privatisation. In effect they became a second order regulator, policing the regulator and 
ensuring that, is as many circumstances as possible the consumer interest was at the heart of  the 
policy or regulatory proposal.
Charities like RNIB, W4B and Age Concern, are also considered under the rubric of  consumer 
organisations, as they represent a variety of  constituents as consumers. It is important to note that 
they are included in the various forums, but they are not explicitly and solely consumer organisa-
tions like Consumer Focus, and Which?, which are the important organisations for discussion here. 
There is however an further question as to how the variety of  civil society organisations have come 
to be understood as ‘consumer organisations’? It may well be the case that some of  the arguments 
developed in this thesis, that see individuals as consumers, makes the process of  regulation and 
policy making easier as complex public interest concerns are subordinated to concerns over choice. 
In so doing it means that the representative dimension requires consumer advocates rather than 
other forms of  representation that concern the broader public interest, despite the attention shown 
to some dimensions of  being a citizen. However this goes back to the discussion between consum-
ers and citizens that was had in the literature review (section 2.9), in which the tensions between  
individuals’ construction, or identification, between a consumer and a citizen was shown to un-
derpin some of  the more philosophical issues at the heart of  the debates around regulation (For 
further discussion see Bevir and Trentmann, 2007).
6.5 Regulators and Consumers in the UK
As has been discussed in the previous chapter (chapter 3) on the regulatory state, regulators have 
come to play a significant role in modern democratic polities. They ensure that industries and sec-
tors which have both a significant impact on people’s lives, particularly various utilities, but which 
are also not as easy to enter or exit for both consumer and producers. The regulators are there 
in order to protect the interests of  consumers, and to ensure particular standards are upheld, like 
environmental standards and quality of  goods and service. There is a great deal of  research about 
regulators and regulation from a host of  disciplines, summarized well in Baldwin et al. (2012). 
They refer to consumer organisations as PIGS (Public Interest Groups), a term which brings 
together any group or organisation intent on advocacy and lobbying on behalf  of  ‘end-users’ – 
not the government, and not the regulator, and not the industry. Regulators come in a variety of  
guises; from the merely informational to the more involved policing of  markets. Regulators are 
there to carry out the various policies and regulations set by governments, but which are intended 
to be relatively free from day-to-day politics of  Westminster (Baldwin et al., 2012, p.376). The in-
tention is therefore to have industries and sectors where the rules of  the game are fairly stable and 
not subject to fluctuation, something that is of  benefit to both consumer and producers. Baldwin 
et al. (2012) suggest that regulation can be seen in three different, but often overlapping, senses: as 
a specific set of  demands, as deliberate state influence, or as all forms of  social or economic influ-
ence. These are three degrees of  regulation, which regulators and agencies are put in place to 
administer. 
What this section intends to show is that regulators, although having the consumer interest at 
the heart of  their operations still require an external consumer advocate to ensure that these prin-
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ciples are adhered to. One particular regulator, Ofcom, has been chosen in this regard, principally 
due to the fact that unlike other regulators it has the consumer interest enshrined in its statute. If  
it is the case that even a regulator with such strict rules put on it requires this, then it would follow 
that it would also be the case for those regulators which do not have such strict, and explicit, re-
quirements to consumers, even if  it is understood implicitly by actors involved. What will be looked 
at here is the institutional design of  Ofcom with regard to consumer representation, and the inclu-
sion of  consumer organisations into regulation and policy making. 
This section will first outline some of  the characteristics of  Ofcom, it will then explain in detail 
some of  the forums and sites of  intermediation that are part of  the institutional design with regard 
to consumer representation and interest. It will show how consumer organisations are engaged by 
the regulator, and how the regulator has attempted to ensure that there is an active dialogue with 
civil society in the form of  ‘consumer organisations’. This will help to show how, in addition to 
individual consumer organisations like Which? and Consumer Focus, regulators are also engaged 
in consumer representation. This was outlined in Rose’s (1981) taxonomy of  consumer represen-
tation that was set out in the literature review (section 2.7), which refers to the Political-bureaucratic 
elite model – where existing regulatory bodies have concerns about consumer welfare, some special-
ist ‘individuals, offices, or departments’ will concentrate on representing consumer interests. The 
point here is to show how regulatory agencies are connected to consumer organisations in how the 
institutions are designed to include consumer organisations, like Which? and Consumer Focus, as 
part of  their core functions in their representation of  consumers. 
6.6 Ofcom, Consumers and Citizens
Ofcom is a special case as a regulator in terms of  consumer representation and this is why it is be-
ing considered here in some detail. It also highlights the intentions of  New Labour with regard to 
the  de-regulation of  markets, but with consumers in mind. Ofcom was also closely observed across 
Europe as an agency which ‘represented a prominent instance of  the new regulatory authorities to 
be established in all members states’ (Lunt and Livingstone, 2012, p.33), in light of  changes going 
ahead under the Audio Visual Media Services Directive 1997, and the convergence of  media mar-
kets. The old separate regulators were thought to be ill suited an age of  converged media technolo-
gies (Lunt and Livingstone, 2012). 
As Lunt and Livingstone (2012) also note the creation of  Ofcom was viewed with scepticism 
by neo-liberals who thought that these bodies would be unrepresentative and as a result would be 
largely unaccountable. Social democrats on the other hand saw these bodies as a way of  interven-
ing into the market in a way that would ameliorate problems associated with deregulation (Lunt 
and Livingstone, 2012, p.3). Despite the fact that regulation in general, and the regulatory state 
specifically, is done for the benefit of  consumers, Ofcom has a statutory obligation to serve the 
interests of  citizens and consumers (Comms Act 2003, s.3(9), p.3). Part of  the setting up of  Ofcom 
involved a particular institutional design concerned with achieving the core mission of  acting in 
the interests of  consumers and citizens. This section will now look at the three core bodies that 
were put in place to ensure that consumer interests were always at the heart of  what Ofcom did; 
the Communications Consumer Panel (CCP), the Consumer Forum for Communications (CFC), 
and the Communications Expert Groups  (CEG). This is done in order to take account of  the ways 
in which Ofcom institutionalised consumer interests and the connections to consumer organisa-
tions. This directly relates to the second research question regarding institutionalisation, but also 
the main research question concerning consumer organisations role in policy making and regula-
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tion (research questions can be found in section 1.3).   
6.6.1 Communications Consumer Panel, Forum and Expert Groups 
Most regulators have some facility for organisations to meet on an institutional and formal basis 
every so often. These can be termed ‘Consumer Expert Groups’, but sometimes have other names 
such as; ‘consumer advisory committee’, ‘consumer expert panel’, and ‘consumer forum’ for exam-
ple. There are differences in how these forums are populated, their responsibilities and ultimately 
the extent of  their authority. The communications sector in the UK has both a Communications 
Consumer Panel and a Consumer Expert Group, who are affiliated with Ofcom, albeit independ-
ent, and the Consumer Forum for Communications, all groups have different members and differ-
ent responsibilities, but overlap to some degree (CB, Interview,  2012). The first two are independ-
ent of  Ofcom and act as agents together, and the Forum is a more informal meeting house hosted 
by Ofcom. This section will now look at these in turn in order to understand the differences in how 
they are populated and how they act. This will give us an insight into the regulation of  a sector that 
in the UK is beset by public interests concerns, and rapid technological development, whilst taking 
into account the importance placed upon the media for a functioning democracy. The broader in-
tention is to understand how the media industry is regulated, and the extent to which the public, as 
either consumers or citizens, are represented in this regulation, against that of  industry. Gaining an 
understanding of  the place and role of  consumer representation in this respect is of  fundamental 
concern to understanding the tensions between markets and democracy. 
6.6.2 The Communications Consumer Panel
The Communications Consumer Panel (CCP) was established by the 2003 Communications Act at 
the same time as the establishment of  Ofcom, as part of  the ‘better regulation’ agenda. Through 
research, and with evidence, they are tasked as a policy advisory committee specifically concerning 
the communications markets, and are principally concerned with the protection and promotion 
of  consumer interests. It is made up of  a range of  individuals from advocacy, academia, industry, 
the trade union movement, regulation and the third sector; this currently totals at six individuals 
(2012). Due to Ofcom having a statutory obligation to consumers and citizens, as written in their 
constitution, they have been active in trying to ensure that there are processes with which interme-
diation between consumers, their representatives, and the regulators and policy makers can take 
place. The previous chair of  the panel, who is now the chairman of  Ofcom, Collette Bowe, says of  
the panel’s relationship with Ofcom:
There was no resistance to what we were trying to do coming from inside Ofcom. Ofcom is a 
regulator whose primary statutory duty is the protection of  consumers and citizens...Ofcom works 
under a very modern statute, and therefore consumers and citizens have primacy. So there was no 
question of  us having to set ourselves up in opposition to Ofcom. We construed our role as being more 
that of, that well-worn concept of, a ‘critical friend’. And I translated that into we thought our job 
was to tap Ofcom on the shoulder, with reasonable frequency, and say ‘you’re missing something’. 
(CB, Interview, 2012)
This suggests that Ofcom was from the outset explicitly concerned with the need to be reflective, 
and the need to have external advice specifically concerning consumer issues. The very fact that 
these safeguards, or processes, were put in place and enacted from the very inception of  the regu-
lator is, I think, telling. It suggests that, without them the regulator might do otherwise, there by 
potentially going against the remit of  the statute. This is something that the literature on regulatory 
96
capture is familiar with: that regulator soon becomes ‘captured’ by industry, or by ‘compact, organ-
ized interests’, at the expense of  ‘a diffuse group’ (Balwin et al, 2012, p.44), much like consumers. 
This by no means translates into concrete and instrumental influence on the part of  consumer 
organisations, but does show a concerted effort, that is more than just lip-service to an idea of  
inclusivity and deliberation within the process of  regulation. Lunt and Livingstone (2012), support 
this saying that: 
...we have observed Ofcom’s work in generating independent, publicly available research,  
encouraging public debate on communications policy, enhancing public deliberation through  
consultation and supporting the work of  civil society bodies to represent public opinion on  media 
and communications matters alongside enhanced stakeholder relations with industry bodies. (Lunt 
and Livingstone, 2012, p.185)
However, is this born out in their actions? Do they drive forward regulation and policy that directly 
responds to these concerns, and these processes? The case studies of  Lunt and Livingstone (2012) 
show that Ofcom generally prefers to give: ‘greater prominence to the market over social and 
cultural issues, grounds for concern over the effectiveness of  public engagement and consultation, 
especially as regards civil society bodies and the wider public...’ (Lunt and Livingston, 2012, p.185)
It will be shown in the case study here, that in the legislation on product placement, despite the 
significant opposition from public interest groups, and consumer organisations specifically, it was 
legalised, albeit with some concession to issues around children and unhealthy foods. 
However, the implementation of  measures like the various consumer bodies follows from the 
idea that the creation of  Ofcom, and the Communications Act 2003 more generally, character-
ised New Labour’s approach to new forms of  regulation, that was ‘historic’ in its reform and a 
consolidation of  the communications regulation (Doyle and Vick, 2005, p.75). The importance of  
consultation and public engagement was part of  this ‘changing nature of  regulation’, which ‘in-
creasingly means that institutional spaces for talk – in other words, for an evidence-based, consul-
tative, multi-stakeholder engagement in the discursive framing and negotiation of  policy – can be 
decisive in the process of  policy making and its consequences.’ (Lunt and Livingstone, 2012, p.33) 
This evidences much of  the literature discussed in the theory chapter around governance and the 
regulatory state, which at the same time as responsibilities are being devolved to regulators and 
agencies, there is also a participatory norm that demands an inclusion of  a range of  voices. It also 
corroborates one of  the main arguments of  this thesis; that consumer organisations have provided 
a ‘perfect form’ of  representation which enable the public to have a voice in regulatory forums but 
which does not ‘rock the boat’ away from a primarily market-led prescription of  organisation. This 
is typical of  some of  the intricacies of  neoliberalism in practice, where state intervention is to en-
able the proper functioning of  markets, but kept to a bare minimum. Thereby not getting involved 
in more complex public interest concerns, and inoculating consumers from being conceived in 
political terms. Consumer organisations in this respect play a particular role, they enable ‘better 
regulation’26 to be implemented but do not challenge prevailing orthodoxies regarding the power 
of  the market. Through a light touch, generally de-regulatory framework, consumer bodies play 
some part in ensuring consumer interests are best served. But as could well be argued, they are 
‘making the best of  a bad situation’, in that the context might be one which does not favour con-
sumers, or citizens, necessarily. The argument from the advocates of  minimal regulation would be 
26 The concept of  ‘better regulation’ is associated with government bodies such as the UK’s Better Regulation Task Force 
that was set up to ‘use ‘more imaginative’ thinking about regulation and have stressed the need to adopt minimalist or self-
regulatory controls in the first instance.’ (Baldwin et al., 2012, p.8)
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that in principle the markets will work in the best interest of  consumers, and that consumer organi-
sations are only there to ensure the consumer interest is taken into account, and to support them in 
the worst cases. 
However, the panel (CCP) was tasked with being a body within Ofcom, but independent from 
it, that would specifically and diligently research and lobby on behalf  of  consumers. The CCP 
is a particularly unique body, as it has a very healthy budget in order that it can carry out rigor-
ous research, and that it is more ‘on the inside’ than independent consumer organisations. In this 
respect they serve as a ‘go-to’ for far less well-resourced consumer organisations who want to get 
perspectives through to Ofcom (CB, Interview, 2012). They are also referred to unofficially as ‘the 
great and the good’ (CB, Interview, 2012), in that they do not necessarily have any particular back-
ground in consumer issues, but they are experts in a variety of  relevant fields. The Panel is there-
fore very much the technocratic side of  the consumer representation in Ofcom, unlike the Forum 
which is more representative. 
In addition, the Panel has a memorandum of  understanding with both Ofcom, and with 
Consumer Focus. This sets out each party’s responsibilities, and intends to strengthen their rela-
tionship at the same time as ensuring that they do not duplicate work (CM, Interview, 2011; CB, 
Interview, 2012). This shows a distinct connection with other organisations of  different types, 
which together form important governance networks. 
6.6.3 Consumer Forum for Communications (CFC)
The Consumer Forum for Communications (CFC) is an informal forum for consumer representa-
tives hosted by Ofcom. The purpose is for both interactions between members, in that they can 
share ideas and experiences, but also importantly to ‘help decision-makers to be as well informed 
as possible about consumers’ preferences and priorities.’ (Ofcom, n.d.) There are currently 38 
members, ranging from charities (Age UK), to non-departmental public bodies (Consumer Focus) 
to consumer advocates like PUAF, to consumer organisations like Which?, and to sector specific 
consumer/citizen organisations like Voice of  the Listener and Viewer (VLV). It is interesting in 
that there is such a wide range of  organisations represented in the forum, which could be argued 
to display considerable plurality of  consumer representation in the UK. The forum has a chair, 
whose job it is to best represent the interests of  the group as a whole. Her understanding of  the 
core mission of  the CFC is:
To help the members to understand the issues in communications policy as they affect their own 
specific constituencies and to formulate their views and to influence those policies. It’s a forum 
for helping its members; to help them by exchanging views and exchanging information with one 
another and, most of  all, being a convenient grouping for others to come and share information 
with them. That’s its strength; that as a group we can attract speakers whom we wouldn’t be able to 
attract just as one or two of  us. (CM, Interview, 2011)
In this respect the CFC becomes an informal talking shop for consumer organisations, which dou-
bles up as another avenue for organisations to interact with decision-makers. It works alongside the 
Panel to advise and criticise Ofcom’s activity, but with explicit encouragement to do so. One of  the 
key problems in consumer advocacy, and advocacy in general, is access to resources, in the form 
of  both money and time. This is one reason why Ofcom hosts such a forum, and actively encour-
ages it, that otherwise there might not be such a meeting due to both the lack of  resources and the 
diverse interests of  the members. As Claire Milne outlines: 
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It’s [consumer advocacy] extremely part-time for almost everybody doing it. Our resources are made 
up of  little bits of  time of  a large number of  people....Origins of  the forum are in the voluntary 
sector. It was originally set up as an association among consumer organisations more than 10 years 
ago. At that time it had a proper written constitution, and there were criteria saying who could and 
could not be a member. (CM, Interview, 2011)
The members of  the forum are decided upon between the Chair and Ofcom, so long as the indi-
vidual or representative is a bona fide consumer advocate, then there is little problem in becoming 
a member, although over the last decade there has not been a great amount of  fluidity in the mem-
bers of  the Forum. The power that the Forum has is gained from its representation of  a variety of  
consumer interest, from both the general consumer, to vulnerable consumers. It is this which gives 
it its weight with policy makers and regulators. As Claire Milne, the chair of  the Forum, says:
Government departments and regulators are only interested in talking to me as the chair of  the 
forum as I represent the members, not as an independent consultant.  If  it was a network or 
umbrella group the chair would be expected to be neutral. (CM, Interview, 2011)
This is interesting for two reasons. Firstly it shows that mere expertise is not enough, which casts 
doubt on the ideas of  just epistemic communities. It is about more than just technocratic informa-
tion and about being inclusive too. But secondly it runs against some of  the comments around the 
fact that the consolidation of  consumer interests into one voice hinders consumer pressure against 
the multitude of  industry stakeholders. This is therefore a crucial dimension; are consumer or-
ganisations hindered by their co-option into regulatory forums, or is it in their interest? This is the 
dilemma that faces the process of  regulation, and with consumer representation within it. 
One of  the most important aspects of  the forum is to provide a space for organisations and rep-
resentatives which takes account of  the resource concerns of  many smaller groups. As the Director 
of  the Content, Consumer and External Affairs unit outlines, it is not enough to just put out 
formal consultations and wait for a response, as this can end up with ‘unintentional bias’, with bet-
ter resourced groups, like industry being able to ‘out consult’ other interests (CP, Interview, 2011). 
This is the fundamental point behind Ofcom’s various consumer bodies; the panel, the forum, the 
expert group and the policy unit, to ensure that they adhere to their statutory obligations to ‘act in 
the interests of  citizens and consumers’. In this respect consumer organisations, in all their differ-
ent forms, are of  crucial, and therefore core, importance to the regulatory process. 
6.6.4 The Consumer Expert Group (CEG)
The Consumer Expert Group (CEG) is made up of  individuals from some of  the groups repre-
sented in the forum (CFC). The CEG exists as something between both the panel and the forum. 
It is smaller than the forum in its membership, and they are not necessarily representatives of  an 
organisation, both similar characteristics to the Panel (CCP). However, they are independent from 
Ofcom, whereas the panel is ‘semi-independent’. In many respects this group represents a half-way 
house between the panel and the forum, as it might be able to be more reactive than the forum, 
but with more of  a representative perspective.  It was set up in order to provide a direct advisory 
body to the relevant minister in DCMS (RC, Interview, 2011).
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6.7 Intermediation: Contact, Connections and Consultations 
In this section the intermediation between organisations, regulators and policy makers will be as-
sessed. It is split into four further sections: contact, consultations, connections and change. These 
are four themes that are connected themselves, but which are important to address individually. 
The nature of  contact between organisations and policy makers is fundamental to understanding 
the relationships between them. Whether or not these networks are enacted through only formal 
meetings, or whether they exist in informal networks, and the extent of  these, tells us details about 
the nature of  the role consumer organisations play. Consultations are a core part of  contemporary 
governance, and a way in which regulators and policymakers can both glean information from 
epistemic communities and also appeal to a notional democratic ideal. In this respect they form 
an important part of  how consumer organisations engage regulators and policy makers. This then 
moves on to talk about connections, which brings together both contacts and consultations to talk 
about the connections between consumer organisations and regulators and policy makers more 
generally. This takes into account the various institutional arrangements and actors that are in-
volved. The last sections concern the changes that have occurred over the last decade or so. This is 
an important aspect that I put to all interviewees to see whether there was any significant change 
over this time period in how consumer organisations were engaged with; it was nearly unanimous  
in that consumer organisations had become more involved and that the relationships between 
organisations and regulators and policy makers had improved.  
This is an important section as it seeks to address one of  the principal questions of  this the-
sis, whether consumer organisations provide a counter-balance to industry and agency pressure, 
though determining the extent of  intermediation between the organisations and the authorities as 
distinct from their contact with industry.
6.7.1 Contact and Connections
Contact between policy makers, regulators and staff  in consumer organisations is of  crucial impor-
tance to appreciating the networks that exist in regulation. There are four aspects to this contact 
that will be considered here: frequency, formality, instigation and issue. These are the fours themes 
that came up in the interviews from both prompting through questions but also often independent-
ly. It is also the case that these are the different elements of  contact that are important to get an un-
derstanding of   the relative importance of  consumer organisations; how often do they contact, is it 
institutionalised and formal or not, who generally instigates the contact (consumer organisations or 
policy makers and regulators), and what is discussed: general position on policy, technical advice, 
consultation response, or direct campaign lobbying. One of  the most important aspects to make 
clear from the start is that informal ad hoc relationships were greatly valued by all those who were 
interviewed. Even though the formal settings were an important way of  institutionalising contact 
between consumer organisations, regulators and policy makers, and which made something regu-
lar. 
In terms of  frequency, in the case of  Ofcom and DCMS, there is a formal, quarterly meeting 
with the Consumer Forum. This is the main-stay of  the institutionalised discussion between con-
sumer organisations, the regulator and policy makers. Since 2008 the primary responsibility for 
the Forum has been with the Consumer Affairs Unit. What is crucial is that it is Ofcom that hosts 
a forum that is intended to spark debate and discussion amongst consumer organisations, in ad-
dition to it being a forum where consumer organisations can inform policy makers. It is explicitly 
assumed that discussion will continue elsewhere, and that personal connections and networks will 
continue outside of  the more institutionalised dimensions. As explained on the Ofcom website 
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(Ofcom, n.d.). It is also the case that members of  the CCP are present at the forum, in order to 
keep the connections between the forum, the panel and Ofcom generally in place.  
However, in addition to all of  the formal dimensions, it was personal, and sometimes daily, 
contacts between staff  of  organisations and regulators and policy makers that were most impor-
tant. All of  the interviews with both consumer organisations, and regulators and departments 
made it apparent that ad hoc and informal meetings, discussions and emails were the primary way 
in which intermediation was conducted. It was of  course suggested that ‘if  you had the ear of  the 
relevant minister’ (RC, Interview, 2011) this would be of  considerable bonus, but that it was largely 
luck that put you in a position were, the ‘policy stars aligned’.
With regard to what is a relatively outsider, and specialist consumer organisation, Voice of  the 
Listener and Viewer (VLV), they value the networks that individuals build up with civil servants in 
various positions more than the formal connections. It is also the case that personal relationships 
play an important role in consumer organisations intermediation with officials, as Robert Clarke 
suggested of  VLV:
There is no doubt that having someone at the top like Joceyln (Hay), who had fantastic relationships 
with a whole raft of  key players, was invaluable. Underneath her, people like myself  and other board 
members, are developing their own networks in their specialist areas. It’s not so much the old-boy 
network, but in who you know, getting their confidence and maintaining a relationship of  trust and 
understanding. (RC, Interview, 2011)
In this respect it is the ad hoc contact becomes valuable to both the consumer organisations, and to 
officials. The organisations can, through constant contact, hope to ensure that a consumer perspec-
tive is taken into account in the formation of  policy and regulation. In addition it was felt by both 
officials, and by consumer organisations, that consumer organisations were valued as an informa-
tion source, and as an ‘ear to the ground’ (JH, Interview, 2011). In this respect the aggregate of  
consumer organisations, and those working within them, provided an epistemic community to the 
policy makers and regulators. The community of  consumer representatives together would pro-
vide vital information about what the salient issues were with regard to consumer in the regulated 
industries and beyond. This was generally seen to be the case both with civil servants, in depart-
ments and regulators, and for ministers. Although it was pointed out that ministers are of  less 
value to consumer organisations, as points of  contact, as they change so often. In this respect the 
relative stability of  the civil servants in the various regulators and departments enable long term 
relationships and connections to be sustained, which seems to be the most important contacts and 
connections for consumer organisations, and the state generally, but that if  luck was on their side 
the right minister in the right place was invaluable. As one spokesman said: ‘The sad thing here is 
that because the politicians keep changing they’re of  less value. But that is not to say that at crucial 
moments the right politician, in the right place is going to be invaluable to us, but you can’t bank 
on it.’ (RC, Interview, 2011) This is interesting as it suggests that although both regulators and 
departments are constantly looking for information on particular policy they are working on, and 
consumer organisations can provide that to them, the various projects can hinge on the perspec-
tives and priorities of  a minister.  This generally only applies to policy at a departmental level, but 
can still impact on general regulatory tracts at a regulator level. This is shown below with regard 
to product placement, which even though the broader regulator agenda is implemented by Ofcom 
when it comes to the granular policy details there can be changes at ministerial level which dra-
matically alter the course of  policy. In this case going from a ban on product placement, to liberal-
ising the regulations in line with the European agenda.
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However, for the most part it seemed to be the case that the presence of  consumer organisation 
in the regulatory and policy environment meant a subtle embedding of  the consumer interest in 
the general approach. Most of  the individuals interviewed thought this to be the case, even though 
there maybe times where that had specific impact on a regulation or policy development, it was 
this immeasurable ‘embedding’ that they that to be the most important dimension of  their work. 
The regulators and policy makers also suggested that this was the case. As a spokesman for one 
organisation, VLV, put it:
It’s [impact] subtle. Sometimes there can be occasions where we can see we put that in or something 
was missing which we’d suggested be taken out. There is concrete evidence of  impact. I’m told, as 
I wasn’t there, that the citizen/consumer remit of  Ofcom was strengthened thanks to consumer 
[organisation] input into the 2003 Communications Act. (RC, Interview, 2011)
This brings together the three dimensions of  potential influence; the subtle embedding, the con-
crete input on a particular policy or regulation (positive), or the removal or stopping of  a particular 
policy or regulation (negative). Even though the second two dimensions are important, they are 
relatively random, relying on a host of  conditions to be on the side of  the organisation. What is 
the most important is the subtle embedding, through constant contact with civil servants through in-
formal networks. It seems logical too, that in an environment which establishes that the consumer 
interest is paramount, witnessed in the implementation of  the consumer interest into the statute of  
the newest regulator, there is an ideology that promotes the consumer interest as the public inter-
est. In this circumstance, where regulators and policy makers are tasked with gathering evidence 
and creating ‘better regulation’ through engaging with stakeholders, it is consumer advocates that 
ensure that the consumer interest is kept at the forefront. In this way many consumer organisations 
and policy makers and regulators share norms about both the market, the place of  regulation and 
the importance of  consumers. An epistemic community, like Haas (1989; 1992) suggests, is created. 
This could also be spun as being “captured by the consumer interest”, as if  it were the opposite, 
where industry and business shared norms of  the free-market, for example, it would be termed so. 
But the difference here is that the regulators have a statutory duty to consumers and citizens, not in-
dustry, and Parliament is meant to represent citizens, not industry. The concern is both the extent 
to which these organisations have an influence, regarding the consumer interest, over and above 
the producer interest, and if  this interest is, normatively, a good or a bad thing for individuals; is it 
really in their interests?
This next section will look at a specific site of  intermediation, consultations. They are used 
by most institutions, in most Western democracies, in order to get information from civil society 
and the public sphere more widely. It is a process of  research in order to ensure that the proposed 
policy and regulation maximises utility for the stakeholders involved, in theory. They are interest-
ing in that they enable a constant dialogue between officials and the various stakeholders in civil 
society, but also that they enable both a democratic mandate to be reached through some sort of  
dialogue, but also an efficiency mandate to be gained through gaining up-to-date information on 
specialist sectors.  
6.7.2 Consultations
Consultations have become a core part of  contemporary policy making in both the UK and 
Norway, and are considered a vital part of  the regulatory and policy making process by all those 
interviewed.  However, there has been some scepticism with regard to consultations at the EU level 
at least, that they fail to really provide the technical detail that the policy makers really want. This 
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shows that there is a considerable technocratic dimension to the consultative and participatory 
culture, and the process is not an end in itself. This is one tension that concerns us; is the inclusion 
of  consumer representatives a concern with the principle of  more porous governance processes, 
or a technical concern for better regulation? The director of  the Conent, Consumer and External 
Affairs Group at Ofcom, a relatively recent department, said that these aspects were not necessar-
ily incompatible, and in fact were both of  great importance: ‘The right answer is the right answer 
objectively in terms of  consumer outcomes, but also the right answer in so far as its been arrived 
at through a fair process...the process being fair is important to getting the answer correct but it is 
also important in and of  itself.’ (CP, Interview, 2011)
Consultations can also be understood both in very narrow terms, of  the specific consultations 
that are sent out and require direct reply by a particular date, but can also be seen in a wider sense 
as a constant process of  engagement (CP, Interview, 2011). In this respect regulators and depart-
ments act very differently some with more of  a regulatory culture than others. Ofcom, it appears, 
has an extremely engaged and active consultative culture, in which they really feel that outside 
perspectives are fundamental to their work. In addition is the fact that there is a multifaceted 
way of  drawing upon the views and perspectives of  civil society, which is bound to the regulator 
through institutional design. It seems to be the case that Ofcom are acutely aware of  the problems 
that beset regulation in terms of  both how it is constructed, and problems that various constituen-
cies may face in its implementation. This is well put by Claudio Pollack the director of  the Conent, 
Consumer and External Affairs Group at Ofcom:
As a regulator it is absolutely pivotal for us to engage with interest groups, it is absolutely vital that 
we seek out interest groups rather than wait for them to come to us, because in developing policy it is 
important that we hear the full range of  informed views and perspectives and there is a very big risk 
of  unintentional bias if  you just have one model of  consultation in which you publish documents 
and wait for people to come to you. (CP, Interview, 2011)
In an overview it is clear that Ofcom, despite its deregulatory agenda, places a significant impor-
tance on the role of  consumer representation in the process of  policy making – or says that it does. 
The fact that Ofcom are obliged by statute to act on behalf  of  consumers and citizens is funda-
mental to how the institution has been shaped. This includes the creation of  the Consumer Policy 
Unit which is tasked with assessing and investigating dimensions of  regulation that will impact 
on consumers as a routine and daily operation. From what we can see Ofcom is a special case 
amongst regulators in this respect.  They have the three different bodies, both independent and 
semi-independent, and both of  an epistemic quality (CCP and CEG) and a more representative 
quality (the Forum).
It is also the case that not only do Ofcom constantly review their principle activity, the act of  
regulating, but are also constantly reviewing, and reflecting upon, their engagement practices too. 
In this respect consumer organisations are a core part of  the process of  regulating as all the vari-
ous aspects of  consultation and engagement; the panel, the forum, formal consultations, and the 
consumer policy unit itself, work together to bring all the various dimensions of  consumer repre-
sentation together. 
However, the institutional design, which the various bodies and policy units are a manifesta-
tion of, do not in themselves mean that consumer interests necessarily make it into legislation and 
regulation, but do show that there is a concerted effort to ensure that consumer perspectives are, at 
the very least,  on the agenda. It is telling that Colette Bowe sees the role of  the CCP as a ‘friend 
who can tap Ofcom on the shoulder to remind them of  their remit,’ (CB, Interview, 2012) as this 
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suggests that there is a constant risk of  ‘mission drift’ away from the consumer interest. This sug-
gests that the consumer interest, and by extension consumer organisations, could be seen to be 
both peripheral in that regulatory missions tend to gravitate away from consumer interests towards 
either producer or agency interests (not to say that these are not necessarily aligned), to be pulled 
back into line by consumer representatives. Or that they are core, in that regulatory decisions de-
spite meandering away from their core interests of  consumers, will always return to the fundamen-
tal tenet; that they are chiefly concerned with consumer issues as set out in statute. So it is possible 
to view this from two perspectives: that consumer interests are (1) peripheral and therefore rely on 
consumer representatives to ensure they are taken into account and follow statutory duty, or that 
(2) consumer interests are core and consumer representatives embellish and strengthen this. This 
will be assessed in greater detail in the analysis chapter below (chapter 8). 
Now a particular policy issue, product placement legislation, chosen as it highlights the tension 
between producers and consumer well, will be examined in relation to consumer interests. This is 
done in order to see the extent to which consumer or producer interests are taken into account in 
a particular policy setting, but also to explore the way in which the policy making occurs with, or 
without, regard to consumer organisations. This helps us to better answer the research questions as 
it puts the efforts of  consumer organisations into a specific policy context.
6.8 Policy Issue: Product Placement 
An example of  a policy and regulation issue, where there are typical producer vs. consumer inter-
ests issues at stake, is the debate around product placement advertising on domestically produced 
television in the UK. It is a classic example of  deregulation which favours the interests of  produc-
ers, as both the broadcasters have an additional revenue stream and advertisers have increasing 
coverage. For consumers there is the issue of  the extent of  commercialisation of  culture more 
broadly, but specifically that advertisers  become involved in the actual production of  program-
ming in order to advertise products. This includes the inclusion of  commercial messages in scripts, 
to the nearly total control over productions by those companies investing in the potential advertis-
ing.  Commercial Hollywood films, where there is no regulation around product placement, are 
seen as ways in which to facilitate the promotion of  secondary products. 
6.8.1 TWFD and AVMSD
Most European nations have had some form of  broadcasting legislation for many decades. These 
have required there to be a clear and distinct separation between advertising and the rest of  pro-
grammed material. In the UK this was initially set out in the Television Act 1954. In 1989 the 
Television Without Frontiers Directive (TWFD) was implemented at an EU level with one simple 
goal in mind: for there to be a single market in television broadcasting (HL Paper 27, 2006-07). 
The intention was, like much EU legislation, to harmonise media markets to enable firms to com-
pete across borders. 
Due to the rapid pace of  technological change in telecommunications specifically, which has 
brought about significant developments in the media with online content reaching increasingly 
higher levels of  audience penetration as traditional media forms, the TWFD needed to be up-
dated in light of  this. This is where the Audio Visual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) came in. 
Outlined below is a timeline of  the key events regarding product placement legislation in the UK.
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6.8.2 Product Placement Legislation: Timeline of Key Events (1989-2011) (UK)
1989 – TWFD adopted
1997 – TWFD – Updated
2003 – AVMSD Consultation 1
2005 – AVMSD Consultation 2
2005 – Ofcom Consultation on Product Placements (19th Dec 2005 - 13th March 2006)
2006 – Ofcom Consultation Responses on Product Placement (18th Oct 2006)
2007 – AVMSD – Revision of  TWFD – (to be implemented by Nation States by 2009)
2008 – DCMS consultation on AVMSD (July – August 2008)
2009 – DCMS consultation Responses on AVMSD (March 2009) – No conclusion on PP.
2009 – ‘Ban on PP remains’ – Secretary of  State (DCMS) Andy Burnham (March 2009)
2009 – ‘Ban to be reconsidered’ – Secretary of  State (DCMS) Ben Bradshaw (Sept 2009)
2009 – Letter to Bradshaw from Coalition against PP (Sept 2009) 
2009 – DCMS consultation on PP (9th Nov - 8th Jan 2010)
2010 – Ministerial Statement (Bradshaw) (9th Feb) 
2010 – DCMS consultation Responses on PP (March)
2011 – Product Placement allowed on UK television (28th Feb)
The most interesting aspect of  this time-line, and why it is being included here, is the point be-
tween the change in ministers. This was seemingly crucial to the eventual adoption of  the more 
liberalised legislation coming from the EU in the form of  AVMSD. Despite all of  the consultative 
process, going back to 1989, Andy Burnham, the then Culture Secretary, had decided in 2009 that 
the ban on product placement would remain. However, not soon after the minister changed to Ben 
Bradshaw, the decision to continue the ban was reversed and product placement was to be allowed. 
This is what was suggested by the spokesman for VLV, that a minister can make the difference, 
explicitly citing the case of  product placement as an example (RC, Interview, 2011). So despite 
structures being important, and as argued in this thesis to be broadly determining, in this case it 
was the individual that seemed to make the difference. However, it could well be argued that Andy 
Burnham was swimming against the de-regulatory tide, and that the broader structures where 
against him, and that it therefore took someone with less conviction about the particular case of  
product placement to change the policy. In this respect the relationship between structure and 
agency, as not oppositional concepts but part of  an intricate feedback, can be shown. 
Despite the fact that product placement was allowed, however, there were some marginal gains 
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made by consumer organisations. Even though they were unhappy about the relaxation of  the ban 
in general, there were still specific demands made on the regulation. This mostly revolved around 
vulnerable consumers, children specifically, and the advertising of  high fat foods, also known as 
junk food. Although product placement was to be allowed, there would be strict regulation against 
the placement of  these products, and there would be sensitivity towards vulnerable consumers 
(DCMS, 2010, p.4). The fact that there was a position change, but which had conditions, shows 
one example of  how the consumer interest can be included despite an overall policy programme 
that largely benefits the producer interest. The position of  consumer organisations is well put by 
the Children’s Food Campaign spokesperson, Jackie Schneider: 
 
It is good news that the massive pressure from health, consumer and children’s groups has forced 
Ben Bradshaw to drop plans to allow the product placement of  junk food...[However] We are very 
uncomfortable that plans to allow some product placement will still go ahead. This creates the 
possibility that a future government could still allow placement of  junk food through the back. The 
political parties should be warned that any attempt to reintroduce product placement of  junk food in 
the future will be met by the same massive level of  opposition that won this argument. (sustainweb, 
2010)
6.8.3 Product Placement – Consumer vs. Producers
The discussion,  debates and arguments around product placement legislation acutely exposes 
some of  the tensions that this research is concerned with; the primary tension being the cleavage 
between consumers and producers. The relaxing of  legislation on product placement in Europe, 
that began with the Television Without Frontiers Directive in 1989, which was updated to take 
account of  various technological changes to the Audio Visual Media Services Directive in 2007, 
was part of  a broader attempt at the harmonisation of  broadcasting legislation across Europe. It is 
a particularly telling example which concerns both the need for advertisers and producers to find 
new revenue streams in the face of  a continuously fracturing audience, against the clear public 
interest concerns around the over-commercialisation of  domestic production. It should be noted 
that product placement has been allowed on European television screens, but only if  the program 
shown was made outside of  Europe. This particular case therefore pits consumer against producers 
in an acute fashion, which, through analysis can show us the extent to which the consumer interest 
is taken into account in the face of  various changes in markets. 
6.9 Conclusion
This chapter has given an insight into the place that consumer organisation have, and the role that 
they play in UK policy making and regulation. It has looked at a specific case, media regulation 
and Ofcom, to see how consumer organisations interact with the state, and to see what both the 
priorities of  the organisations themselves are, but also to see what the priorities of  the policy mak-
ers and regulators are with regard to consumers.
 It has been found out that consumer organisation may well have a significant place in policy 
making and regulation in the UK, despite the fact that the concrete influence they might have 
on specific policy might be fairly random. It is suggested though that even though there is a gen-
eral shared norm, both amongst officials, civil servant and advocates, but also institutionally as in 
Ofcom’s statute, toward the inclusion and importance of  consumer interests, it is still the case that 
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consumer organisations are necessary. What this suggests is that, on a case-by-case basis, the con-
sumer interest can either be seen as (1) peripheral and therefore rely on consumer representatives 
to ensure they are taken into account and follow statutory duty, or that (2) consumer interests are 
core and consumer representatives embellish and strengthen this.
Consumer interests, over the past decade, have become an important feature of  the regulatory 
landscape, as shown in the connections established both formally and informally. There is explicit 
implementation of  formal contact, through both forums and consultation, for the consumer inter-
est to be lobbied in the institutional design. However, the extent to which this is an active connec-
tion, rather than a passive connection, often depends on the policy areas and those involved – the 
issue. Overall though, it can be said that consumer organisations are generally seen as more ‘insid-
ers’ than ‘outsiders’. This is argued to have been largely due to a combination of  (1) the ‘better 
regulation’ agenda, (2) the need for regulators and policy makers to engage with civil society for 
principled and practical reasons, and (3) the broader neoliberal ideology that posits the market, 
which by extension   identifies people as consumers, as the most efficient form of  organisation.
The thesis will now move onto look at consumer organisations in Norway, specific attention 
being paid to what is referred to as the ‘consumer family’, the four main bodies that represent 
consumers: Forbrukerombudet (the consumer ombudsman), Forbrukerrådet (the consumer council) 
and SIFO (the consumer research council), and the Department for Consumer Affairs. It will detail 
these organisations and institutions and will argue that although in ideologically different contexts, 
consumer organisations face similar problems with regard to business lobbying and being regarded 
as generally peripheral to the regulatory and policy making process. 
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7. Empirical Chapter 2: Consumer 
Organisations in Policy Making and 
Regulation in Norway
7.1 Introduction:  ‘Norway doesn’t have any consumer organisations’ (IT, 
Interview, 2011)
This chapter explores and analyses the role of  consumer organisations in Norway. The comparison 
between the UK and Norway is useful as it can show us how consumer representation functions  
in similar contexts, in that both countries are liberal democracies, but contexts which are in many 
respects very different. Most importantly, it enables me to compare consumer organisations, and 
consumer representation, which have different ideological and governmental underpinnings.  In 
this respect it is possible to assess the extent to which differing structures produce different institu-
tional dynamics. The specific focus in this chapter is on the relationship between the organisations, 
the regulators and government department. This importantly includes the extent to which con-
sumer organisations are seen as either core or peripheral to the regulatory and policy process, and 
a method to analyse the role they have in the processes of  governance. Crucially the questions that 
I want to address are: does a different ideological setting mean that consumer organisations have 
different roles? And does the different setting and context impact the extent to which they are a 
core, or peripheral, part of  the regulatory process?  And what are the particularities of  the UK or 
Norwegian institutional setup that accommodate consumer organisations being part of  the pro-
cess? Can these structures be seen to either encourage the inclusion of  consumer representatives, 
or to marginalise them? The intention, as stated previously, is to gain an in-depth understanding of  
the regulatory culture around consumer representation, and the place that consumer organisations, 
in their different manifestations, hold within that. This is achieved through an analysis of  partici-
pants’ understanding of  their place within the system. This is the best way in which we can gain an 
understanding of  actors perceptions of  the processes, which in turn can tell us the extent to which 
consumer organisations are seen as core or peripheral to the regulatory process, and the extent to 
which they are understood to provide a counter-balance to industry and agency pressures. 
The aim of  this chapter is to get an in-depth understanding of  the structures, connections and 
positions of  consumer organisations in Norwegian politics, and to see whether or not consumer 
organisations really matter to the Norwegian state. What is crucial is to find out whether or not the 
institutional setup is favourable to consumer organisations in terms of  them being an integral part 
of  the policy process, and whether this might have changed over time. The central findings are: 
(1) consumer organisations are seen in a favourable light by policy makers, (2) their presence in the 
policy process is seen as positive, by regulatory and government officials, in terms of  providing con-
sumers with a voice, and (3) that consumer organisations have an institutionally privileged position 
in a typically corporatist way, yet feel they have little impact on policy and regulation. ‘They tell us 
what consumers are thinking,’ (ØC, Interview, 2011) as one senior policymaker put it. 
As would be reasonably expected consumer organisations in Norway provide a link between 
government officials and the public concerning regulation, but do not seem to ensure that policy 
and regulation are implemented with much concern for consumers. It is evidenced that they face 
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similar pressures that UK consumer organisations face, both in terms of  being outweighed by the 
business lobby but also the  Europeanisation of  much policy and regulation forces them to act 
more at a European level than domestically than before.
This chapter is structured in a similar way to the previous chapter on the UK (chapter 6), but 
differs slightly due to the fact that the consumer organisations, and the important institutions in 
Norway with regard to consumers, are different. The chapter is split into five main sections: it will 
first give a background and overview of  consumer organisations in Norway (section 7.2), it will 
then look at the broad political context in relation to ideology and the state (section 7.3), it will 
then look at the characteristics of  the main consumer organisations (section 7.4), then it will con-
sider the main government institutions with regard to consumer organisations (section 7.5), before 
concluding with an overview of  the core issues in Norway with regard to consumer organisations, 
mainly that despite their institutionalisation they seem to be relatively peripheral to the processes 
(section 7.6). The thesis will then move onto to the analysis chapter (chapter 8) where the insights 
from both empirical chapters (chapter 6 and 7) will be brought together, before moving onto the 
conclusion (chapter 9).
7.2 Overview of Consumer Organisations in Norway
As will be shown Norway has a tripartite consumer ‘family’ (EJ, Interview, 2011) comprised of  a re-
search body (SIFO), an ombudsman (Forbrukerombudet) and a consumer council (Forbrukerrådet). 
They each have a particular role in how consumer interests are represented, and all have reason-
ably close ties with the government generally, and their parent ministry (Ministry for Children, 
Equality and Social Inclusion) and the Department of  Consumer Affairs (DCA) specifically. The 
DCA then represents the consumer interest in broader policy making and attempts to lobby 
other ministries, and the EU commission, in consumers’ favour. These ties and connections will 
be looked at in greater detail below through an analysis of  discussions with officials from all or-
ganisations in the ‘consumer family’, officials from the Department of  Consumer Affairs, and an 
official from the Ministry of  Culture. This will enable a deeper understanding of  the connections 
between the various institutions, in order that the key research questions can be addressed: what 
role do consumer organisations play in Norwegian policy making and regulation? Do they provide 
a counter-balanced to industry and agency pressure? And in what respect are consumer organisa-
tions understood to impact upon policy and regulation?
The Consumer Ombudsman is specifically tasked with upholding the Marketing Control Act 
2009, and ensuring that goods and services are not misrepresented to consumers. They have taken 
on a number of  high profile cases, in particular one against Apple (Forbrukerombudet, 2008), and 
another against Facebook (Forbrukerombudet, 2012), both done in partnership with the Consumer 
Council (Forbrukerrådet), and in the Facebook case other Scandinavian consumer organisations. 
In this respect they can be seen as being at the vanguard of  consumer redress, in that they ensure 
business compliance with the Marketing Act, although they are at times also proactive in policy 
advice. The ombudsman has regular meetings with the Director General of  Consumer Affairs 
in order to gauge and address current issues and concerns (GN, Interview, 2011). However the 
relationship between the Department and the consumer organisations seems to be stronger than 
between the Department and other ministries (GN, BF, TN, Interviews, 2011). This could well be 
explained by the epistemic community that arises around consumer issues and advocates generally 
– they all share similar ideas on the consumer interest.
SIFO is a testing and academic research institute concerned with various aspects around con-
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sumption and consumers (SIFO, n.d.). They have been testing products since the 1950s. They are 
regularly called upon to give independent advice on policy, and are well respected by both the 
Norwegian policy makers and EU officials. However, there is still some doubt among staff  about 
the actual impact of  their work and advocacy in the policy process, which tallies with the other 
members of  the ‘consumer family’ (UK, AN, EJ, Interviews, 2011). They are also involved in 
advising roles in Brussels, with both the commission and with BEUC (AN, Interview, 2011). They 
are funded in part by government but also by business, and the EU, through various projects (AN, 
Interview, 2011). 
The Consumer Council is the most typical form of  consumer organisation in Norway, in the 
sense that they are explicitly an interest group not a research council or an ombudsman. They are 
still government funded, although there are some attempts to reduce this and get them to be more 
self-sufficient (GN, Interview, 2011) They are in some respects an ‘agency’ but who regard them-
selves as an independent interest organisation. This is very similar to Consumer Focus in the UK, 
which is regarded as a non-departmental government  body. The council is by far the most overtly 
political arm of  the family, as the ombudsman’s activism has supposedly been reduced through 
government appointment (TN, Interview, 2011) and SIFO is not that proactive in terms of  its con-
sumer representation. The three groups used to all be based in the same building, but now only the 
council and the ombudsman share the same building. This means that their ties are closer than to 
SIFO, but they are still all well connected. They all have good connections to the DCA, and both 
the Council and SIFO seem to have close ties to BEUC in Brussels. 
The issue of  Europe was very apparent in the interviews, in that most of  the interviewees see 
campaigning and lobbying to be more effective at the European level than at the Norwegian level 
despite the supposedly close relationship that they seem to have, and the open system in Oslo (GN, 
TN, AD, UK, BF, Interviews, 2011). This is even to the extent that the DCA considers it to be 
more effective to lobby Brussels than some of  the other ministries in the Oslo (BF, Interview, 2011). 
Most of  the regulation that is of  concern, like the Consumer Rights Directorate or legislation on 
Digital Rights, is happening in Brussels, and therefore lobbying needs to be targeted there. It is too 
late to have an impact once it gets to Oslo. 
The subtitle ‘Norway does not have any consumer organisations’ was the words of  one in-
terviewee who has done considerable research on the Norwegian consumer movement (Theien, 
2006a, 2006b) . In her eyes the key institutions that exist in Norway are not typical ‘consumer 
organisations’, in the sense that they are not bodies of  consumers but arms-length advocacy or-
ganisations; they are essentially part of  the state. 
This is, in comparison to the UK, interesting as it shows a particular perspective towards cor-
poratised representation that challenges its representational legitimacy, something that will be 
discussed further in the next chapter (chapter 8). However, for this research the ‘consumer fam-
ily’ organisations still represent consumers as their core mission, and are therefore analysed here 
on the basis of  their place in governance networks. They are the relevant subject matter for this 
thesis, even though they may be democratically questionable, this will however be considered as 
part of  the analysis chapter later (chapter 8). What we can see in Norway is an epistemic commu-
nity concerned with consumers, both in terms of  redress through the Ombudsman, and in terms 
of  designing and implementing policy and regulation with the consumer interest in mind through 
the ‘consumer family’. But, their presence is by and large understood to be peripherally important 
even though they are part of  the institutional design.
Norway has a long tradition of  social democracy, which has meant that this ‘consumer family’ 
has been  seen as an important part of  overall policy. However, as understood from the interviews, 
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their relative standing in the policy process varies from case-to-case, as competition and choice are 
often seen as preferable to intervention. This relationship has not changed to much degree, and the 
impact of  neoliberalism seems to be slight overall. However, it is still possible to witness a general 
shift towards governance that appeals to individuals as consumers over citizens, and a preference 
for economic regulation over social policy, even in Norway (UK, Interview, 2011). The idea of  
consumer choice is a pervasive one, and providing there is competition and choice then other more 
socially orientated goals are not of  interest, a particularly neoliberal development. 
In this respect the chapter will now move to look at Norway in terms of  the ideological context. 
In understanding how a particular set of  interests, that of  consumers, is represented in governance 
processes requires that we take account of  the ideological context of  a political system (both in the 
UK and in Norway). One aspect this thesis highlights is the extent to which the dominant ideol-
ogy of  a particular context impacts upon the role of  consumer organisations. In this respect these 
questions are salient: Is there a significant difference in the institutional design between systems, in 
consumer organisations connections with government and regulators, and in the extent to which 
they are seen as either core or peripheral to the regulatory or policy process? And can these differ-
ences, or similarities be attributed to the ideological context? With this in mind the next section will 
outline the ideological conditions in Norway.
7.3 Ideology and the State in Norway
Norway, much like the other Scandinavian countries, is known to have a social democratic herit-
age. This has resulted in a ‘deep structure of  social democratic norms’ (Østerud, 2005), and also a 
type of  democratic capitalist system that is ‘tempered by small-scale enterprises and strong norms 
of  popular legitimation (Sejersted, 1993; 2000).’ (Østerud, 2005, p.707). What this research high-
lights is that this is of  fundamental importance when considering the role of  consumer organisa-
tions in the process of  policy making. The intervention into markets on behalf  of  individuals as 
consumers, and their representation by organisations, is therefore an interesting way to take ac-
count of  the extent of  this heritage, and the relationship between individuals, the state and markets 
in this particular ideological context. This is done through tracing processes and understanding 
perceptions in an interpretive research design. The major difference between Norway and the UK, 
apart from population and market size, is that of  ideology. It is therefore interesting to see that 
despite the differences in principle guiding ideology, similar concerns are felt by consumer organi-
sations. Whether this is a result of  an overarching neoliberalisation of  governance practices, or 
whether it is merely endemic to consumer organisations in capitalist democracies will be addressed 
in the next chapter (chapter 8). 
One of  the intentions of  this research is to critically assess the role of  consumer organisations 
in two different contexts and to analyse the democratic integrity of  processes of  network govern-
ance. My research suggests that ideology is an important factor in comparing the extent of  con-
sumer organisations role, and their relative stability over time, in both the UK and Norway. In 
Norway we see that although reasonably stable in terms of  their funding and activities, the extent 
of  the consumer organisations impact seems to be increasingly less. The organisations in the UK, 
and seen in the previous chapter (chapter 6), despite undergoing significant changes, including the 
outright closure of  one organisation (Consumer Focus), have found that their perspectives are taken 
into account, albeit inconsistently. In Norway the history of  consumer organisations has been one 
of  social democratic norms, which has meant an institutionalisation of  consumer representation in 
the form of  the organisations we still see there today. A key point in this thesis is that ideology is a 
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crucial difference in the way that institutional structures have historically developed.
It is also crucial to note the importance of  successive Labour governments on the consumer 
landscape in Norway. Theien suggests: ‘...the form of  socialism espoused by the Scandinavian 
Labour parties paved the way for a comparatively strong state involvement in consumer affairs.’ 
(2006, p.137) This is important as the development of  forms of  governance within an ideological 
frame is argued to impact on the extent to which consumer organisations matter to policy making 
and regulation. This is in theory as well as in practice. It is the case that Norway displays a more 
social democratic heritage that the UK, and one way this can be seen in the extent to which the 
consumer interest has been incorporated into the structures of  governance in Norway. Although, 
as will be addressed in the analysis chapter (chapter 8) and the conclusion (chapter 9), this does not 
necessarily mean that there is adequate representation of  consumers, in the sense that consumer 
interests are central to regulation or policy making, or that consumers are necessarily in a better 
off  position than in governances structures which do not incorporate consumer organisations to 
such a degree. The extent to which consumer organisations are either seen as core or peripheral is 
still of  concern in understanding their role in the regulatory and policy making process.
This is the essential point of  the comparison between the UK and Norway for this thesis; do the 
differences in the ways in which institutions are designed and governance structured have a signifi-
cant impact on the ways in which consumer organisations matter to policy making and regulation? 
Is it necessarily the case that a social democratic regime will have stronger consumer representa-
tion than a neoliberal one? In large part the answer is no; that in many ways the more neoliberal 
regime can be advantageous for consumers, but that maybe over time the social democratic state 
may end up being more favourable. 
Additionally Theien also makes the interesting point that consumption in the Scandinavian 
countries was encouraged to be viewed as a public matter, not a private one (Theien, 2006, p.137). 
This has ideological dimensions and developed alongside plan for ‘collectivist forms of  consump-
tion, most visibly in plans drafted in both Sweden and Norway for collective laundries, refrigera-
tors and even common meals within housing estates in the 1950s, inspired by British ‘community 
centre’ ideas.’ (Theien, 2006, p.137) So in this respect it can be seen that the UK and Norway, al-
though being underpinned by a particular ideological perspective, are not hermetically sealed units 
that do not learn from the others policy programmes. As was the case in the 1950s, like Theien de-
scribes, is still the case today, with the Consumer Ombudsman having visited the OFT on several 
occasions over the past decade (GN, Interview, 2011). The point is that the ideological contexts can 
become guiding principles, but are not deterministic. There are also international epistemic com-
munities dedicated to consumer protection issues, and also may share a particular world view, this 
will be further explored in the next chapter27. 
This chapter will now move to look at the three important consumer organisations in Norway. It 
will first look in detail at the three parts of  the ‘consumer family’ and will then consider the impor-
tant government institutions relevant to consumer protection and representation. Overall this will 
give an extensive picture of  how consumer organisations are positioned within the state and the ex-
tent of  their interactions in the processes of  regulation and policy making. This will be followed by 
the analysis chapter (chapter 8) where the information from both countries will be compared and 
contrasted. 
27 The large umbrella organisations Consumers International, and BEUC, bring together various national consumer 
rights movements. These organisations, although not necessarily having legitimacy at a national level, enable consumer 
organisations to share experiences and to learn from each other. 
112
7.4 Consumer Organisations in Norway
Consumer Organisations in Norway are limited. There are a few sectoral specific organisations 
like the Norwegian Automobile Federation (NAF), and a wide variety of  organisations that are 
concerned with consumer issues. These are largely a second order concern as their primary in-
terest is in a broader area like the environment, or health. In this respect there are few explicitly 
consumer organisations, like Which? and Consumer Focus in the UK. This thesis is concerned with 
the organisations that are explicitly and primarily concerned with consumer issues as a principal  
objective, and not as a second order objective. With this in mind it is possible to see that in Norway 
consumer representation is focused on three organisations, and one ministry, this will be the core 
focus of  this chapter – The Consumer Ombudsman (Forbrukerombudet), The Consumer Council 
(Forbrukerrådet), The Consumer Research Council (SIFO), and the Ministry for Children, 
Equality and Social Inclusion and its Department for Consumer Affairs. 
As might be expected in Norway the structure of  the system is of  a corporatist nature in that 
the interest of  consumers, and their representation through organisations, is funded and organ-
ised as arms of  the state – it is wholly co-opted. This has advantages, but also significant problems 
which will be addressed in the next chapter. The co-option of  consumer interests in the ‘consumer 
family’, in theory, feeds directly into the ministry responsible for consumer affairs, which then 
informs broader policy making across the government. There are of  course other operations that 
the three consumer organisations do, as they all have different functions, and it is also the case that 
what happens in theory is not what necessarily happens in practice. So this chapter will outline first 
the three members of  what has been called the ‘consumer family’ and will explain their institution-
al status, their primary objectives and how they are structured. This will be done in order to see the 
relationship between the consumer organisations themselves and between the consumer organisa-
tions and the regulators and policymakers in both the Government and Authorities (Regulators). It 
will then be possible to see what the role of  consumer organisations are in the Norwegian context, 
and whether or not the social democratic ideology, and institutional design has a bearing on how 
they are perceived and their position in terms of  being core or peripheral to the process. The key 
aspects that will be focused on are: what are the main responsibilities of  the various organisations 
and institutions; what connections the consumer organisations have with each other, with policy 
makers and regulators, and internationally (EU and other countries); how are consumer organi-
sations perceived in the policy process, and what specific policy issues have been addressed. The 
section starts by looking at Forbrukerombudet, the Consumer Ombudsman.
7.4.1 Forbrukerombudet – The Norwegian Consumer Ombudsman
In terms of  organisations remit and function the role of  the ombudsman is fairly straight forward. 
They are a public authority which acts as an enforcement body on behalf  of  Norwegian consum-
ers.  Their mission is to work to provide a more convenient and safer environment for consumers 
in Norway28. The Ombudsman’s responsibilities are set out in the Marketing Control Act 2009, in 
sections 34 to 39 (Marketing Control Act 2009). Their primary responsibility is to ensure that the 
act is complied with by businesses operating in Norway. However, within this is scope for a degree 
of  advocacy on behalf  of  consumers that goes outside of  merely strict compliance and enforce-
ment. Through their experience those at the ombudsman gain an understanding of  the consumer 
landscape and the issues that face consumers, which might be a different perspective from that 
28 The safety of  consumers has, as has been said before, been of  primary concern for consumer organisations around the world 
in that they are often principally concerned with the quality of  products and services and ensuring that businesses do not 
endanger consumers through malpractice.
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of  the other parts of  the consumer family. Having an enforcement agency of  this kind was also 
encouraged at EU level in the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005:
The consumer ombudsman model is also recognised more and more in European countries, 
because some years ago there came an EU regulation saying every country should have a 
consumer ombudsman to take care of  the marketing control act, the rules coming from the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. You have to have a body like us to deal with this act. (GN, 
Interview, 2011)
This is interesting as countries in Europe are being encouraged to ensure that there is a regulator 
dealing with unfair commercial practices explicitly. This suggests that the regulatory state does in 
fact include the institutionalisation of  bodies specifically designed to mitigate against some of  the 
more nefarious business practices that a wholly free market might encounter and support consum-
ers. 
The Ombudsman is also in this respect in touch with other domestic enforcement agencies 
(regulators) but also internationally other ombudsman, (like the OFT in the UK for example). It is 
also the case that from the typology set out by Rose (1981) the Norwegian Consumer ombudsman 
fits into the Quasi-public consumer agency model. Like Consumer Focus, and in many respects the OFT, 
these are arms of  the government specifically charged with taking care of  the consumer interest 
over and above merely having some individuals or offices with the responsibility. In this respect 
there are many parallels with the UK. As the OFT and Consumer Focus, like the Ombudsman 
and the Consumer Council in Norway, share an office building and have different responsibilities 
regarding consumer protection. The OFT enforces consumer protection law, like the Ombudsman, 
and Consumer Focus campaigns on behalf  on consumers, much like the Council in Norway.
The OFT and the Norwegian consumer ombudsman have shared many perspectives and con-
cerns over the past decade, including meeting with the OFT on various occasions (Interview, GN, 
2011). In this respect there seems to be international co-operation between enforcement bodies 
and regulatory agencies, in addition to that of  consumer organisations, in order to share experi-
ences and deal with common problems. This cooperation occurs across polities and markets de-
spite often considerable differences in both size and structure. This cooperation is interesting as it 
suggests that consumer organisations, and their role in the political process, face similar challenges 
with regard to de-regulation and the ‘rolling back of  the state’, despite the differences in govern-
ment, political system and market. It also could well be down to the processes of  neoliberalisation, 
and how consumer organisations are trying to adapt to a policy and regulatory paradigm in which, 
like Hilton suggests, ‘choice’ is privileged over ‘access’ (Hilton, 2009). This is why it is important to 
assess the boundaries of  consumer organisations’ role in policymaking and regulation and assess 
the extent to which they are seen as core or peripheral, as this is a way of  detailing the parameters 
of  the system and assessing the common ground evidenced between polities. 
In terms of  the Ombudsman’s work, they are officially responsible for ensuring that Norwegian 
businesses comply with the Marketing Control Act 2009, whilst simultaneously ensuring as greater 
protection of  consumers as possible. As said, this does also leave room for other activity. This is 
outlined by the Ombudsman herself: 
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We have this act that gives us our role, we can’t go beyond that act, but of  course this act is very 
vague. It is very much like the British one, as it comes from an EU directive. It contains very 
vague words like; misleading, unfair etc. Legal terms that are very vague and we have to fill it with 
something. This is a form of  consumer representation as we argue for what is misleading, or what is 
unfair. (GN, Interview, 2011) 
It seems to be an accepted practice that although officially they are only tasked with upholding 
the Act, their responsibilities are far broader. The activities of  those involved in consumer protec-
tion comes in many guises, from ensuring compliance in a domestic market, to lobbying the EU 
and the Norwegian government, to informing consumer and citizens directly. However, in Norway 
there is also a specific Department for Consumer Affairs in the Ministry for Children, Equality 
and Social Inclusion. This is the parent department and ministry for the ‘consumer family’, which 
oversees their activities. This department will be looked at in more detail below.  Although in the 
UK there is a parent ministry to the OFT and Consumer Focus, BIS, the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills, does both hold the purse strings, and have ultimate say, they are less close 
to the organisations than in Norway. For example, the Ombudsman (the head of  the organisation) 
formally meets with the Director for Consumer Affairs on a monthly basis, in addition to the two 
or three consultations that they will respond to from various ministries (GN, Interview, 2011). Here 
they discuss the current issues facing consumers, and by and large seem to have the same interests 
at heart. 
However, the specific issues that the Ombudsman as an organisation decides to focus on, on a 
yearly basis, is determined internally but with input from individual consumers: ‘We don’t consult 
them (consumers) to ask ‘do you agree with this?’ we just try to understand what they mean, and 
what is best for them [from complaints].’ (GN, Interview, 2011) When consumers complain to the 
Ombudsman about a particular practice that they are facing in a market it is recorded. Then when 
the yearly assessment is done the latest problems facing consumers are taken as the benchmark 
from which the new priorities are decided upon:
They [Heads of  Sectors] decide on a yearly basis what they will focus on for the coming year. They 
look to see what markets might be problematic. This is flexible to an extent. Each head of  sector 
gets together, who have also been on the phones to consumers complaining, and they then decide on 
what to focus. We take into account all the complaints of  the past year. (GN, Interview, 2011)
This suggests a significant input from consumers themselves, considerably more so than in the UK. 
Which therefore questions the extent to which more corporatist consumer organisations, like in 
Norway, are necessarily less representative of  consumer perspectives than more explicitly member-
based organisations like Which? in the UK. This dimension will be looked at further in the next 
chapter.
In addition, and more broadly, the Norwegian government has historically taken consumer is-
sues seriously, as evidenced in the setting up of  organisations in the 1950s, and in the more recent 
Marketing Control Act 2009. This has led to the implementation of  the structure of  consumer 
representation seen in the ‘consumer family’ that is in place today. However, that is not to say 
that this is not without its problems. It seems to be the case that the Norwegian system is faced 
with very similar issues to the UK, in that they are often relatively peripheral in the policy process 
compared to other interests, and that the ‘consumer interest’ is taken as one voice, against the often 
many voices of  the business lobby. However this might be felt less acutely in Norway possibly due 
to the broader social democratic ideology, whereas in a more neoliberal system there might be a 
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tendency to rely more on the market and less on regulation.
The Ombudsman as an enforcement agency, also cooperates with other enforcement bodies in 
Norway, including many of  the regulators. They have a general consumer approach which supple-
ments the more specific foci of  the other agencies:
We have a very general approach, a consumer approach, in all markets. So it is very important for 
us to have good cooperation specific enforcement bodies on specific areas where consumers are 
[having issues]. So to have a good cooperation with the enforcement body in finance, electricity, 
anything. The areas which have most other enforcement bodies don’t have economic value for most 
consumers. (GN, Interview, 2011) 
The point here is that other enforcement bodies do not have a principal objective of  ensuring 
consumer interest. They have different priorities as set out in their statutes. For example the func-
tioning of  a particular market, or good competition. So the ombudsman’s role is to ensure that in 
these discussions the consumer concerns are taken into account – and are as much as possible the 
principal concern.  
In addition they have an advocacy role, over and above the compliance role, which is important 
but one which they have to be shrewd about. It is clear that through their years of  operation the 
organisation has built up considerable knowledge in a variety of  sectors pertaining to consumer 
interests, but that as an organisation it is still part of  the political landscape and must  be tactical 
when it comes to its activity. In this respect in order to ensure the consumer voice is represented, 
and ultimately included in final policy and regulation, the Ombudsman is very careful about when 
and in what capacity they promote the consumer interest. As the Ombudsman herself  says:
We have to choose our fights...in some cases we would be satisfied to have the general consumer view 
taken into account, but in some areas it is very important for us to get specific legislation changed. 
I think that if  we succeed in getting this general understanding that consumer problems [are] also 
important for the market, it is easier for us when it comes to the important [specific] things that 
need to change. So it’s [about] building up confidence, not always shouting from the barricades for 
consumer rights but also that we know there are two sides. (GN, Interview, 2011) 
It is possible to see that the value for consumers, and therefore often the role of  the organisation, is 
to ensure that the consumer perspective is always present. This greatly reflects what was witnessed 
in the UK situation, and what was outlined to be of  significant concern, that in some circumstanc-
es the consumer interest is core and in others it is peripheral, and in each circumstance the role 
of  consumer organisations shifts. When the consumer interest is core to the process their role is to 
ensure it continues to be, and when the consumer interest is peripheral consumer organisations’ 
role is to ensure that, as best as can be, the process takes into account the consumer interest. This 
will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter when comparing what has been evidenced in 
the UK and in Norway.
However, the difficulty comes in the extent to which other interests are also involved in each 
process. When the consumer interest is core, then consumer organisations’ priority is keeping the 
regulation on track and attempting to work in other interests without compromising the core objec-
tive. But when it is peripheral consumer organisations’ role becomes more concerned with trying 
to get even minor consumer provisions taken into account, as other interests dominate the process 
leaving behind the consumer interest. This then becomes more of  a ‘banner waving’ role. 
So in a similar way to the UK, as seen in the previous chapter (chapter 6), the role of  the 
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Ombudsman is often to remind policymakers of  the importance of  the consumer interest in the 
process. This is especially the case when markets, and regulatory structures become more liberal-
ised:
When something important happens to the regulation of  a market we also see that consumer  
problems arise at least for a while, and then it’s important to have a consumer organisation  coming 
in to try to find a balance. And also maybe to give input to policymakers to say that “you forgot 
something in this legislation we also need this and that to make it right again”...often it is too late 
for them [consumers] to know about the problems. They need someone to help them to use their 
consumer power; information and minimum of  legislation that someone enforces and then on top of  
that they can use their consumer power. (GN, Interview, 2011)
 
In this respect, the role of  consumer organisations in both countries is somewhat similar. They 
form a connection between the policymakers and individual citizens and consumers. Information 
about problems experienced in the market, in how the market is regulated, is fed to the policy-
makers through the consumer organisations who collate the salient issues from consumers. They 
are then consulted by policymakers, who often come to them (GN, Interview, 2011), for input 
on the policy and regulatory process when there is a clear consumer issue at stake. So with the 
Ombudsman, in addition to their enforcement role, they are also part of  the epistemic community 
around consumer issues. Policy makers call upon them for their perspectives, both general and 
specific: ‘Some of  our opinions [on policy and regulation] would be very general, but some would 
be very specific if  we have certain qualifications in a particular area. But most often it is general.’ 
(GN, Interview, 2011) It is the areas of  specific sectoral competency which become of  interest as to 
the extent to which consumer organisations can fill the gap between being a general representative 
of  the rather nebulous and broad ‘consumer interest’, and being able to give targeted and specific 
advice on particular policy and regulation proposals. What is interesting is that often the call from 
policymakers is that they want high level, in depth ‘evidenced based’ policy proposals, where it 
seems that the ombudsman at least is more often called upon for the more general ‘consumer per-
spective’. 
This moves us onto to seeing one of  the problems that the ombudsman, and consumer organi-
sations and the consumer lobby have in Norway, which was also mentioned in the UK case. The 
most significant being that the consumer lobby in general faces significant opposition from the 
business lobby. This is most put most starkly by the ombudsman:  ‘If  you have two or three organi-
sations representing consumers in Norway, then you maybe have ten or twenty others represent-
ing the business side.’ (GN, Interview, 2011) The problem for consumer organisations often seems 
to come from the ‘consumer voice’ being bundled together – there is one consumer perspective. 
Whereas the business community has the opportunity to lobby and consult both as individual busi-
nesses of  all shapes and sizes, in addition to the business federations being able to lobby as well. 
There is also the issue of  resources, in that often businesses are able to utilise rather substantial PR 
budgets in the process of  lobbying, where other public representatives might not be able to. From 
the ombudsman’s perspective this has had a significant impact on consumer organisations activity 
in the last decade or so. 
What we see is that it’s becoming more and more difficult over the years to be the consumer voice in 
these processes [regulation and policy making] because there are more and more legal awareness in 
businesses, and they are much more organised and much more [often] represented by lawyers and 
they know that to lobby the ministry or government is very important for them. So I would say that 
117
it is more difficult for us to be heard with a consumer voice now than for instance 15 years ago...I try 
to represent ‘my’ consumers and find it more difficult now than 15 years ago. (GN, Interview, 2011)
The balance between consumer representation, through consumer organisations, and business 
representation is one that has changed. In some respects consumer organisations are seen to have 
become more involved in the regulatory and policy processes and in other respects they are seen 
to have become less involved. This issue was addressed in the last chapter on the UK, and will be 
looked at in greater detail in the next chapter as it is one of  the common features of  this research; 
that consumer organisations are at times seen as peripheral and at times seen as core to the policy 
and regulatory process. In which circumstances which is which, and why this might be the case, 
will be considered in the next chapter.
What seems to be the case in looking at the role of  consumer organisations in regulation and 
policy making is that there are no general rules. Even if  it was the case that resources had in-
creased, or that consultation responses had increased, this tells us little about the extent to which 
the organisations, and by extension consumer representation are taken in to account in the con-
struction and implementation of  policy and regulation. This does not mean that nothing is known 
though. What this research shows is that we can gain an understanding of  institutional contexts 
in which consumer organisations operate, which also tells us a great deal about how interests are 
arranged in the regulatory environment. It seems to be the case that in the UK and Norway there 
are similar problems that consumer organisations, and consumer representation more broadly 
faces, and this comes down to the extent to which they are core or peripheral to the process. What 
is clear, through the continued support of  the consumer family, is that there are concerns that 
consumers need to be represented by a publicly funded body, even though it might be the case 
that these bodies have less impact. The rationale behind this is made clear by the Ombudsman: 
‘Consumers are a considerable part of  the market. If  you don’t have satisfied consumers you don’t 
have a good market. So it’s very important that consumers are taken care of  in legislation so they 
also can feel safe in the markets where they act.’ (GN, Interview, 2011) 
So for Forbrukerombudet, the Norwegian consumer ombudsman, it is possible to see that 
although they have good connections with both the government, enforcement agencies, and other 
consumer organisations, they find it increasingly difficult to get the consumer perspective across. 
This seems to be down to three factors, (1) that of  the increasing professionalisation of  the business 
lobby and (2) the increasingly acceptance of  lobbying more generally as a practice in Norwegian 
politics. But also (3) of  the increasing amount of  legislation conducted at an EU level, where 
even the parent ministry has to lobby Brussels in order to ensure its perspectives are heard (BN, 
Interview, 2011):
One of  the facts is that more and more acts result from EU directives and in that respect there is 
not that much we can say when it comes into Norwegian law. So one of  the tendencies is that we 
have to act earlier in the process, when the proposal is in Brussels. We have a very wide possibility to 
go directly to the commission. We don’t have to go through our ministry. We can go directly there. 
In some cases they have been so important that we have spent a lot of  time trying to influence the 
commission directly...The new proposed directive on consumer protection for instance, that will 
have a great impact on consumer protection in Europe...We go to the commission and the European 
parliament directly. (GN, Interview, 2011)
This gives a further reason as to why consumer representation, when individual consumers have 
less power to act collectively, is so important; That organisations with significant expertise can try 
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to act on behalf  of  individuals at both domestic and EU level. This has also meant that whilst at 
the same time as organisations needing to be involved in more political spheres, they also need to 
communicate with individual consumers. This has meant that the media have also become increas-
ingly become a valuable tool in how the Ombudsman communicates with Norwegian citizens, in 
order to inform them of  their activities but also to create some sort of  consultative process between 
the authority and consumers (GN, TN, Interviews, 2011). It seems that the media, in Norway, play 
an important role in informing and engaging consumers in consumer activism:
The Consumer Council is the main consumer policy organisation. But on television, the two main 
television channels, they have their own consumer programs, and I would say that if  you ask a 
random consumer on the street ‘who is taking care of  consumer rights in Norway?’ then he would 
mention one of  the two television programs. (Interview, GN, 2011)
The role that these television programs play, although not a focus of  this study that concerns the 
policymaking sphere, is important as it forms a connection with individuals and becomes part of  
the public sphere where consumer activism is concerned. The consumer organisations in Norway 
thus utilise the media in order to gain an audience for their campaigns but also to form a relation-
ship with the people that they represent. The feedback between individuals and the organisations is 
encouraged by exposure through mainstream media channels:
When we are out with a television, radio or newspaper we are interviewed about a problem. This 
will lead to more telephone calls and emails into our office the next day because people are then 
aware that we are dealing with it. It is not direct consulting with consumers but because we have 
been exposed people will come back to us with information. (Interview, GN, 2011) 
The issue of  the extent to which the media is utilised as a part of  the consumer advocacy strat-
egy is not however the focus of  this study, but is an important consideration in terms of  how 
individual consumers voices become part of  the policy making and regulation process. (However 
the details of  this particular phenomenon would require further study which is beyond the remit 
of  this thesis.) This section has sought to outline the characteristics of  the Norwegian Consumer 
Ombudsman and show what their responsibilities are, and what their role is in Norwegian politics. 
This chapter will now move to consider another important part of  consumer advocacy in 
Norway, the Consumer Council. This organisation is arguably the closest to what is generally un-
derstood to be a consumer organisation in terms of  what is being analysed here. The Ombudsman 
although an organisation explicitly representing the interests of  consumers is officially not a lobby 
organisation, where the Council is. 
7.4.2 Forbrukerrådet – The Consumer Council
This section will outline and detail the main characteristics of  Norway’s only dedicated consumer 
interest organisation, Forbrukerrådet. It will look at the ways in which it campaigns, how it inter-
acts with policymakers and how it interacts with the other members of  the ‘consumer family’. This 
chapter will then move to look at the consumer research council SIFO, and then onto look at the 
Department of  Consumer Affairs. The Consumer Council is the principal interest organisation 
in Norway. We therefore need to analyse the Council’s place in Norwegian governance in order 
to understand the role consumer organisations have, and the extent to which they both counter-
balance industry pressures and impact on policy and regulation.
The Norwegian Consumer Council, Forbrukerrådet, is the only consumer ‘interest organisation’ 
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in Norway, despite the fact that one commentator (IT, Interview, 2011) suggested that there are no 
real consumer organisations due to the fact that the council is a public body rather than a mem-
ber-based organisation. However, in terms of  what this thesis is concerned with, the Consumer 
Council fulfils the requirements of  being a consumer organisation despite the fact that they are not 
a grassroots organisation, or a member-based organisation, as they are an advocacy organisation. 
They are specifically a lobbying and campaigning organisation in the sense that they are explicitly 
politically motivated, unlike the Consumer Ombudsman who has a stricter set of  responsibilities 
around the Marketing Act. Although it is financed by the government it is politically independent 
from its parent ministry which is established by Royal Decree. ‘We are 100% funded by the gov-
ernment, but at the same time 100% independent from government.’ (TN, Interview, 2011) It was 
founded in 1953 in order to ensure that the consumer’s voice was present in public debate and in 
government decisions. Its principal mission is to: ‘...give [the] power and possibility for consumers 
to make good choices.’ (TN, Interview, 2011) In this respect they concern themselves with working 
on behalf  of  consumers to campaign and lobby for regulations and controls in markets that are 
not providing consumers with optimal circumstances to have ‘power and possibility’. The organisa-
tions try to realise this through a combination of  lobbying officials, responding to consultations and 
informing the public through campaigns and their comparison website. In this respect they emu-
late the common pattern of  approaches seen by consumer organisations, that there are three core 
concerns: information, redress and regulation. 
The organisation differs from the Consumer Ombudsman in numerous ways; they are com-
pletely independent in terms of  what they can campaign on, and what they can make policies 
on, as the Ombudsman, as mentioned, is constrained by their constitution and the Act that they 
are part of: ‘We [Consumer Council] have a right and obligation to make policies...they [the 
Ombudsman] are bound by the legal act, they are bound in what the can and cannot say.’ (TN, 
2011, 2min) This greater freedom enables the Consumer Council to act more widely for the 
consumer interest, searching out new areas of  concern, and actively lobbying on their behalf. 
Whereas the Ombudsman’s activity is focused on when an organisation has contravened the Act, 
the Consumer Council’s work concerns a greater array of  issues pertaining to the three core areas: 
information, redress and regulation. However, there is a concern in the Consumer Council that 
they are seen to be far too similar to the Consumer Ombudsman, which again chimes with the 
perception that the ‘consumer interest’ is a single interest upheld by a single body, a problem when 
dealing with the multitude of  business and producer organisations: ‘We are seen as very similar to 
the Consumer Ombudsman, it is partly because we are in the same building, it’s not helping us. 
In Norway you have Forbrukerrådet and Forbrukerombudet, and they are calling us sometimes 
Forbrukerombrådet...We have an issue in trying to define ourselves.’ (TN, Interview, 2011) This is 
interesting as it comes back to how consumer organisations are perceived, and the extent to which 
they are seen as both core or peripheral to the process, and how they are perceived ideologically. In 
the analysis chapter (chapter 8) I use a three-fold typology to describe this process in more detail, 
with consumer organisations being framed as either a ‘toxic agent’, a ‘perfect form’, or as a ‘fly-in-
the-ointment’ regarding their involvement in the policy process. As said, this will be addressed in 
greater detail in the next chapter (chapter 8), but what is important to point out here is that, like in 
the UK, Norwegian consumer organisations face similar concerns. They are both subject to insti-
tutional and ideological pressures, and the communities and cultures that build up around regula-
tion are not neutral but determined by both the institutional structures and ideological positions. It 
is this culture of  governance, with regards to the role of  consumer organisations, which this thesis 
analyses.
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There are three core departments in Forbrukerrådet: Service, Policy and Portals (TN, 
Interview, 2011), and six major sectors: Housing, Vehicles, Finance, Tourism, Energy, Telecoms 
(Forbrukerrådet, 2012). The three departments are split into the Service sector, which directly 
helps consumers when they call, the Policy team that deal with campaigning and lobbying issues, 
and the Portal which is the main website full of  information for consumers including tenancy 
agreement contract for renters and some price comparison features. 
What is most important to consider here is the Policy team, as it is the connections with the 
government, and the activity of  the campaigners, which is most interesting in analysing consumer 
organisations role, how they are perceived and the role of  institutional structures in the process. 
The other dimensions, like the information provision and redress channels, are also vital parts 
of  consumer advocacy, which were also seen to be crucial in the UK but which do not in them-
selves tell us a great deal about the place of  the organisations in the structures of  governance. 
Information and redress are key dimensions to the consumer advocacy movement, which even 
critical scholars like Harvey (2005) have said have been considerable victories against the neoliberal 
state. But what this thesis is focused on is the place of  consumer organisations in the regulatory and 
policy process over-and-above these dimensions. Information and redress issues are seen as a given. 
We will gain an understanding of  the place of  consumer organisations from analysing the external 
work on policy and regulation, the relationships build up with regulators and authorities, and the 
broader ideological context. 
In a similar way to the Ombudsman, the Council have regular meetings with Directors of  the 
Authorities and with government officials. This is where they decide upon issues and problems they 
are going to cover, and where they discuss progress of  previous issues taken up. One senior policy 
advisor, and head of  sector, suggests that they have good connections with a variety of  institutions 
in Norway:
We have very good connections with the Authority on different levels. Two times a year we have 
Director meetings, the top bosses of  the Consumer Council and the Post and Telecommunications 
Authority have meetings two times a year, where we sit down for three of  four hours and discuss 
our topics, and what we are working on. These are the formal meetings we have, they are every six 
months. Then we meet each other on different occasions because we are working on the same topics, 
from different sides, but we are [both] working on telecommunications. I have my job and they have 
their jobs. (TN, Interview, 2011)
This is interesting as it suggests, much like other consumer organisations in the UK and Norway, 
that the connections between departments, regulators, and organisations are by and large good. 
They meet regularly, share similar goals around consumer protection and rights, and they take 
seriously the different roles that each institution both informally, and in their statutory duties. 
However, this being said, it is still the case that organisations often feel peripheral when it comes 
to the actual impacts on policy, which has been evidenced in numerous interviews in both the UK 
and Norway. It is clear that there are common issues that consumer organisations face – like the 
more professionalised business lobbying, and that the consumer perspective is taken as one voice. 
This discontinuity makes for interesting analysis which will be considered in more depth in the 
next chapter, but it is enough to say here that the structures put in place ensure only a minimum 
level of  consumer interest representation in the regulatory state. This could well come down to the 
differing ideological perspectives towards consumer organisations, and the place of  the market and 
regulation more generally.  The extent of  consumer organisations’ involvement, and the extent of  
consumer interests being taken into account in major policy and regulatory decisions, are experi-
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enced differently by different individuals due to the general expectations of  the extent which these 
organisations should have an impact on decision making. 
However, in order to combat the concerns around lack of  impact when standing alone, the 
Council utilise the connections it has to the Ombudsman and to the Authorities; working together 
is better than working apart, even though it is acknowledged that the different organisations and 
institutions have different responsibilities:
We often use the Ombudsman and the Authorities to push our things forward. Like our complaint 
on Facebook we sent it to the Data Inspectorate, we have a complaint on Playstation 3 on the terms 
and conditions and we sent it to the Consumer Ombudsman. So we use them a lot  to try to figure 
out how we are going to move the big industries...so we use them and talk to them a lot. They are 
usually our friends but sometimes they have to step back and be regulators. There are differences 
in the legal framework for the different ombudsman, authorities and inspectorate, for instance the 
Competition Authority they have in their paragraph number one they have to ‘regard consumers’, 
the telecommunications (ECOMM) Act does not have that, they are talking about ‘users’...which by 
definition includes businesses. (TN, Interview, 2011)
The differences in how individuals, or citizens, are identified in the statutory responsibilities of  or-
ganisations and institutions are, in this respect, crucial to how consumer organisations function. If  
consumers are to be understood in only a very narrow conception, in that they are merely individ-
uals in the process of  purchasing, or having purchased, a product or service, then there are limita-
tions also on the scope of  consumer organisations. It is therefore potentially in their interest to take 
a narrower conception as it increases the potential wins that they might have. However, here it is 
possible to see that different institutions and organisations have markedly different constituents, be 
they identified as ‘consumers’, or ‘users’. In this respect the Council would need to work harder to 
represent consumers in their contact with Telecoms Authority, than they would in their interac-
tions with the Competition Authority, who recognise that it is specifically consumers that they are 
interested in. How the institutions understand individuals, as consumer, users, or citizens, plays into 
the role that consumer organisations, like the Council, have. It is also important in terms of  under-
standing the major political thrust of  the parliament, and what their intentions are:
The reasoning for the law is often put in the first paragraph in Norway. Why we have this law, and 
the overarching things you have to look out for. You can’t use these paragraphs materially in a court 
of  law for instance, it doesn’t amount to a lot, but they are political instruments. So if  the ECOMM 
Act and the Competition Act is totally different in how they are comprehended by the people who 
are working on them I’m not sure, but at least there is a signal, a political signal from the Storting 
[Parliament]  that they want to have the consumer in focus in the Competition law and the user in the 
ECOMM law. (TN, Interview, 2011)
So this means that the Council’s role is relatively constrained when it comes to addressing the 
Telecoms Authority, in comparison to the Competition Authority, as the Council cannot rely on 
saying that the Authority has statutory obligations to the consumer as an individual. However, this 
can also be brought up as a way to lobby the Authority in itself: 
I love to use this example when I talk to the Post and Telecommunications Authority when they are 
being too much of  a regulator say ‘Well we need to make the businesses go good, we need to take 
care of  them, and they need to have a level playing field towards competition from outside’, and I 
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say ‘Well I understand that you don’t look at consumers because you don’t have a definition in the 
law’, they are talking about users not consumers, the director of  the PTA isn’t too happy about that. 
It’s a cheap shot but we have different roles and the law gives them a different role to what I have. 
(TN, Interview, 2011)
So it possible to see how important the statutes and laws around the regulators, authorities and 
organisations are in determining the extent of  the activity and the character of  their interactions. 
The Council therefore needs to manage the relationships and connections between the differ-
ent institutions carefully in order to ensure that the consumer interest is always being taking into 
account. This brings us back to considering the fact that the consumer interest is at times periph-
eral and at times core to the regulation and policy process, and therefore the Council’s role subtly 
changes in their interactions with these different bodies. 
This chapter will now look at how the Council develops its campaigns and policy initiatives 
in order to see the process behind why the organisations choose particular policy objectives over 
others. This can then help in understanding in which circumstances the organisations might have 
more impact than others, as these would tend be chosen over potentially more challenging policy 
areas; The idea of  ‘picking one’s battles’. This can then help us to understand whether the organi-
sations can be seen as a counterbalance to industry and agency pressures, and the extent to which 
they anticipate having potential impact on policy and regulation. Understanding these processes 
can give us a picture of  the active role of  consumer organisations. 
7.4.2.1 Campaigns and Policy Areas
The way in which the Council comes up with their campaigns is a combination of  personal experi-
ence and intuition, followed up by research, including input from consumers themselves through 
a variety of  channels. For example they recently hosted a conference on video games and asked a 
range of  individuals, academics, journalists, and developers the simple question ‘Is there anything 
in the games market that we as consumer representatives should be working on?’ (Forbrukerrådet, 
2011) There were a few examples of  games being released before the Christmas period that were 
poorly developed, which had led to a lot of  gamers complaining online. So with a combination of  
both some of  the staff  at the Council, researching online forums, and inviting various important 
people in the industry the council could see whether or not this should be an area of  importance 
(Interview, TN, 2011). This is how they might find out about a particularly problematic sector. Also 
in how they build an evidence base to ensure that this is in fact something which the Council, and 
by extension both consumers and the government, should be concerned about.
In practice, when considering any policy area, it is essential for those in consumer organisations 
to make a rough judgement about the perceived costs and benefits of  a particular direction, which 
is made based on the evidence and research suggested, but also crucially takes into account the 
potential impact:
There is a graph. It [our work] should impact a lot of  people, and there should be a reasonable 
possibility to make an impact. So if  something affects very few people and you have no chance of  
changing, you shouldn’t be working on it. And, the other end of  the scale, if  a lot of  people are 
affected and there is a big chance of  making a change. That is one way to find out whether it is 
worth working for it. (TN, Interview, 2011)   
This is also what was witnessed in the UK, and with the Ombudsman in Norway; that they must 
pick their battles carefully, to find out what project might have the best outcome for the most 
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amount of  people. This is the same for Which?, the Consumer Ombudsman, The Consumer 
Council, and Consumer Focus. This dilemma is a common issue for any interest organisation, but 
which is made more acute if  you are a peripheral actor with relatively few resources, or a con-
strained remit. It is also the case that organisations funded through public funds need to show di-
rectly how money is spent and that it is spent wisely – there is control over budgets and remit. This 
is in contrast to business that has a freer remit, whose logic concerns the bottom line, which may 
well put them in a far greater position that the consumer organisation. The battle then becomes 
about the relative cost effectiveness of  fighting for or against a piece of  legislation for each side; 
consumers or producers. It is therefore in the interests of  business to spend more as they know of  
the budget constraints of  public bodies, and relatively small organisations, if  they end up spending 
that extra British Pound or Norwegian Kroner, then they may win. But is it all about the money? 
Probably not. Although resources are clearly a vital part of  the extent to which interests are able to 
impact on legislation, it also comes down to ideas and ideology. 
Therefore we also need to consider how ideas feature in the analysis. What are the general over-
riding ideologies and what are the trends in public policy. How do consumer organisations fit into 
these at any given time? If  they are core, they’ll see more gains, if  more peripheral then they’ll see 
less, and this can change from policy area to policy area. Therefore what campaigns they choose is 
significantly important, and why the Council also look ‘up the chain’ to the European level to see 
what the organisations there are concerned about, as having an understanding of  market problems 
at an international level can put the organisations, and therefore consumers, in a better position 
domestically: ‘We try to make our working plans in line with BEUC...We are not waiting until it 
comes to Norway. We are very aware that the processes that are going on in Brussels are the ones 
that we have to be in, not the ones in Oslo. Being in early means in Brussels not in Oslo.’ (TN, 
Interview, 2011)
The Council, and the Norwegian policy process, also has the issue of  the distinction between 
citizens and consumers. This is also apparent in the UK, especially when dealing with issues in the 
media. At what point is it that someone is a consumer and someone a citizen has not been articu-
lated well enough. This is maybe the point on which the ideological distinction lies. The more 
spheres in which individuals are seen as consumers the stronger consumer activism is dominated 
by a more neoliberal ideology and the more that individuals are seen as citizens, in their consump-
tion, the stronger the social democratic ideology. This can vary from country to country, and from 
policy area to policy area, and also ties in with the understanding where consumer organisations 
are seen as core or peripheral to policy and regulation processes. 
What this chapter has discussed so far are both the organisation itself, and the process through 
which it comes to deciding upon particular policy objectives. This has shown us that the Council 
has to be tactical in what it focuses on, and that it needs to build its connections around a par-
ticular issue with both the Ombudsman and the relevant Authority. What will now be addressed 
are the informal connections that the Council utilises in its activities, in order that we can gain 
a deeper understanding of  the networks that build up, and the ideas that characterise consumer 
advocacy in Norway. 
7.4.2.2 Informal Connections
In addition to both the formal contacts that the Council needs with the Authorities and govern-
ment departments are the informal, and more personal connections. As was seen in the UK these 
can be of  great significance to how policy gets developed. But, as is generally argued here, these 
relationships are still constrained by the structural conditions in which the consumer organisations 
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operate. However, it might be the case that informal connections can ensure an issue gets on the 
table:
This is a personal thing as well because, the head of  the post and telecommunications office and me, 
they are in Lillestrøm, we have been ‘head-butting’ a couple of  times, we don’t have that personal 
relationship that is normal for us to just go out and have lunch and talk about things. But with the 
Data Inspectorate chief, he used to be the [Consumer] Ombudsman, and we know each other 
very well so we go out and have lunch, which is really informal, and just talk about things. (TN, 
Interview,  2011) 
What is important to appreciate here, is that the policy official and the ex-ombudsman had very 
similar ideas about consumer activism in large part due to how closely they had worked together. 
In this respect we can see that ideas and perspectives towards the consumer debate generally can 
have an impact on the perceptions of  consumer organisations, despite individuals not necessarily 
being able to change much within a particular context. 
There is also a choice made as to whether it is best to make connections at a similar level to the 
official you are – this could be called horizontal influence, in order for them ‘sell the idea upwards’, 
or whether it would be best to send a formal letter to someone more senior so that they can sell 
it downwards – vertical influence. This happened for Forbrukerrådet when they tried to make 
their Facebook campaign more European, instead of  the Digital Rights officer connecting their 
counterpart in BEUC they wrote a formal letter to the Head of  BEUC (TN, Interview, 2011). 
This is interesting in terms of  what was seen in the UK with regard to networks, and what has 
been addressed with regard to ‘which battle to pick’. Although there are by and large structural 
and institutional constraints on activity by consumer organisations, due to both funds and remits, 
the informal networks that have built up around consumer rights and advocacy do play a distinct 
role within this. They are also not flat networks but involve hierarchy, and are therefore like Davies 
(2011), and others, suggest are not in any way neutral, but heirarchically determined despite the 
freedom of  individual actors to make independent connections. In this respect networks do not ex-
ist independently of  the institutions and structures but are greatly constrained by them. 
The instance in which an individual may try to push the structural constraints may have an 
impact, but equally may be reacted to. In the case of  the Norwegian Consumer Ombudsman 
it seems to be that as they became more political, they were changed, or that the Ombudsman 
started to work outside his remit due to the fact that they might be changed:
Bjørn Erik Thon, was [previously] the head of  the Consumer [Ombudsman], who had the Apple 
case, which we gave to him, he was probably pushing his boundaries as an Ombudsman, being 
more political than the present one is, who is more being an Ombudsman, Bjørn Erik was really 
active and went out and talked outside of  the Marketing Act as well. That is something  that the 
government, when they hired the new one, they wanted someone who was a bit more low key, more
ombudsman-like. So the ombudsman has a more difficult role balancing...their ombudsman work 
and if  they have any policies or thoughts outside the Act they are working within. (TN, Interview, 
2011)
This shows that within the ‘consumer family’ there are structural constraints due to the specific 
roles expected of  the organisations by the government. But it also shows us that an epistemic 
community is created around consumer advocacy issues which might in some circumstances be 
helped by particular individuals in particular positions, even though it is generally the case that 
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consumer advocacy is seen to be structurally constrained. It also might be the case that individual 
personalities and relationships between people might differ in the different cultures of  particular 
ministries and authorities. Some of  the cultures might be more or less susceptible to the influences 
of  a particular individual, which demonstrates that structures are not monolithic but in a state of  
flux, although this still greatly determined by particular ideologies like neoliberalism. ‘I think dif-
ferent personalities at the top of  the ombudsman really could change how they are being looked 
at [perceived], or what kind of  work they do, also how we work with them.’ (TN, Interview, 2011) 
Therefore the head of  one authority might well be more sympathetic to consumer advocacy issues 
than the head of  another, and might well see consumers in a different ideological light – for exam-
ple, that there are social dimensions to being a consumer as well as economic ones. However, there 
are still broader institutional structures which constrain and largely determine the extent of  activity 
of  consumer organisations, and this is argued to be in great part down to the broader ideological 
context. 
The chapter will now move to look at the more international issues by considering the connec-
tions that the Council has in Brussels. This is given special attention here as it seemed to be the 
case that Norwegian organisations had better connections with EU bodies, than they did in their 
own country (TN, BF, Interviews, 2011), and that increasingly policy and legislation is decided at 
the EU level. Although consumer organisations in the UK, like Which?, do have strong connec-
tions to EU bodies such as BEUC, there seemed to be a greater degree of  importance placed on 
the EU level in Norway, than there was in the UK. 
7.4.2.3 Norwegian Consumer Organisations and the EU
As has been stated earlier in regard to both the UK and the Consumer Ombudsman, consumer 
issues are increasingly being decided in Brussels. This means that consumer organisations need to 
be ahead of  the game to ensure that they impact upon policy and regulation as best they can by 
being in Brussels. The view is generally held (Hull, 1993; Loth et al., 1998) that the earlier in the 
policy process on can get the better chance one has of  impacting on the final legislation. What is 
also interesting to mention is that even though Norway is not a Member of  the EU, the access the 
Council has in Brussels is better than in Oslo:
Being a Norwegian in Brussels is really like being a Swede or a German...I have never met a closed 
door. It is easier to have access to people in the commission than in the government in Norway. My 
experience is that the commission is much more interested to hear stakeholders, you can call it being 
lobbied, in the writing of  a paper, than the Norwegian government is. They are very closed up, 
and they are sitting there writing things, and then they put it out in the hearing, and then you can 
respond. In Brussels you have the chance to talk to people writing and ask them, and tell them. (TN, 
Interview, 2011)  
But this is a problem for the Consumer Council. They have great access at European level, and for 
the most part this seems like the best place to have access. In much of  the literature (Hull, 1993; 
Loth et al., 1998), and as has been seen here (BF, ES, TN, Interviews, 2011), the earlier on in the 
legislative and regulatory process one can intervene the better. As much legislation now originates 
in Brussels it is preferable for consumer organisations that they find a keen ear here. However, it is 
still difficult for the Consumer Council in their discussions with the Norwegian government, even 
though it might be the case that trying to change legislation at a Norwegian governmental level, as 
they still have to act in the interests of  Norwegian consumers on a regular basis domestically too. 
This is interesting in terms of  the comparison with the UK. Where, comparatively, the consumer 
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organisations seem to have greater access to the government in lobbying terms. 
However, the relationship between regulators and consumer organisations seems to be the 
strongest bond in both countries, which is interesting in terms of  how the regulatory state func-
tions. As well as government devolving power to the regulators, they are also devolving the respon-
sibility to have connections and relationships with the various interests competing for influence. 
This was seen in the UK in how the regulators have explicitly made moves to include and accom-
modate consumer concerns in their structure, through the Consumer Forum and Consumer Panel 
at Ofcom. It was seen in Norway with how the Consumer Council will rarely go to the relevant 
department in order to achieve something, but will go to the relevant regulator or authority. In this 
respect it is possible to see that the connections that are most important for consumer organisations 
are to the regulators and authorities. Therefore the consumer organisation’s role becomes one of  
informing and contributing to the tasks of  regulators, whilst also trying to constantly ensure that a 
consumer voice is present in the regulatory and policy process.
The Consumer Council is the most important part of  the ‘consumer family’ in terms of  con-
sumers being represented in regulatory and policy processes in Norway. Although the Ombudsman 
is a vital part of  the dynamic, as is SIFO who will be looked at next, their narrow remit means that 
they are not able to lobby as extensively as the Council. But, as was made clear earlier, the profes-
sionalisation of  the business lobby and the increasing presence of  lobbying by business in Norway, 
an accelerating lobbying culture, means that the job of  the Council becomes ever more important 
in ensuring that consumers are represented and that consumer issues are core, not peripheral con-
cerns. 
One dimension that has also been alluded to in the UK is research and evidence; if  organisa-
tions go to policymakers, both regulators and government officials, with solid evidence for a case 
they are more likely to gain favour. This is why the final part of  the ‘consumer family’ is also 
important, as they carry out significant research into consumer issues. In this way SIFO, compar-
ing with the UK, is the research arm of  Which? or Consumer Focus. In this respect, it seems that 
Norway takes seriously the value of  evidence, with regard to consumer issues, in having a desig-
nated consumer research body, where in the UK this is left to in house research teams. However, 
this may in fact be less effective in terms of  impact on policy and regulation as the connections 
between organisations may be less strong than with-in organisations. Now the main consumer 
research body in Norway will be looked at in greater detail. 
7.4.3 SIFO – National Consumer Research Council 
The National Institute for Consumer Research (SIFO) is a government run research organisation 
specifically concerned with issues around consumption and consumers. They have been actively 
engaged in both testing products and researching consumer issues since the 1950s (SIFO, n.d 1). 
They are also, much like the Consumer Council, involved in discussions and debates at a European 
level (AN, UK, Interviews, 2011).
This section will outline the important aspects of  SIFO as an organisation; their organisation, 
their function, and their connections. Being that they are first and foremost a research institute, 
they are less active in their lobbying than the Council, and in legal work like the Ombudsman, but 
do play a crucial role in the ‘consumer family’. The research they produce is utilised by both the 
Council and the Ombudsman, and they work reasonably closely, although SIFO, unlike the other 
two organisations, no longer shares an office building. This has meant that SIFO has become more 
distant from the activities of  the other organisations than in the past (EJ, Interview, 2011). 
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7.4.3.1 Organisation and Operations
SIFO is a special case, in that they are a government funded, although an independent research 
institute dedicated to specifically researching consumer issues. They are given a free regime to 
research what on whatever they see fit. They have a board where members are appointed by the 
Ministry of  Children, Equality and Social Inclusion, and then a variety of  staff  both academic 
researchers and product testing staff. Their principal mission is to develop and disseminate knowl-
edge in the field of  consumers and consumption. It essentially functions as an academic institution 
(EJ, Interview, 2011). They are run by a Board appointed by the Ministry, which ‘consists of  repre-
sentatives from research institutions, other consumer institutions, organisations and SIFO employ-
ees.’ (SIFO, n.d. 1) This includes the consumer Ombudsman, and senior staff  members from the 
Council.
There are three core areas of  research at SIFO: consumption and the economy, culture of  
consumption, and technology and environment (SIFO, n.d. 1). This ranges from qualitative re-
search into various social and cultural practices, to larger studies with international co-operation, 
to the testing of  products. They have, much like Which? in the UK, a fully functioning labora-
tory for testing all manner of  products sold on the Norwegian market (EJ, AN, Interviews, 2011). 
In order to conduct this work they are funded through a variety of  streams. 50% of  their budget 
comes from projects for the Ministry, and then 50% comes from a variety of  Research Council 
grants, EU grants and industry funding (EJ, AN, Interviews, 2011). It is mostly all ‘public’ money, 
as the industry funding is for very specific projects which are infrequent. In this respect SIFO does 
‘answer’ to the ministry, in the sense that they have to keep on track with their research agenda and 
show results. One of  the principal reasons being that if  a new government were to get in that did 
not see their work as particularly beneficial, then they would be cut. Despite the fact that they have 
been working well for  so many years, there is still a concern that the more right-wing party, if  they 
got in, might not look upon the organisation favourably. As in the past they have stated that they 
would move research funding away from social research towards other research, like medicine (EJ, 
Interview, 2011) However, even within political parties there are changing winds in terms of  priori-
ties:
Due to changing political attention, for instance we belong to this sub division of  the Department 
that has to do with consumer issues, and this has been into different kinds of  ministries and every 
time there is a new government they change the [headline] title of  the ministry, right now it is the 
Ministry of  Child Affairs, before it was the Ministry of  Equal Rights, before that it was actually the 
Ministry of  Consumer Affairs. But that is way back, some 20 years. So these headlines [titles] actual 
tell you the main priority of  the government...this has an effect on the political attention we are 
given. (EJ, Interview, 2011) 
This is interesting in terms of  what this thesis is arguing, that ideas and ideology matter, as these 
can determine the structures put in place to deal consumer issues. The political attention that the 
organisation receives is dependent on the perspectives of  the policymakers that are in charge in the 
parent ministry. As will be shown in the next chapter (chapter 8) perspectives towards consumer 
organisations and their involvement in policymaking and regulation can be drawn along ideologi-
cal lines.
What is clear is that as an organisation SIFO has a fairly independent status, and can conduct 
research without being too tied to their funders, and who have to demonstrate both scholarly 
activity and public dissemination through the media. This section will now turn to the connections 
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SIFO has, particularly concerning their parent ministry. 
7.4.3.2 Connections
For SIFO the key connection is with the parent ministry, the Ministry for Children, Equality and 
Social Inclusion, and the Department for Consumer Affairs. This is who they meet with regularly, 
who have oversight of  their activities and who control 50% of  their budget. SIFO’s contact with 
individual consumers is limited to when conducting research, but this can bring up crucial issues. 
When this does occur it is backed up by significant evidence, as a result of  dissemination, and one 
of  the principal places that this is done in through the media. 
We’re a research institute. So if  we, through our research, can document for instance that consumers 
are not satisfied with conditions in this or that industry it often has a really big impact. This goes two 
ways. We have meetings with regulators and ministry to present our findings, but...the biggest impact 
is through the media. Our stuff  is very often on the front pages, because it sells, it is about YOU. (EJ, 
Interview, 2011)
The focus on the personal dimension of  consumer advocacy is interesting, and brings us back to 
the more neoliberal dimensions of  consumers. The idea that consumer issues impact on individu-
als, not on collectives. The scandals can be focused on how it might have impacted on you as a 
person, not how it might impact on society in general. In terms of  Norway, this increase in neolib-
eral discourse in the media has been evidenced by Nafstad et al. (2007), this will be considered in 
the next chapter. 
It is also interesting to note that SIFO perceives that they can have a reasonable impact on 
industry if  it is the case that consumers are really not happy. This seems to be in contradiction 
to what various colleagues said about the overall impact of  SIFIO on policy generally (UK, IT, 
Interviews, 2011). This is possibly explained by the fact that by and large policy issues and regula-
tion are influenced little by consumer organisations, but that when a major problem is found in a 
particular industry, and there is a strong public reaction – high salience, then something might be 
done. A good example of  this was with the predatory behaviour of  the major diary producer Tine, 
who, as a result of  both public outcry and the work of  The Norwegian Competition Authority, was 
forced to pay a substantial fine.  
In addition, the researchers at SIFO, due to some becoming experts on particular subjects, 
are called upon to be on advisory boards for some of  the regulators and Authorities  (EJ, UK, 
Interviews, 2011). This inclusion of  expert advice and advocacy organisations is part of  the broad-
er trends in governance and network governance more specifically. That through bringing together 
the various stakeholders, including consumer representatives and experts, ‘better regulation’ will 
be reached. This is part of  the broader ‘republican tripartism’ which this thesis is concerned with. 
These advisory groups and forums, like in the UK, are a crucial part of  the structure of  govern-
ance networks, as it is where the contact between the decision makers and stakeholders is institu-
tionalised. This will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter (chapter 8).
However, for SIFO the most important connections, or ‘governing dialogue’ (AN, Interview, 
2011) are made in three different ways (AN, Interview, 2011): (1) is through a ‘commission letter’ 
from the ministry which states the budget for the institute. This letter is divided into various catego-
ries detailing the extent of  SIFO’s activities. The letter is accompanied by biannual meetings with 
the ministry, the DCA, where SIFO report on their activities, budget, tasks and on-going projects. 
In these meetings they received signals from them on the political priorities. This is a strict and for-
mal meeting. (2) SIFO has a monthly breakfast meeting with at the Director of  the Department for 
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Consumer Affairs in the Ministry. This is more informal meeting where they keep up-to-date with 
each other’s activities. (3) The head of  SIFO has regular conversations with the Head of  Office, 
under the Director,  for the Department for Consumer Affairs. These usually revolve around on-
going projects that SIFO is conducting on behalf  of  the Department and Ministry. These three 
dialogues, which are official SIFO interactions with the Department and Ministry, are in addition 
to the more informal connections between other SIFO researchers and regulators, Authorities and 
Ministries (AN, Interview, 2011). 
The amount of  connections between SIFO and the Ministry seems to be more than the other 
two organisations, the Ombudsman and the Council, albeit that they all have regular contact with 
their shared parent ministry. But the one difference is that SIFO is constantly and actively working 
on behalf  of  the ministry, so it needs to be made sure that the work that they do is in accordance 
with the Ministry’s needs, ‘otherwise our budget would be vulnerable.’ (AN, Interview, 2011) It is 
also the case that over the last few years that SIFO and the Ministry have become closer, by mutual 
consent, but that SIFO is acutely aware of  the dangers that this holds, especially the fact that they 
do research on behalf  of  the Ministry:
There are dangers of  course. From our part, we are interested in having an arms-length distance to 
the Ministry so they don’t involve [themselves] too much in our research agenda, because a research 
agenda should be driven by an academic interest and not through what the government thinks is 
important or not. If  there are political considerations that are governing our research then the value 
of  the research will deteriorate. (AN, Interview, 2011)
So for SIFO the challenge becomes how they manage their relationship with their parent Ministry, 
to ensure on the one hand that they are doing what is required of  them in terms of  research for the 
Ministry, and on the other that that they remain independent and arms-length deciding upon areas 
of  interest and expediency. Due to their budget being tightly controlled by a government Ministry 
means that SIFO have to perform certain duties, but they constantly re-visit the manage the their 
relationship in order that academic integrity is not compromised, as a senior advisor from SIFO 
says:
 
...the basic funding is broken into three parts: building our competence, projects related to on-going 
governmental duties, money to support other projects. The government is interested in the research 
for them, whether it is useful for them in their on-going policy making. They give signals, and then 
we respond with ideas, then there is a dialogue on how the research should be designed. There 
is a tolerance, and patience from the ministry that research is a process that needs freedom, and 
they cannot interfere and control it directly. There I think our government and SIFO is in a very 
beneficial position because I know research institutes similar to us but related to other ministries that 
are much more strictly, and much more tightly controlled by their ministry. (AN, Interview, 2011) 
It is therefore possible to see that despite the relatively close relationship between SIFO and their 
parent ministry they still enjoy greater freedom than their counter-parts in other sectors. It seems 
apparent from the interviews in general, that SIFO’s success is in their combination of  product 
testing, public interest research and its dissemination in the media, and their high-level academic 
research on not just markets but social and cultural dimensions of  consumption too. However, as 
one researcher pointed out they find that their academic work suffers from a focus on more popu-
lar media dissemination. This is seen to be easier, quicker and cheaper to produce, as it is firstly in 
Norwegian, and it has a short turn around, when a media outlet is informed about something it is 
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normally pretty immediate in its coverage. This is in stark contrast with high-level academic work 
which is more costly, more difficult as it needs to be in English, and there is a significantly long turn 
around for dissemination (EJ, Interview, 2011). 
In summary, SIFO is the primary research institute for consumer related issue in Norway. It 
is well funded by the Ministry for Children, Equality and Social Inclusion and enjoys relatively 
close, but reasonably free, relationship with the Department of  Consumer Affairs who oversee 
their activities. It is interesting to note the importance of  the media as a point of  dissemination, 
something that was also alluded to in discussion with both the Ombudsman, and the Council. The 
importance of  directly informing consumers of  the current debates, issues and possible scandals 
seems very apparent, despite the fact, or maybe because of  the fact, that one commentator sug-
gested that Norwegians were generally very passive (IT, Interview, 2011). SIFO, although outside 
the loop in terms of  direct policy and regulation lobbying, does seem to be an integral part of  the 
consumer family in terms of  their relationship with the ministry, their connections to the other 
organisations, the dissemination of  their research via the media and academic publications, and 
through their researchers sitting on advisory boards across sectors. Despite all of  this, their impact, 
and consumer organisations impact generally, is still considered by some of  the senior research-
ers (UK, IT, Interviews, 2011) to be peripheral. This issue will be returned to in greater detail in 
the next chapter (chapter 8), but it is very interesting, and crucial to this thesis, to make clear that, 
despite the favourable structures, these organisations are still peripherally important to policy mak-
ing and regulation. Subsequently this makes determining their role, the central question of  this 
thesis, much more difficult, but all the more important. Even though they seem to be understood 
to be peripheral this tells us a great deal about contemporary network governance, the regulatory 
state and the connections to civil-society. It shows that although there has been a broad encourage-
ment of  civil-society inclusion and institutionalisation, that this is seemingly largely rhetorical and 
that the decision making power still resides outside of  forums designed to devolve the practices of  
policy making and regulation close to ‘citizens’. This problematizes contemporary practices of  net-
work governance, much like Davies (2011) suggests (as discussed in the theory chapter (3)), in the 
sense that these connections are still very much hierarchical despite being imbued with an ideology 
of  inclusion and devolution.
This chapter will now turn to consider the policymakers, particularly focusing on the 
Department of  Consumer Affairs, the key institution inside the Norwegian government that deals 
with consumer issues. This will be done in order to gain the perspective of  the those that are closer 
to the decision making, and to get an understanding of  the role of  consumer organisations in 
Norwegian politics. 
7.5 Regulators and Policy Makers in Norway
In a similar way to the UK, Norway has a variety of  regulators in place to uphold various Acts of  
parliament, and to ensure that particular sectors run in accordance with the Act. This is no dif-
ferent with the media where there is the Mediatilsynet in place to uphold the Broadcasting Act. 
However, the Norwegian regulators, unlike the UK, do not have ‘consumer forums’. There are 
advisory groups set up, for example in the Food Industry, where consumer advocates with a partic-
ular expertise in a specialist area will be called upon. This was shown in the previous section when 
concerning the experts at SIFO. 
The more crucial connection is with the parent ministry, and specifically with the Department 
of  Consumer Affairs (DCA). It is with the DCA that the various members of  the ‘consumer family’ 
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meet regularly. What was accessed through the interviews was the key ministry in the Norwegian 
government that is specifically concerned with consumer issues, in addition to the three arms of  
the consumer advocacy ‘family’, and a discussion with a key officials in the Norwegian culture min-
istry. These together enabled a significant understanding of  the place of  consumer organisations in 
Norwegian regulation and policy making to be gained. 
7.5.1 Department for Consumer Affairs: Organisation and Connections
The Department for Consumer Affairs (DCA), which is part of  the Ministry for Children, Equality 
and Social Inclusion (MCES, 2012), is the main point of  contact for the consumer organisations 
in Norway. Although there are important connections built up between consumer organisations 
and Authorities (regulators), the primary point of  contact, in general, is with the DCA. In par-
ticular this is with the Director General, who has regular meeting with the Ombudsman, and the 
Consumer Council. The DCA employs 20 people who work on various aspects concerned with 
consumer issues and upcoming policy. 
They are the primary point of  contact in the government for the consumer organisations. To 
the extent that they enjoy a better relationship with them than they do other ministries and regula-
tors, due to both the fact that they are funded by the DCA and the Ministry, but also that they have 
shared objectives. They are principally concerned with consumer issues, just like the consumer 
organisations. The DCA’s role is, other than helping to implement the legislation of  the politicians 
in charge, is to also lobby other ministries and regulators from within (BF, Interview, 2011). 
As a Department in a ministry they spend time talking to a variety of  interest groups, including 
environmental NGOs about issues related to consumption and the environment. This is interest-
ing in regard to what one of  the commentators from SIFO suggested, that most of  the major 
public policy problems, like the environment, were really issues of  production not consumption (IT, 
Interview, 2011). Changing the habits of  consumers was not going to resolve a problem which at 
its heart was an issue with the production process. This takes us back to a more Marxist perspec-
tive that sees the core concern in the production process itself, not in the results of  the process. As 
Grant (2005) suggests we now live in a political order which is chiefly concerned with the results of  
the production process, but in addition as an interviewee suggests, the cleavage between labour vs. 
capital, and now moved to one of  production vs. consumption (UK, Interview, 2011).
It seems from discussion with the DCA, that their principal contacts are with the consumer 
family, and with other ministries. Being that the DCA is part of  the government ministry their role 
is far more focused than that of  the Consumer Council. They are there to do the bidding of  the 
minister in terms of  issues relating to consumers and consumption, and it is their role to ensure 
that the ‘consumer family’, who are bigger organisations, do their job in this respect (BF, Interview, 
2011). As you can see in the table below the Consumer Council and SIFO are directly answerable 
to the DCA: 
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It is therefore clear to see that the consumer organisations in Norway, although relativity inde-
pendent in their operations, are very much part of  the government structure. This complies with 
Norway being a more corporatist state than the UK through having the representatives of  collec-
tive interest, like that of  consumers, incorporated into the main body of  the state. However, there 
are differences between ministries, and between departments, as to how close their relationships 
are with the subsidiary organisations. For example, in the consumer section, the various organisa-
tions seem to have, and understand themselves to have, good working relationships, but which do 
not compromise their core mission. The Consumer Council, it seemed, was less eager to admit to 
this, often stating their independence despite the financial and political oversight from the DCA 
and the Ministry (TN, Interview, 2011). Whereas SIFO and the DCA understood the ties to be 
close, although not overbearing: ‘It is a strong tie but we are perfectly aware of  our different roles.’ 
(BF, Interview, 2011) However, the DCA recognises that the institutions set-up around consumer 
Fig.3 Structure for the Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion (MCES, 2012)
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representation, including the ‘consumer family’, the DCA itself, and the dispute resolution agencies 
share common goals but that they have their seperate roles. Moreover, the Consumer Council itself  
is seen to recognise that they are part of  a ‘consumer family’, and that the DCA and MCES are 
part of  that: ‘I think they [Consumer Council] have a better relationship with us than with other 
ministries. I think they feel we are their ministry.’ (BF, Interview, 2011) This sense of  being part of  
something is a vital part of  how consumer representation and advocacy works in Norway. Through 
the various bodies an epistemic community is created that, in their different roles, represents the 
interests of  consumers.  
The greater difficulty for the DCA comes with their attempts to persuade other ministries to 
adopt more consumer orientated policy and regulation. On the whole they consider the attempts 
to influence other ministries as not generally successful, some ministries being particularly diffi-
cult to persuade, like the Ministry of  Trade and Industry. Others, like the Ministry of  Agriculture 
and Food, who work with similar cases, and who have responsibilities that overlap with the DCA 
and the MCES, are far easier to persuade (BF, Interview, 2011). This again can be put down to a 
shared set of  ideas about the role of  regulation, and the purpose of  consumer protection and rep-
resentation. The times when other ministries do come to the DCA is when they themselves have a 
specific consumer issue that they need help with, rather than broader policy and regulation which 
may require input from consumer organisations: ‘If  they [other ministries] have a consumer inter-
est, and they have when it comes to dispute resolution, because they are bound by EU resolutions, 
then they need our help, and then we are very interesting for them.’ (BF, Interview, 2011) In this 
respect the regulations put in place through the EU are of  significance for consumers, as decision 
makers are forced to comply with particular standards with regard to dispute resolution. However, 
this only concerns consumer within markets. Dispute resolution and consumer redress issues are 
systems put in place to deal with problems occurring within markets, and are therefore not con-
cerned with the process in which regulation and policy is created. 
This seems to be the major factor in when consumer organisations are seen as core, and when 
they are seen as peripheral to a policy or regulatory process. When developments in policy or regu-
lation have an explicitly consumer dimension, like the Consumer Rights legislation, the organisa-
tions become the ‘go-to’ people for those making and ratifying the policy. But when the consumer 
interest is perceived to be of  peripheral importance, like with product placement legislation, then 
consumer organisations have the bare minimum impact. It is in this respect that understanding the 
role of  consumer organisations, and whether they can counter-balance industry pressures and have 
impact on policy and legislation, we can only really understand it on a case-by-case basis. In this 
respect the issue, much like ideology, matters. This will be discussed in greater detail in the analysis 
chapter next (section 8.6).
Although there are institutionalised and ad-hoc meetings with the consumer organisations, 
it is when a major issue arises that they actively work together. This took place recently with the 
Consumer Rights legislation going through Brussels, an issue that has come up in numerous other 
interviews in both the UK and Norway (JH, TN, Interviews, 2011). The EU was another issue that 
also arose, as the DCA, together with other consumer organisations in Norway had got together 
in order to put forward the Norwegian interest in respect of  the Consumer Rights regulation: 
‘For example we were working hard [to] influence the upcoming directive on consumer rights, 
and there we had a permanent group with two ministries involved, our ministry and the Ministry 
of  Justice, and the consumer institutions. All worked for Norwegian interests, on mostly the same 
ground, but through different channels.’ (ES, Interview, 2011) In this way the various organisations 
together, and in a particularly expedient case, could potentially have some impact and ensure that 
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the legislation was drafted in such a way that consumer advocates across Europe would be satisfied. 
The European Directive for Consumer Rights will have to be implemented into member state law 
by 2014, and consumer organisations throughout Europe, including both the UK and Norway, 
have been involved in the process. However, as one consumer representative from BEUC, the 
European umbrella group for consumer organisations said, there have been ‘compromises’, but: ‘In 
general we are happy with what is included in this directive.’ (Moore, FT, 2012) So in the case of  
Norway the various institutions concerned with consumers, although having a variety of  independ-
ent roles, came together over a crucial issue and what has been reported was by-and-large a success 
for consumer organisations, and subsequently consumers. The DCA, for Norway, was a key part of  
this coalition as they are a Norwegian government ministry so do hold weight in Brussels, having 
built a good working relationship over 25 years enabling them to have exclusive meetings with the 
commission (BF, ES, Interviews, 2011). It also helped that one of  the officials in the commission, 
who was working on the legislation, had previously worked in a local office in the Norwegian con-
sumer council (ES, Interview, 2011). In this respect the connections that the DCA has in Brussels, 
combined with their experience, enabled them to an extent lead the consumer coalition in putting 
across their perspectives, which is  for a small country like Norway is impressive. 
In summary, what this section has outlined is how the Department of  Consumer Affairs deals 
with processes of  regulation and policy making and what connections they have to both other con-
sumer organisations, other ministries and the EU. It was shown that the Department for Consumer 
Affairs acts on behalf  of  the Ministry for Children, Equality and Social Inclusion to ensure that 
consumer policy is adhered to, that new policy takes consumers into consideration, and that they 
oversee the activities of  the ‘consumer family’. It was also clear that interactions between them-
selves, other ministries and the consumer organisations happened very much on a case-by-case 
basis, despite the institutionalised connections. It was really when a particularly important issue 
arose that they would capitalise on the relationship between the different consumer organisations 
who would otherwise be working on their own concerns.
An overview of  this chapter will now be given in order to get an insight into the state of  con-
sumer representation, and consumer organisations in Norway as a whole, and to see what role they 
have in Norwegian politics.  
7.6 Conclusion: Understanding Consumer Organisations and 
Representation in Norway 
Norway, despite the significant differences with the UK in terms of  structure and ideology, faces 
some of  the same issues when it comes to consumer representation. In Norway it is possible to 
see a well funded and well organised, in terms of  roles for the different organisation, consumer 
advocacy system. This is despite the fact that, as one commentator put it ‘Norway has no con-
sumer organisations’ (IT, Interview, 2011), in the sense that they do not have any organisations that 
represent grassroots consumers, but only government funded public bodies. The three members of  
the ‘consumer family’, together with the DCA make for a solid structurally stable consumer repre-
sentation, despite the legitimacy issues surrounding their contact with consumers. However, it still 
remains the case that by and large the organisations feel that they are peripheral to the main policy 
making and regulatory processes. It is only when particularly obvious cases, like that of  consumer 
rights legislation, arise do they become core to the process. This will be addressed in greater detail 
in the next chapter.
In addition, Norway clearly differs from the UK in the extent to which, as practiced govern-
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ance, they place less emphasis on farming out responsibility to regulators than the UK does. Even 
though there are numerous regulators and Authorities with particular responsibilities, it is less 
developed in terms of  the inclusion of  consumer perspectives than in the UK with the example of  
Ofcom. In this respect the regulatory state can be seen to exist much more starkly in the UK than 
in Norway. What is clear however is that consumer issues, and consumer organisations, are given, 
on the face of  it, more resources and more power. As shown in the interviews the Norwegian 
‘consumer family’ is very well supported financially, compared to other European countries, but 
also crucially they are generally seen in a positive light by both policymakers and the public (BF, 
ES, Interviews, 2011). This is made most clear with the dedicated consumer department in the 
Ministry, and with the ‘consumer family’ that directly feeds into the ministry. This is typical of  a 
more corporatist system that Norway is often claimed to be.
 But it does not however necessarily mean that consumer organisations have any more impact 
than they do in other systems. What is interesting is that despite the significant difference in sys-
tems there is considerable similarity in the way in which consumer organisations are at times un-
derstood to be core participants in policy making, and at other times considered to be very periph-
eral. This is also despite the rhetoric from the authorities that consumers are the most important 
group and that all policy provisions are made on the basis that they would enhance the position of  
consumers. Even though the policymakers, of  course consider consultations and the input from 
consumers as vital, but this does not mean that policy and regulation will necessarily go that way as 
there are various other interested stakeholders who also involved in lobbying. 
In Norway consumer representation, through the various institutions, is still in a good position 
despite the fact that some of  the interviewees think that it is changing. So what we see in Norway 
is a system of  consumer representation that has remained relatively stable over the years, which 
receives popular support, but which has little political power in the regulatory and policy process, 
although can have some power when there are media scandals or very ‘consumer specific’ issues. 
The major point is that consumer organisations have more weight than individual consumers, 
who have the classic collective action problem. They can then represent them in forums in which 
individual consumers would not otherwise be represented but business and labour would be. The 
idea that government officials would be both representing the citizen interest and the consumer 
interest whilst trying to arbitrate between the competing interests is difficult, due to the increasing 
complexity of  consumer markets that has resulted from a neoliberal policy paradigm. If  it is the 
case that markets need to be opened up, then consumers need to have the ability to act over and 
above merely opting out, which is the only line of  defence for the market liberal. You cannot opt 
out of  some markets as there is either not enough competition or that a particular good or service 
has become dominant. In this respect, despite the issues with some of  the Norwegian organisa-
tions, like their grassroots legitimacy and the lack of  a consumer conscience, the fact that they are  
so well-funded, structurally stable, and enjoy popular support are positive attributes.
What is most important to note about Norway is the scale of  their consumer representation in 
comparison to their size, as one official pointed out: 
We are a little country but we probably have the largest consumer organisations compared to the 
population...in the figures about how much the European governments contribute to consumer 
organisations, in money real I think Germany is a little bit ahead of  us, but proportionally Norway is 
way beyond any other country. So the consumer council has quite a unique standing in Norway, they 
cover all aspects of  consumer policy and interests and matters, in that sense there is not room for 
other organisations. (ES, Interview, 2011)
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But, as the interviewee pointed out, the very fact that there is such a strong corporatist dimension 
to the consumer movement in Norway means it does not leave much room for other actors, like 
a more ‘grass-root’ movement with a direct relationship to a ‘membership’. Therefore those that 
think that Norway needs to develop more member-based advocacy organisations, for both demo-
cratic legitimacy reasons and to have greater independence, might be willing to forgo the relative 
luxury they experience in terms of  proximity to government and in terms of  resources.
Like in the UK consumer organisations in Norway seem to be core when it comes to consumer 
rights legislation, but peripheral when it comes to broader policy and regulation. It seems to be 
the case that only when significant evidence can be shown that either a market is failing to provide 
adequate choice, or when there is enough public outcry about a particular issue, that consumer 
organisations have some leverage. But as we have seen it is the organisations themselves that are re-
quired to better understand these issues and then disseminate the findings. Outside of  this consum-
er organisations, in Norway and the UK, remain just an interest among many, and in most sectors 
it is industry which has greater weight. So, if  the organisations were not there, the situation would 
be that consumer rights legislation would most probably be weaker, there would be less exposure of  
scandals and market issues, and there would be far less developed information and redress services. 
However, it might then be the case that more independent grassroots organisations, like Which? in 
the UK would come about, but due to the various collective action problems associated with such 
diffuse public interests, this is in theory unlikely.
So consumer organisations, in both UK and Norway, therefore play a vital role in the broader 
public sphere, but whose strength in policy and regulation is largely of  peripheral importance, and 
limited to being core in very specific cases. In this respect there are significant improvements that 
could be achieved if  a genuine counter-balance to industry and agency pressure is to be achieved. 
Furthermore the regulatory state, in the case of  the UK, can be seen to be inclusive of  consumer 
interests, but that when weighed against that of  industry is far weaker. In short, in both the UK 
and Norway consumer representation is good, but could be far better. 
This investigation will now move onto the analysis chapter, where the findings from the chapter 
on the UK (chapter 6), and this chapter on Norway (chapter 7), will be analysed in greater depth, 
and the key arguments presented. 
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8. Empirical Analysis: Consumer 
Organisations in the UK and Norway
8.1 Introduction
This thesis is concerned with the role of  consumer organisations in policy making and regulation. 
It has so far outlined the literature on consumer organisations, interest groups, and the state and 
governance networks in order to gain a full understanding of  the complex dynamics at the heart 
of  contemporary policy making. It then utilised data gathered from elite interviews in the UK and 
Norway in order to get a deep understanding of  the role that consumer organisations play, and are 
understood to play, in the regulatory and policy process, and has sought to take account of  the ex-
tent to which they are seen as a balance to industry and agency pressure. The theories on the regu-
latory state, governance networks and constructivist institutionalism have been utilised to structure 
the analysis. This was achieved by addressing how the regulatory state appeals to civil society, 
assessing the subsequent governance networks that result, through a constructivist institutionalist 
position that is concerned with the ideas and perceptions of  actors within the policy and rgeulatory 
process. This analysis also used the meta-frame of  an interpretive epistemology that is concerned 
with unpacking the ideas, practices and discourses of  phenomena derived, and interpreted from 
‘...observation, conversational interviewing, and texts, rather than translated into measures’ 
(Yanow, 2003, p.16). What has been seen is that it matters how consumer organisations see them-
selves, and how policymakers, construct the role of  consumer organisations. This can tell us a 
great deal about the politics of  policy and regulatory process. What has also been shown is that 
consumer organisations’ role in policy making and regulation is greatly determined by ideology, 
ideas and issues. In addition it has been shown that despite the structurally advantageous position 
of  consumer organisations, compared to some other interest organisations, they are still relatively 
weak compared to that of  business. 
This chapter will take what has been outlined in the previous two chapters on the UK and 
Norway, and draw out the most salient factors in order to structure the chapter; whether they are 
core or peripheral to the policy process (section 8.3), the ideological frames in which they are con-
structed (section 8.4), and the importance of  ideology, ideas and issues (section 8.6). It will directly 
address the research questions, and will show how we can understand consumer organisations 
in contemporary policy making and regulation, and in so doing gain a full understanding of  the 
complex politics of  policy making. What is shown is that consumer organisations’ role differs de-
pending on ideology, ideas and issues. The broader ideology of  the state matters in so far as it has 
a determining impact on the structure and resources of  the organisations, but also it sets an ideo-
logical context in which the organisations have to operate. The ideas matter as individuals within 
the policy making and regulatory process have political positions with regard to the extent of  the 
market, the extent of  regulation, and the legitimacy of  particular groups and organisations, and 
this matters for how consumer organisations build relationships and ultimately represent consum-
ers outside of  markets. 
After this, the research questions will be directly addressed (section 8.6). It will start with the 
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supplementary questions in order to build towards the key overarching question of  ‘what the role 
of  consumer organisations is in contemporary policy making and regulation?’ In order to take ac-
count of  this question we need to first understand the more intricate dimensions regarding three 
specific elements: (1) how consumer organisations are institutionalised by the state, (2) the extent to 
which consumer organisations provide a counter-balance to industry and agency pressure, and (3) 
in what respect consumer organisations are understood to impact upon policy and regulation. By 
understanding these three elements, can we then address the primary concern of  what role con-
sumer organisations play in contemporary policy making and regulation.
The thesis will then move onto the conclusion (section 8.7) where the broader debates will be 
addressed with regard to the analysis and arguments presented in this chapter. It will also provide 
some issues for future research.
First this chapter will consider the differences and similarities between consumer organisations 
in the UK and Norway, before moving to look at the broader themes. This will then set in context 
the deeper analysis that comes after. 
8.2 Major Differences and Similarities: UK and Norway
As we have seen in terms of  the structure of  the state, and the incorporation of  consumer organi-
sation, there are significant differences, but also some similarities. There are several themes which 
were evidenced, core/peripheral, the framing and the place of  ideas, which will be addressed in 
this chapter as stated above. What this section will do is look at the differences and similarities in 
terms of  the UK and Norway as political systems. 
The relatively more pluralist political system of  the UK, and the subsequently more corporatist 
system of  Norway, did by and large fit what was evidenced with regard to consumer organisations. 
The consumer organisations in Norway were part of  the state structure, albeit at arm’s length. 
They are chiefly funded and overseen by the Department of  Consumer Affairs and the Ministry 
for Children, Equality and Social Inclusion, and even though they exhibit considerable independ-
ence in their activities, they are still ultimately answerable to those that hold the purse-strings. This 
does not however seem to have made a difference in terms of  whether they are considered to be 
either core or peripheral to the regulatory process, or the extent to which they have impact on 
policy. The UK on the other hand displays greater pluralism, in that there are more independent 
organisations from a wide cross section of  civil society, all whom are included, or have the oppor-
tunity to be included in the various policy and regulatory forums that are convened by numerous 
regulators. However these organisations are not exclusively and explicitly consumer organisations but 
a variety of  charities and NGOs concerned with their particular constituents’ issues as consumers. 
But when concerning those organisations which are exclusively and explicitly consumer organisations 
there is one notable difference. That is the organisation Which?. The organisation’s independent 
status, combined with its successful business model and the fact that it is incorporated into govern-
ance networks through its position as a ‘super-complainant’, and its inclusion in policy making 
forums both across British policy making and regulation but also at a European level, makes it 
one of  the more successful organisations in terms of  it operation. This does not necessarily trans-
late into direct influence, but does give the organisation good standing in the policy and regula-
tory process. Which? is respected in the fact that it does not take money from anyone – public or 
private, and that it has a membership that gives them a grassroots dimension. However, this has 
itself  been criticised, as the ‘grassroots’ membership is made up of  those individuals that subscribe 
to their product testing magazine, who are largely middle class and affluent, and can be accused 
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of  being ‘petty minded penny pinchers of  commodity capitalism,’ (Hilton, 2009, p.51). They do 
not therefore represent the bulk of  consumers, or in particular ‘vulnerable’ consumers who have 
a particular significance for regulators and policy makers, due to them being ‘at particular risk of  
exploitation’ (BIS, 2012, p.4). This is evident in the recent consultation and response documents for 
the ‘Changing Consumer Landscape’ consultation in the UK, in which vulnerable consumers are 
mentioned frequently as one of  the key reasons for the need for a system of  consumer protection 
and representation (BIS, 2012). 
Despite these concerns accorded to Which?, they are well respected in the UK and elsewhere 
(IT, MG, Interviews, 2011/12), and provide us with an anomaly in terms of  the consumer or-
ganisation populations in both the UK and Norway. Consumer Focus, the other dedicated  con-
sumer organisation in the UK, is similar to that of  Forbrukerrådet, being that it is a non-depart-
mental public body, and also located in the same office as the OFT, the ombudsman, much like 
Forbrukerrådet and Forbrukerombudet in Norway.
In more structural terms the consumer organisations in the UK seem to be more varied and 
dispersed, in terms of  both how they are run and thier connections to other organisations, than 
those in Norway, which are more concentrated in terms of  their closeness to government and their 
relationship to each other. The importance of  this in terms of  the strength of  consumer represen-
tation in each system is difficult to ascertain, as in one respect the incorporated system one might 
consider to be better for the organisations and for consumers as they are closer to the levers of  
power and the decision making process. However, this could be a way to disarm the organisations 
and co-opt them into a broader system in which their impact is diluted. According to one com-
mentator consumer organisation inclusion in Norway is largely aimed at merely increasing legiti-
macy: ‘It’s about legitimacy. They don’t want to communicate about solutions, about the power 
between the industry and consumers, they don’t want any of  that...they’re interested in, it’s about 
legitimacy, they want peace and quiet.’ (UK, Interview, 2011) Although this might be an overly 
cynical perspective on the role of  consumer organisations in Norway, the particular interviewee 
had been active in advisory groups for a number of  years, especially in food policy, and was decid-
edly negative about the potential of  consumer organisations in impacting on policy and regulation. 
This tells us that the system which incorporates might not be so good for the consumer at the end 
of  the day. Where in the UK we do see a more diverse and dispersed population of  organisa-
tions, the regulators themselves are seemingly, in the case of  Ofcom at least, keen to ensure that 
consumer organisations and their representation are made part of  the institutional design through 
the various forums. As stated, Ofcom has as its mandate to regulate in the interests of  ‘consum-
ers and citizens’, as does Ofgem, the energy regulator. But both have been criticised for a lack of  
attention to the needs and wishes of  consumers: ‘OFTEL, too, under its various Director Generals 
(DGs) could be seen in general to be on the side of  the consumer. In spite of  this in the first five to 
ten years after privatization it was not apparent that the consumer’s lot was improving in terms of  
lower prices or better standards of  service.’ (Young, 2001, p.55) However despite this Young also 
suggests that privatisation has been of  benefit to consumer organisations, and by logical extension 
consumers. This is of  significant interest, as it is the suggestion that consumer organisations have 
become more relevant with DLP as consumers are the target interest: 
140
Under nationalization, consumer bodies were weak and had little influence (Ogden, 1997, p. 535).  
Those established at privatization developed a much stronger role, each with its own individual  
structure and modus operandi. Other organizations such as the PUAF, NCC, CA and the National  
Association of  Citizens Advice Bureaux (NACAB) have also been instrumental, through lobbying  
parliament, Whitehall and the regulatory offices in gaining improvements for all categories of   
customers. (Young, 2001, p.64) 
One suggestion from across the interviews is that market size matters, as was suggested in the inter-
views at the EU level with BEUC -  the bigger markets tend to have stronger, and better resourced, 
consumer organisations. However this does not seem to be the case with Norway, which has a rela-
tively small market but a strong consumer presence, as was outlined above in Section 7.6. However, 
what it may show is that without the state intervention, as in Norway, small markets do not enable 
a strong consumer voice, which are possible in larger markets. The consumer organisation from 
Malta, for example, complained of  the lack of  funding and resources, and put it down in large part 
to the relative market size combined with a disinterested state (Consumers’ Association of  Malta, 
Questionnaire, 2011). 
However, the co-option we see in the UK, is not the same co-option as we see in Norway, but 
a way that the regulatory state attempts to get ‘better regulation’, for, as was said by the Ofcom 
official (see chapter 6 on the UK), both instrumental and democratic reasons. The process is made 
more democratic through reaching out to a wide variety of  civil society organisations, and al-
though the connections might not be as well developed and concentrated as in the Norwegian case, 
it may have a greater impact collectively. This however could also be down to the ideology, ideas 
and issues which will be looked at later in the chapter. Furthermore, even though the UK is by and 
large more easily defined as neoliberal, the setting up of  some of  the regulators under New Labour 
were themselves ideologically contested: 
...those from a neoliberal perspective have feared that such bodies too easily become an insidious 
and unaccountable extension of  the state; meanwhile, those taking a social democratic approach 
to governance have hoped – albeit with critical doubts along the way – that such bodies can 
achieve beneficial outcomes precisely because of  their political independence, their concentration 
of  expertise and their flexibility in working with industry, civil society and the public. (Lunt and 
Livingstone, 2012, p.3)
In this respect the regulatory culture in the UK seems to provide a more dynamic relationship than 
of  that in Norway, which is fairly instrumental. Norwegian policy makers seem to see consumer 
organisations as a link, and a mediator, between them and the public evidenced as they are seen 
as: ‘A way to get relevant information. To understand what is going on. To test the water,’ (ØC, 
Interview, 2011), and they can, ‘...see loopholes in our legislation,’ (ES, Interview, 2011), and this is 
principally due to the fact that: ‘They meet the consumers. We don’t’ (BF, Interview,  2011). In this 
respect consumer organisations in both countries can be seen as ‘eyes on the ground’, organisations 
who help politicians and policymakers to see the potential pitfalls of  policy and regulation. In this 
respect consumer organisations become somewhat of  a mediator in the governance network. This 
diagram helps to illustrate this:
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As this diagram shows, consumer organisations, receive information from consumers in the form 
of  complaints and redress cases, this informs them of  issues in particular sectors and markets. This 
enables the organisations to really understand how particular markets are functioning for con-
sumers. At the same time the organisations are able to provide consumers with information, both 
about the rights as consumers and about products and services, through both their website, cam-
paigns and media appearances. Consumer organisations are themselves able to feed the informa-
tion they receive from consumers through to policy makers and industry. This is done both through 
the institutionalised forums and through ad-hoc connections. At the same time consumers inform 
industry through their consumption practises, and inform policy makers both through individual 
responses to consultations and ultimately through the voting booth. At the same time industry is 
also lobbying the policymakers for favourable conditions for business, which by and large means 
less regulation. 
Therefore what is crucial here, and where the consumer organisations in both countries share  
characteristics, is that they are seen as mediators between the public and policy makers, they en-
able the policy and regulatory process to be more porous and open to public scrutiny, but also 
providing input that directly serves the interests of  consumers. So, on the face of  it their role seems 
to fit into what the theory on governance suggests of  public interest organisations: ‘The inclusion 
of  relevant and affected groups and organizations in governance networks help to overcome prob-
lems in terms of  societal fragmentation and resistance to policy change, and thus tends to make the 
governing processes more effective.’ (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007, p.4) However, what is crucial to 
understand, and therefore what this analysis chapter, and thesis as a whole is aimed at achieving 
is determining, through understanding the participants’ perspective, whether or not these govern-
ance networks actually work in this way when concerning consumer organisations in practice. 
What needs to be understood then, when looking back at fig.4, is whether or not the connections 
between consumers and policy makers, and consumer organisations and policy makers is enough 
to counter-balance the intermediation between policymakers and industry. 
Through the interviews it has been possible to gain an understanding of  how consumer organi-
sations are understood to fill this role, and the extent to which it is successful in terms of  acting 
as a counter-balance to industry and impacting on policy. What has been found is that consumer 
Fig.4 Consumer Organisation Intermediation
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organisations are in fact largely peripheral to the processes but if  the issue is salient and obviously 
explicitly relevant to consumer organisations input, like that of  Consumer Rights legislation, then 
they will get to input in a significant way. What mattered was the ideology of  the structure, the 
ideas of  those involved and the issue in hand; all of  these dimensions play a part in the role that 
consumer organisations will subsequently have in a particular policy process.  
This chapter now moves to look at how the inclusion or exclusion of  consumer organisations 
into the policy and regulatory network can be theorised further. This is done in terms of  the extent 
to which organisations and policy makers understand the consumer interest to be core or periph-
eral to decision making, and therefore determine the role of  consumer organisations in the process. 
This has been done through drawing on the interviews and building a picture of  how it is that con-
sumer organisations play a role in the policy process, and what was found was that perceptions and 
understandings were in many respects contradictory. However, once we theorise the role they play, 
and critically analyse them, it is possible to see that the role that they have is by no means fixed, as 
evidenced in individuals’ different understandings of  the place of  consumer organisations - which 
can also have a determining impact. This is why taking account of  the perceptions of  individu-
als involved in the regulatory process is so vital for understanding the contours of  the state and 
governance networks, as it is these perceptions and positions which both evidence and can shape 
the activity. It is the ideas and discourses that construct the institutions themselves, therefore what 
needs to be uncovered and unpacked are these very understandings.
This chapter now turns to look at one binary dynamic which frames the way in which individu-
als involved in the policy process understand the consumer interest and consumer organisations. 
This is done in terms of  the extent to which the consumer interest is seen as either core, or periph-
eral, to the policy process, which then impacts the particular role of  consumer organisations.
8.3 The Consumer Interest: Core or Peripheral
In the previous two chapters we have seen how consumer organisations in two different polities in-
teract with policy makers and regulators, and have understood, to some degree, what role they play 
in contemporary governance. They inform policy makers of  consumer issues within the market, 
and potential issues with new legislation outside of  the market, whilst at the same time informing 
both industry of  concerns, and providing information and dispute resolution to consumers them-
selves. They also provide greater democratic legitimacy to the process in general, and their inclu-
sion conforms to the central premise of  governance networks. What will now be shown is the ways 
in which consumer organisations are understood to play a role in the policy and regulatory process, 
in terms of  how the extent to which the consumer interest is seen to be either core or peripheral to 
the decision making. 
This is not to say that it is only the case that consumer organisations, or the consumer interest, 
are only ever core or peripheral, but to suggest that, depending on the particular policy area, those 
actors involved, the norms and ideologies of  those actors, and the broader ideological frame, will 
impact on the role that consumer organisations are understood to have in that particular case. This 
the might well be translated into them, in practice, in particular scenarios, being core or peripheral 
themselves, but this is of  no consequence if  we are trying to understand their broader role in the 
policy and regulatory process, and system of  governance as a whole, as the answer to the simplified 
question ‘Do they have influence?’ will just be an ambiguous ‘Well it depends.’ It is therefore far 
more satisfactory to detail and theorise the intricacies of  inclusion as public interest groups, taking 
account of  the differences in perceptions, both in broader terms of  their inclusion in the regulatory 
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process but also in terms of  ideas and ideology of  individuals. The place of  consumer organisa-
tions, and the consumer interest, in this respect is not one or the other, either core or peripheral, 
but both, in different circumstances and in different capacities. 
The next diagrams, fig.5 and fig.6, show the ways in which the consumer organisations can be 
seen to play a role in the policy process in terms of  the consumer interest being either core, or pe-
ripheral, to the decision making. On the left hand side is a diagram of  how the consumer interest 
are understood to be core to the regulatory process, and on the right hand side is a diagram detail-
ing how the consumer interest is peripheral to the process. Below the diagrams is a full explanation 
of  the role of  consumer organisations in each circumstance. 
From the analysis in the empirical chapters (chapters 6 and 7) we can see that the representation 
of  the consumer interest can been understood in two ways. That either the consumer interest is 
core to all that regulators and policy makers do, as shown the left-hand diagram in fig.5, where 
policy and regulatory decisions meander from some being more in the interest of  producers, and 
some being more pressured toward agency concerns. This is not to say that these interests could not 
overlap, they could, but to explicitly show that decisions will have some bias, be that in favour of  
the producer or the agency. What is crucial here is that the consumer interest is core. It is a cen-
tral tenet by which policy and regulatory decisions are made. The role of  consumer organisations, 
when this might be the case, is to embellish and strengthen this, the stronger the interest organisa-
tion community the wider the band in the middle would be and the less the fluctuation between 
producer and agency pressures. 
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The regulators and policymakers, in addition to some consumer organisations, thought that 
the consumer interest was core to policy making and regulation. Even though it is likely that the 
regulators and policy makers would say this, as it is by and large their statutory or parliamentary 
obligation, it can still be gauged in terms of  core and peripheral, as sometimes the consumer inter-
est  might be core, and sometimes it will be peripheral. In these circumstances we can then analyse 
what role consumer organisations have, to either embellish or strengthen policy and regulation 
proposals and implementation, or, in the next case, to ensure that statutory duties are upheld.
It is also the case that the consumer interest can be seen as peripheral, fig.6, where policy and 
regulatory decisions gravitate away from the consumer interest and toward the producer interest. 
This occurs through both regulatory mission creep, and regulatory capture. Consumer organisa-
tions role in this scenario is to ensure that statutory obligations are adhered to, and that the con-
sumer interest is kept in mind. 
So what we can see is two scenarios (1) where consumer interests are core to the process, and 
consumer organisations help it to be stronger, or (2) that consumer interests are peripheral to the 
process, and consumer organisations’ role is to attempt to ensure that the consumer interest is 
taken into account and that statutory duty adhered to. Both of  these circumstances exist in the 
UK and in Norway, and the difference is purely on a case by case basis. With the consumer rights 
directive, for example, the consumer interest, and consumer organisations themselves, were core to 
the process. In the example of  product placement it was peripheral, as most consumer organisa-
tions were against the proposals, and it was only the minister’s decision which changed the ban. 
Consumer organisations were then in a position where they had to merely ensure that Ofcom 
would keep to their statutory duties, with regard consumers, in light of  the lifting of  the ban, and 
that the rules around product placement to children, regarding junk food, were adhered to. 
This section has sought to detail the conditions in which the consumer interest can be seen to be 
either core or peripheral to the regulatory process and by doing so illustrated the particular role of  
consumer organisations. They themselves become either central to the process, making sure that 
consumer are central to the decision making, or they become peripheral trying to ensure that what 
is left of  particular regulation is adhered to by the regulators. This shows that the role of  consumer 
organisations, in both the UK and in Norway, and potentially in other states, can depend on a va-
riety of  factors, but which can be broadly theorised into these two dynamics. What will be looked 
at now are more individual perspectives, by those involved in policy making, towards consumer 
organisations. It is argued that these positions themselves can impact upon the extent to which con-
sumer organisations can be seen to play an important role in the policy and regulatory process. 
8.4 Perspectives on Consumer Organisations
In addition to understanding where the consumer interests features in the broader policy process, 
we also need to better understand how individuals’ perspectives towards consumer organisations 
as a political force might impact the perception of  consumer organisations and as a result, their 
role. In the interactions with a wide range of  policymakers, both in regulator, authorities and in 
ministries and departments, there are individuals with positions towards the inclusion of  consumer 
organisations, and it is these perceptions which have an impact on the extent to which consumer 
organisations are taken into account, beyond the structural requirements. 
It is through these forums that consumer organisations can become affected by the institutional 
conditions, which through a move to the regulatory state have changed in terms of  how consum-
ers are represented. However, the broader political framing of  consumer organisations needs to be 
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theorised in terms of  their inclusion into the networks of  the regulatory state. It is then possible to 
see that there are conflicting arguments regarding the inclusion of  consumer organisations into the 
structure of  the regulatory state, and this problematizes the assumption that consumers are both 
uni-dimensional and that their representative power is determined merely by the mechanistic suc-
cess of  a particular group on a particular policy. Instead it needs to be understood that consumer 
representation, as part of  the contemporary state in regulatory capitalism, is bound by conflicting 
ideological positions and that subsequently consumer power is hindered in scenarios outside of  the 
market. Moreover it highlights the inherent politics of  structures considered depoliticised. 
Three particular frames will now be outlined with regard to consumer organisations: ‘perfect 
form’, ‘toxic agent’, and ‘fly-in-the-ointment’. These are three ideological positions concerning the 
inclusion of  consumer organisations into the regulatory state and network governance. They are 
stylised but best represent the three main positions toward consumer organisations in the most par-
simonious way. First the three positions will be outlined, then a table will be included in order to 
better see how these positions compare in respect of  those involved, their politics and philosophies, 
and their pleas.
8.4.1 Typology of Consumer Organisations Frames
1. Consumer Organisations as ‘Perfect Form’:
Consumer organisations represent individuals in a way that is most suited to living in a consumer 
society such as we do. Individuals are largely unconcerned by significant macro-issues of  ideologi-
cal antagonism and require only that the market works more efficiently to deliver better goods and 
services and a lower price. Consumer organisations advise on the implementation of  smart and 
well-targeted regulation to better serve the public good, and to police and report market failures 
and infringements, including anti-trust legislation, price-fixing and collusion. In this respect con-
sumer organisations can ‘grease the wheels’ of  both capitalist enterprise and consumer democ-
racy – they  provide the necessary information to both industry and government on the one hand, 
and consumers/end users on the other. They can be seen as an epistemic intermediary relaying 
information to producers, legislators and consumers. They are also particularly important when it 
comes to the representation of  ‘the vulnerable’ (which could be read as ‘not rational’) consumer – 
children, the elderly, the disabled, the frail and the very poor, who require specific advocacy as they 
have relatively little power.  This is the position held by the groups themselves and more centrist 
politicians and civil servants, who see that a capitalist liberal democracy needs management in or-
der to better serve the population, and to make sure the most vulnerable are cared for – from this 
perspective the market and competition are seen as means to an end. 
2. Consumer Organisations as a ‘Fly-in-the-Ointment’: 
Consumer organisations are seen as unrepresentative re-articulations of  ideologically driven civil 
society groups, NGOs and charities, who attempt to gerrymander issues into particular configura-
tions in which they can influence policy. Their representativeness is undermined by the universal-
ity of  the ‘consumer’ label – consumers are individuals with vastly different, and more significant 
identifications, and cannot therefore be treated as a single body of  people. This is emphasised by 
the relatively small membership of  consumer organisations in comparison to the general popula-
tion of  consumers. Their claims of  legitimacy as being ‘a voice of  the people’ against those of  cor-
porate interests are seen as a mask for crowbarring interventionist policies where none are neces-
sary, or even desired by individuals themselves. These groups undermine the rational consumer by 
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attempting to speak on their behalf  from a privileged position – they are largely middle class and 
affluent but represent lower class and ‘vulnerable’ consumers as they ‘know what is good for them’ 
– an elitist position without merit. 
This position is usually held by market liberals – intervention in the market is seen as corrupt-
ing, especially when trying to accommodate the collectivisation of  the distinctly individual demand 
of  consumers. They see these groups in general from an Olsonian perspective: groups (including 
firms) seek rents from the manipulation of  regulation, consumer organisations are therefore repre-
senting the interests of  their members, not the public at large of  whom everyone is a consumer. As 
Dryzek and Dunleavy (2009) say of  this position: ‘Politicians, interest groups and bureaucrats may 
all claim to be serving the public interest, but that is just cheap talk that justifies their actions and 
cloaks their real motives.’ (Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009, p.106) They therefore consider consumer 
organisations to be misrepresenting people who are rationally capable of  representing themselves 
in the marketplace on a more accurate and individual level – they see their influence as both unjus-
tified and disproportional. They see markets and competition as ends in themselves.
3. Consumer Organisations as ‘Toxic Agent’:
This perspective is politically opposed to the ‘fly-in-the-ointment’ position, in that they consider 
consumer organisations to be emblematic of  a system which continues to promote the identifica-
tion of  individuals as ‘homo-economicus’, and this eclipses far more important social identifica-
tions like being a ‘citizen’. They see consumer organisations as ‘capitalist apologists’ who instead 
of  trying to change the overall structure of  the system, which promotes the market values that 
de-politicises significant public issues (through various neo-liberal developments like the regulatory 
state, NPM and public choice organisation), they in fact conform to a particular world view that 
promotes the market and capitalism as the optimal system for human society. They do this whilst 
at the same time eclipsing genuine political and economic grievances of  individuals and groups 
that identify themselves as anything but ‘consumers’ – other social justice groups, NGOs and civil 
society organisations. This position is held by those critical of  neo-liberalism, capitalism and the 
primacy of  markets – although primarily of  the left also includes communitarians. In the extreme 
they hold that capitalism should be swept aside for more humane and sustainable forms of  social 
organisation, or that public spirited regulation should be held as sacrosanct. They see the relation-
ship between markets and democracy as antagonistic, and the institutions of  the state should be on 
the side of  democracy and citizens, not the market and consumers. They see capitalism as a gener-
ally corrosive process that blindly empties human experience of  any moral core, merely serving-up 
evermore parts of  social life to the dictates of  capital accumulation, as it pathologically searches 
for more investment opportunities for continued growth. Communitarians are less extreme but 
generally see that the free market has no eye for ethics and should therefore be heavily regulated in 
particular fields of  life, and call for the primacy of  citizens as a core identity. These positions can be 
easily compared in the table below where they are set out in terms of  political ideology on typical 
left right axis:
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Politics Left Centre Right
Position ‘Toxic Agent’ ‘Perfect Form’ ‘Fly in the ointment’
Philosophy Marxist, communitarianLiberal, reformist Libertarian, Market 
liberal
People Environmentalists, 
Social Activists, critics 
of  neo-liberalism, critics 
of  market dominance
Consumer organisations 
themselves, policy 
makers, social 
democrats
Business groups, industry 
lobby, market liberals, 
libertarians
Plea Increased regulation 
of  public goods 
and commons to 
nationalisation
‘Smart/Better 
regulation’, second 
gen.regulation, EU 
harmonisation
Further liberalisation, 
de-regulation and 
increased property 
rights. 
Fig 7. Typology of How Consumer Organisations are Framed
What is shown by this theorisation is how there are different arguments at play with regard to the 
inclusion of  consumer organisations as representatives in regulation and policy making. This takes 
seriously the conflictual nature of  politics and public policy, which much of  the literature on the 
regulatory state and public policy does not explicitly recognise. 
It was previously outlined (chapter 3) how the theory on the regulatory state does not take con-
sumer representation into account, yet consumer organisations, and their representation, are a fa-
miliar part of  the regulatory structure. This chapter then moved beyond this to theorise the politi-
cal dimensions of  consumer representation in order to better understand the conflicting politics of  
regulation and policy making. Here the investigation has shown that consumer organisations can 
be argued to fit into three broad normative frames. It can therefore be seen by and large that the 
regulatory state, and the institutional structures, construct consumer representation, as a ‘perfect 
form’, as they both bring information from civil society, grant greater legitimacy on regulatory and 
policy processes whilst not directly challenging the status quo of  marketisation. In this respect they 
become a fairly safe form of  representation, even though they are pro-regulation in ways neoliber-
als would not be. However, as has been shown this also negates the contested nature of  regulatory 
regimes, the politics of  depoliticisation, and also provides a very narrow conception of  consumer 
representation. It is therefore possible to see that within the structure of  the regulatory state, in the 
connections between regulators and civil society, there are conflicting arguments about the nature 
of  consumer representation. This is not to say that any one particular perspective is right or true 
but to describe in greater depth the theoretical positions at the heart of  the politics of  regulation 
and the regulatory state. This further exposes the relationship between the state, the market and 
civil society as a highly contested and political field. In this way it is also possible to see how the 
various discourses, norms, and arguments that contemporary policy making fields are composed of  
have a determining effect on structures and institutions, as Howarth suggests: 
Institutions like states, markets or governance networks can be conceptualized as more or less  
sedimented systems of  discourse, that is, partially fixed systems of  rules, norms, resources, practices  
and subjectivities that are linked together in particular ways. (Howarth, 2010, p.312) 
So it is possible to see how broader hegemonies, like neoliberalism, can impact on the structure of  
the state in terms of  the characteristics of  the regulatory model. This subsequently has an impact 
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on how consumer representation is positioned as political representation. This is of  vital impor-
tance to understand, as how civil society is engaged with by the state is fundamental to how con-
temporary democracy functions. The views and perspectives of  various political actors, how they 
are positioned, and how they position themselves are key points of  reference in disentangling the 
complexity at the heart of  regulation and policy making. 
This chapter will now move to address ideology, ideas and issues directly.
8.5 Ideology, Ideas and Issues
This chapter has so far outlined the various ways in which both the consumer interest, and con-
sumer organisations themselves, are understood to play a role in the policy and regulatory process. 
There were three themes which arose in the research which are considered to be most important 
in addressing the research questions, which will be done next. These were ideology, ideas and 
issues. The broader ideology of  the state, or the regulator, either more neoliberal or more social 
democratic, has a determining effect structurally. The New Labour government, although in many 
ways conceded to neoliberalism, also put in place institutions with a social democratic remit – like 
Ofcom and the focus on consumer and citizens. This has now been impacted by the Coalition’s de-
sire to have a ‘bonfire of  the quangos’ which was to originally include Ofcom, but which will take 
the scalp of  Consumer Focus in the reform of  the ‘consumer landscape’. In this respect we can see 
that the more neoliberal ideology of  the Coalition has directly impacted the ‘consumer landscape’, 
and the Coalition’s politicians, it is theorised, would more likely support the more market liberal 
position towards consumer organisations. There may be some who recognise the importance of  
consumer representation, and there having been Liberal Democrats rather than Conservatives at 
the helm in BIS, the department responsible for the changes, might well have lessened the blow. 
What is important to note is that both the broader ideology of  the government matters to the role 
of  consumer organisations. 
Furthermore, although this thesis recognises, and argues, that structure plays a significant part 
in determining the role of  consumer organisations, it also recognises the impact that individuals 
can have. This was made clear in the product placement issue, where due to a new minister being 
put in place the legislative process shifted to being in favour of  a lighter touch regulatory stance. 
The importance of  individuals was also recognised by one of  the interviewees:
It’s a fortuitous combination of  circumstances that get things to change, or not. It doesn’t seem to 
be down to structure but seems to be down to luck. It is amazing how often luck is on the side of  the 
consumer but there are times it is not. I’ll give you an example, a minister deciding very early on in 
digital television switchover that he wanted to have a consumer expert group to advise him...digital 
switch over would have been significantly different had that not happened. (RC, Interview, 2011) 
So what this tells us is that understanding the role of  consumer organisations in contemporary 
policy making and regulation is incredibly complex. We have seen how the broader ideologies of  
the two states impact upon the relative stability and incorporation of  consumer organisations, we 
have also seen how the extent to which the consumer interest is included is greatly determined by 
contingent factors like that of  ideas and issues. The values and ideas of  particular individuals, in 
the UK at least, can have an impact on the role of  consumer organisations, and the responsibilities 
that they are given. 
The third important dimension to take into account is that of  issues. The issues that is under 
discussion matters to the extent to which consumer organisations are important. The recent de-
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velopments in Consumer Rights legislation that have come from an EU directive are evidence of  
this. All organisations that were spoken to as part of  this research were involved to a greater or 
lesser degree at both national and EU level discussion. Decision makers seemed to take seriously 
the points of  view and perspectives of  consumer organisations with regard to the new directive, 
with Which? even suggesting that they had significant impact on it (JH, AS, Interviews, 2011). But 
even then consumer organisations, although broadly happy with the results, were still required to 
make compromises to industry pressure (FT, 2012). The most stark example of  this is with the EU 
food labelling legislation which became a debate between GDA (Guideline Daily Amounts) and the 
Traffic Light system (Red for unhealthy, Amber for mild, and Green for healthy). Industry was all 
in favour of  GDA, as they argued that the traffic light system would unfairly discriminate against 
particular foods. Whereas all of  the consumer representatives, including numerous MEPs and all 
of  the consumer organisations, health organisations, and consumers themselves whom had been 
surveyed were in favour of  the traffic light system. When the vote went through it was decided in 
favour of  the GDA system, a clear victory for industry. This campaign on behalf  of  the food indus-
try was widely seen as one of  the largest lobbying operations in recent years (EurActiv, 2010). 
Furthermore, regulation and policy on broader more diverse issues are difficult to discern. 
Although consumer organisations in the UK are involved in all of  the regulated utilities sectors 
(water, gas, electricity, telecommunications) it is seemingly quite random as to whether they have 
an impact on policy or regulation. In Norway, there have been discussion over particular issues like 
food for many years, but which those involved felt there was little impact from their side, and where 
the producer groups had significant impact (UK, Interview, 2011). 
Therefore, as has been shown throughout the empirical chapters (chapter 6 and 7) and in the 
analysis chapter here, ideology, ideas and issues have a significant impact on the extent of  consum-
er organisations involvement and subsequently on both the ability to counter-balance industry and 
agencies pressures and their ability to impact on policy. 
These questions will now be address directly and concisely taking into account the discussion  so 
far.
8.6 Research Questions
This section will now directly answer the research questions that have guided this thesis. It will do 
so succinctly in a way that brings all the prior analysis together. It will also start with the supple-
mentary questions in order to build towards the key question.
8.6.1 How are consumer organisations institutionalised by the state?
This question is vital in appreciating both how the state, specifically the regulatory state, has taken 
consumer organisations to be part of  the institutional design, but also in terms of  the extent to 
which these organisations are part of  the governance networks.
What we have seen in both countries, in a variety of  different ways, are states actively engaged 
in the inclusion of  consumer organisations into the governance network. This is in and of  itself  
hugely important in our analysis, and one of  the primary motivations for this research. Even 
though, in the UK, there are dramatic adjustments being made to the ‘Consumer Landscape’ with 
the closure of  Consumer Focus and the introduction of  a ‘Regulated Industries Unit’ under the 
wing of  a revamped Citizens Advice Bureau. 
What we see in the two case countries are two starkly different approaches to the inclusion, or 
incorporation, of  consumer organisations into the state. Drawing on Rose (1981), as stated earlier 
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in both the literature review (chapter 2), and in the empirical chapters (chapters 6 and 7), there 
are examples of  the different models of  consumer representation in both countries. Norway more 
readily fits into the Corporatist Model, whereas the UK fits uneasily between the Free Market Model, 
and the Quasi-Public Consumer Agency Model. Principally, consumer organisations in the UK are insti-
tutionalised through developments in the regulatory state which demand their inclusion, whereas 
in Norway consumer organisations are a part of  the state structure. Even so both systems display 
independence from the central government, although not always in fiscal terms, and contribute to 
regulation and policy debates through formal mechanisms like forums, consultations and advisory 
groups, and more informal mechanisms like contacts with various civil servants and other decision 
makers.  
8.6.2 To what extent do consumer organisations provide a counter-balance to 
industry and agency pressure?
This question is an essential dimension to understanding the extent to which the regulatory state 
has realised the republican tripartism that is intended to ensure ‘better regulation’. Part of  the pur-
pose, theoretically, of   a move to more governance networks and ‘reaching out to civil society’ is 
to ensure greater democratic legitimacy, but also to ensure that a broader set of  interests are taken 
into account and ‘regulatory capture’ is reduced. What is found is that by and large the consumer 
organisations are relatively peripheral to the decision making processes, in which industry is not. 
Being that it is the industry that are the subject of  the regulation they are central to the decision 
making, despite the fact that there are such clear consumer issues with many of  the regulated 
industries. This is on top of  the fact that there is a serious resource imbalance with industry and 
corporations making lobbying part of  their PR arm. Consumer organisations, although often 
funded by the state need to account for ever public penny spent, and therefore need to pick their 
battles very carefully. They cannot have as deep pockets as industry and corporations and therefore 
have to be far more tactical about what they choose to lobby on, this was evidenced in numerous 
interviews with regard to ‘picking battles’ (GN, TN, JH, RC, Interviews, 2011).
Another key factor, which was also brought up in numerous interviews in both countries, was 
that consumer representatives were often lumped together under the ‘consumer perspective’ where 
as industry would have the opportunity to put their cases forward individually. This, for the con-
sumer organisations (GN, TN, JH, Interviews, 2011), was a problem as, for example, if  there were 
ten seats at the table nine would be for industry and one would be for consumers. This clearly dis-
advantages the consumer representation as the forums and consultations become weighted towards 
industry. 
In all three respects (1) engaging with civil society, (2) resource imbalance and (3)  consolidation 
of  consumer representation, consumer organisations are not in an adequate position to redress the 
imbalance between industry and agency pressure. It might be the case that in some marginal cases 
that consumer perspectives reach the final policy goals, but that by and large industry have signifi-
cantly more weight.
8.6.3 In what respect are consumer organisations understood to impact upon 
policy and regulation?
This question most closely addresses the issue of  influence. In asking how consumer organisations 
are understood to have an impact upon policy it is possible to see how influential they see them-
selves to be without getting into the difficult territory of  measurement. 
There are chiefly two dimensions to this question. That is (1) direct and (2) indirect impact on 
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policy and regulation. It was evidenced that in general consumer organisations, and even policy 
makers did not consider consumer organisations to have that great a direct impact on final policy; 
having an overwhelmingly favourable part of  legislation written up in their favour. However, it is 
the case that they might be understood to have had a concessionary impact, where even though the 
bulk of  a piece of  legislation goes through, there are some concessions to the consumer input. This 
was evidenced to often be the case - that even though organisations were on the whole peripheral, 
and did not see themselves or were not seen to have significant impact, they still did not consider 
their efforts as entirely wasted.
In addition there is another dimension with regard to indirect impact, and this concerns a 
more subtle embedding of  consumer concerns in the policy and regulatory processes more gener-
ally. This was more often what consumer organisations saw themselves as doing. Their role in the 
process in this respect was to ensure that consumer issues were always on the minds of  decision 
makers. 
This brings the chapter to the final key question:
8.6.4 What is the role of consumer organisations in contemporary policy 
making and regulation?
Bringing together what has been answered in the previous questions it is possible to say that con-
sumer organisations’ role is multi-dimensional. Principally this thesis argues that they are there 
to ensure that to as great extent as possible consumers are taken into account in decision making, 
and primarily do this through a subtle embedding of  consumer concerns. However they also do 
serve the function of  bringing greater legitimacy to the policy process through their very inclusion, 
despite what potential impact they do or do not have. In this respect they give the impression that 
governance networks are inclusive and horizontal, when in fact it may well still be the case that 
they are still very much hierarchical and dominated by particular interests. Therefore, if  we look at 
them  critically, that can be seen to be, in their current form, supporters of  a system which on the 
whole does not include the interest of  consumers. This is possible to see as they broadly contrib-
ute to the process, they are included as civil society bringing greater legitimacy to the policy and 
regulatory processes, whilst simultaneously still referring to individuals as consumers over being 
citizens, in this respect the do not ‘rock the boat’ ideologically but perform a particular role in their 
very inclusion. In this respect, much like Hilton (2009) suggests of  organisations move from being 
concerned broadly with issues of  access to goods and services and are now primarily concerned 
with choice, this can be seen as part of  a broader process of  neoliberalism that has constructed the 
policy arena as one in which citizens are rather complicated and have ambiguous demands, where-
as consumers are more straightforward and conform to various principles regarding the sanctity of  
the market.
Put simply, consumer organisations’ role is one in which their presence is utilised by a system of  
governance that is principally concerned with ‘better markets’ rather than ‘better regulation’ in or-
der to grant greater legitimacy to regulatory and policy decisions that by and large benefit industry. 
8.7 Conclusion
This chapter, and the thesis as a whole, speaks to the literature on the regulatory state, and the 
literature on governance networks through a constructivist institutionalist and interpretivist per-
spective. It shows that there are inherent contradictions and confusion in processes of  governance, 
which made the particular ideological developments about depoliticisation and the emancipatory 
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nature of  networks in their current form illusory. It has done this through an analysis of  the role of  
consumer organisations in the UK and Norway. 
This chapter has specifically considered four different elements: (1) the major differences and 
similarities in consumer organisation intermediation in both the UK and Norway, (2) the extent to 
which consumer interests are seen as either core or peripheral to the regulatory and policy pro-
cess, and subsequently want role consumer organisations have, (3) the various ways that consumer 
organisations are constructed as political actors, and (4) the key themes that impact on consumer 
organisation’s activities ideology, ideas and issues. It then moved to directly address the research 
question in light of  both the empirical findings and the analysis. 
It is concluded that there were attempts by a social democratic government in the UK to imple-
ment a system of  consumer representation that was both multi-faceted and ingrained, which did 
not contradict neoliberal tenets, and supported ‘third way’ philosophy. This is now being undone 
in favour of  a more neoliberal regime under then current government. Where consumer interests 
were beginning to be understood to have an impact, mostly from an indirect embedding of  con-
sumer concerns, they are now side-lined in the broader reforms of  the Coalition. This shows that 
the Norwegian system for consumer representation is more stable, but possibly more peripheral, 
whereas the UK system is less stable but occasionally can produce more favourable conditions for 
consumers.
Directly assessing the key question of  this research, however, sees the role of  consumer organi-
sations as a marginal attempt to ensure greater representation of  individuals in policy making and 
regulation. It is seen to be of  greater benefit to the policymakers themselves than to individual 
consumers who are still considerably removed from the system. Individuals’ representation by 
consumer organisations can be of  benefit if a variety of  factors work in their favour (ideology, ideas 
and issues) but the challenges to them impacting policy seem great. Industry has considerably more 
resources, and more actors, in addition them not having to justify the ‘representivity’ like consumer 
organisations do. The potential for consumers to be represented outside of  markets, and to coun-
ter-balance industry and agency pressures, is there in the institutional design but suffers from both 
being constructed discursively in a neoliberal context, making choice the primary focus, and being 
outnumbered by business interests, despite the fact that it is consumers whom regulation should 
serve. 
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9. Conclusion – Consumers at a Crossroads 
with Corporations in the Crosshairs 
Much of  the literature bemoaning consumerism makes for pretty ‘grim reading’ (Cremin, 2012). Whether one argues against consumerism from a fiscally conservative, an environ-
mentalist, or Marxist position, the answer is often simply just ‘buy less stuff ’. This impacts directly 
upon consumer politics, and the representation of  consumers outside of  markets, as the concept of  
‘the consumer’ is framed in a particular ideological light as shown in the previous chapter (chapter 
8). 
What this thesis has sought to explore, and argue, is that consumer politics, and consumer-
ism, does not need to be beset by a sense of  passivity, but can in fact be part and parcel of  a more 
active/activist political order. The idea that things just happen to consumers, can be replaced by 
one in which consumers are empowered through representative bodies. The neoliberal suggestion 
that consumers are ‘active’ within markets does not scratch the surface in political terms. This is 
also the case of  so-called ‘political consumption’; discretionary consumption cannot determine 
some crucial markets. This is also set against the fact that business and corporation still have, and 
increasingly so, significant agency in regard to policy and regulation.  What is required therefore, 
as the literature points out, is a counter-balance to these pressures. The most obvious of  these, with 
regard to markets and their regulation, is that of  consumer organisations. This thesis sought to 
investigate, problematize and take account of  these organisations as political actors, to detail the 
challenges and difficulties that they face in trying to represent individuals in the decision making 
process.
This conclusion will be split into five sections: (1) the main aims of  the thesis, (2) the methods 
utilised, (3) the key findings and arguments, (4) the points of  originality and (5) areas for future 
research.
 
9.1 Thesis Aims
This thesis has had three principal aims: (1) to address the extent to which consumer organisa-
tions can be understood to be a counter-balance to industry and agency pressure, (2) to understand 
their role in contemporary regulation and policy making, to analyse the politics at the heart of  
regulation and policy making, and (3) to provide a deeper understanding of  consumer organisa-
tions themselves and contemporary governance networks than the current literature provides. The 
thesis sought to do this in the tradition of  critical policy studies that challenges various orthodoxies 
around public policy and public administration literature. 
9.2 Methods
The research presented in this thesis was achieved with an interpretivist epistemology, constructiv-
ist institutional theory, and utilised interviews and document analysis to gain an understanding of  
consumer organisations in the UK and Norway. In this respect it was also a comparative study. 
These countries were chosen as they are similar in that they are liberal democracies, but principally 
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different in terms of  the dominant governing ideology; the UK being more neoliberal and Norway 
being more social democrat. This enabled us to see the extent to which ideology plays a part in 
how consumer organisations are institutionalised, which helped us explore the key question of  un-
derstanding what role they have in the policy process. Additionally, the two countries are different 
in terms of  the how the political systems are understood, their broader ideology, their population 
size and their relationship to the EU, and can therefore be used as comparisons most different, as 
stated above. From this we can then see what phenomena are similar and can unpack the particu-
larities of  each case.
9.3 Key Findings and Arguments
This thesis set out to better understand the place and role of  consumer organisations in contem-
porary policy making and regulation. It wanted to understand and problematize the politics of  
governance networks through focusing on a hitherto under researched phenomenon; consumer 
organisations. More broadly it also wanted to address neoliberalism as an ideology and a practice, 
and to better understand the contours of  the relationship between civil society and the state in a 
paradigm of  neoliberal dominance. 
There were four key findings, all of  which concerned the extent to which consumer organisa-
tions played a role in the decision making process:  (1) that even though consumer organisations 
have been incorporated into the policy process they still  remain largely peripheral to the decision 
making, (2) that consumer organisations across politics share similar challenges with regard to be-
ing a counter-balance to industry pressure, (3) policy makers across polities see the organisations as 
valuable sources of  information in the process of  regulation, (4) consumer organisations construct 
themselves and are constructed, by policymakers, through various discourses, and this has a deter-
mining effect on the their role in the policy and regulatory process.
Additionally, there are two key arguments, and theorisations, in the investigation: (1) that the 
consumer interest can be understood to be either core or peripheral depending on a variety of  fac-
tors, and that consumer organisations role changes as a result, and (2) that consumer organisations 
can be understood, in political terms, to fit into one of  three types, which by extension can impact 
on the extent to which they are incorporated into the decision making process. 
In this respect it is also argued that ideology, ideas and issues matter to whether or not consumer 
organisations are considered to be either peripheral or core to the regulatory process. If  it was the 
case that particular issues required specific input from consumer organisations then they would be 
brought into the process, as the consumer interest was seen as core. 
The broader argument of  this thesis was that through looking at consumer organisations we can 
better understand and problematize dimensions of  contemporary state-civil society in a neoliberal 
paradigm. It is no doubt that neoliberalism as an ideology impacts on the processes of  governance, 
in terms of  the value placed on the market as a form of  organisation. Consumer organisations 
primarily conform to this, as they are both constructed and construct themselves as merely repre-
senting consumers inside markets, and therefore, as Hilton (2009) suggests being overly concerned 
with ‘choice’. 
Although the consumer, and their representation in regulation and policy making, is here ar-
gued to be able to be reconfigured in a more radical way. It is by no means an answer to the signifi-
cant ideological debate between the individual and the community that dominates so many policy 
issues today. The liberty of  individuals is so often set against that of  the interests of  the community, 
and no-one has yet come up with a resolution that does not involve heavy compromise for either 
155
side. What this thesis has argued, through empirical investigation and theoretical reflection, is that 
although consumers are not necessarily atomised but have widely shared interests, and that due to 
the nature of  collective action problems need to be represented by organisations. These bodies can 
then, if  given the power, act to counter the pressure from business and bureaucracy itself. In this 
way being represented as a consumer does not need to be seen in terms of  being an individual but 
can be seen as being part of  a collective, which can function to counter the trend of  neoliberalism 
to both individualise citizens and to promote the interests of  business. 
9.4 Originality
This thesis is original in four main respects. 
1. The comparison between the UK and Norway in understanding public policy issues and gov-
ernance has yet to be done. This is a shame as the two countries are different in terms of  the how 
the political systems are understood, their broader ideology, their population size and their rela-
tionship to the EU, and can therefore be used as comparisons most different, as stated above. From 
this we can then see what phenomena are similar and can unpack the particularities of  each case.
2. It brings together three sets of  theory that have yet to be addressed in the same study. 
Through using the theory on the regulatory state, the theory on governance networks and the 
theory on constructivist institutionalism this thesis has sought to utilise how these theories frame 
particular political phenomena; the state, civil society, networks, governance, and the role of  ideas 
in structures and institutions. It also contributes to these bodies of  theory by addressing a particu-
lar empirical example, that of  consumer organisations in the regulatory process. This helps address 
the gap in the regulatory state literature about the role of  public interest groups and their institu-
tionalisation, and whether or not they are a counter-balance to industry and regulatory pressure. It 
also contributes to the literature on governance networks through looking at an empirical example 
in a critical way – it intends to make clear the political contours of  processes which have largely 
been seen as neutral developments, in a similar vain to Davis (2011). 
3. It is also original in that it is the first study to directly and explicitly try to understand the 
role of  consumer organisations as political organisations outside of  the market. Other studies have 
considered them peripherally but only when addressing other topics such as regulation (Lunt and 
Livingstone, 2007; 2012), consumer representation more broadly (Rose, 1981), or in a more his-
torical vain as a social movement (Hilton, 2009). These studies were important for this thesis, but 
they do not directly consider consumer organisations as political agents outside of  the market and 
in governance networks, something that this thesis did. 
4. It is also original in that it conducted interviews with a range of  individuals across the UK 
and Norway involved in and with consumer organisations in a variety of  ways. These interviews 
gave a great insight into the challenges and issues that consumer organisations face as political 
agents, and subsequently the issues that governance networks and the regulatory state faces in 
terms of  civil society inclusion and participation. These interviews provided the thesis with a vari-
ety of  observations that linked consumer organisations operating in two different political systems. 
It was observed that although there are great differences in their institutionalisation and broader 
structural conditions, they face similar challenges. 
9.5 Areas for Future Research
This thesis has addressed a particular contemporary phenomenon, consumer organisations, and 
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to take account of  them as political agents in the policy process. It was specifically concerned with 
understanding what role they had in regard to being a counter-balance to industry and agency 
pressures and in terms of  their impact on policy making. However, there were numerous issues 
that arose in the interviews, and through the broader research, that were of  significant interest 
but which were outside the parameters of  this thesis. In this respect there are three principal areas 
which came to light that require further research and these fit under the broader headings of: the 
EU, the media and representation.
9.5.1 The EU
The importance of  the EU for European countries cannot be overstated. This is also the case for 
interest groups, and also consumer organisations. As was evidenced in the thesis, the earlier in the 
policy cycle that views are heard the more likely it is that they would be able to inform the final 
policy, and being that much of  today’s legislation originates in Brussels, the EU is key. This is no 
different for consumer organisations and consumer representation. BEUC the umbrella consumer 
organisation in Brussels is looked to as a stronghold in Europe by the various domestic groups who 
make up their members. However, BEUC still face similar problems to the organisations in the UK 
and Norway, in terms of  having to fight against a far better funded industry lobby and a broadly 
neoliberal ideology. What is not understood however is the connections between domestic consum-
er organisations and BEUC, and the extent to which there are particular organisations that lead 
policy campaigns and whether there are organisations that construct themselves differently more in 
terms of  access and not choice. What would be interesting to find out would be the extent to which 
consumer organisations in BEUC are different in terms of  their focus, and whether or not there is 
a tendency to become more neoliberal as organisations ‘professionalise’. In this respect three ques-
tions could be addressed:
1. Do we see the same Europeanisation with consumer organisations as has been witnessed   
 with other interest groups?
2.  Do consumer organisations across Europe differ in their focus with regards to issues of    
 ‘choice’ and ‘access’? 
3.  To what extent do the consumer organisations of  Western Europe dominate the campaign 
 agenda, and what legitimacy problems does this pose for an umbrella organisation like 
 BEUC?
9.5.2 The Media
The second major factor that arose in the analysis is that of  the importance of  the media for con-
sumer organisations. It was quite clear that the contact time between consumer organisations and 
journalists was greatly valued by the organisations as part of  their campaign strategy to essentially 
inform the people that they are representing of  what the issues are. Information is a key product 
of  consumer organisation activities, and they have websites full of  information on consumer rights, 
various scandals and campaigns they are running. What needs to be better understood is both how 
consumer organisations utilise the media, both old and new forms, and whether or not campaigns 
which get picked up in the media are more likely to have a knock-on impact in policy making.  The 
media also provides a way in which individuals and organisations can connect with each other, this 
also may have implications to some of  the issues with regard to representation that will be consid-
ered next. In respect of  the media three questions need addressing:
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1. How do individuals utilise the media to inform themselves about consumer issues, and what 
 part do consumer organisations play in this?
2.  How are consumer organisations utilising new media to better get information from, and 
 give information to, consumers?
3. Do campaigns that get media attention have more success in the policy making arena than 
 those which do not?
9.5.3 Representation
The third area of  research that is required for a better understanding of  consumer organisations 
is a more theoretical understanding of  the issues around their representation. There are concerns 
that some public interest groups do not adequately represent consumers being that the constitu-
ency of  consumers is so diverse. Some are also referred to as ‘sock puppet’ organisations, publicly 
funded organisations which lobby the government – the government lobbying itself  through public 
funds. There are also concerns that some consumer organisations only represent a marginal set of  
largely middle class ‘penny pinching’ interests, as was alluded to earlier. If  a consumer organisation 
does not have members can it still be said to represent consumers? These are all issues that need 
to be addressed with regard to consumer organisations. Questions that could inform this research 
agenda could be:
1. Is there a common constituency of  consumers that consumer organisations represent? If  so 
 how do they legitimise themselves?
2. Can new media, like apps on smart phones, help to bridge the perceived gap in representa-
 tion between consumers and consumer organisations?
9.6 In Summary
This thesis has sought to take account of  consumer organisations as political actors in contem-
porary policy making and regulation. It has argued that there are complex political dimensions 
to their inclusion in the various processes of  governance, and that the current literature does not 
adequately address these. On the one hand there is the often very technocratic literature on the 
state which does not take the role of  ideas, ideology and cultures seriously, and sees the process of  
governance and policy making as able to be achieved by pulling the right policy levers and utilising 
the correct ‘policy instruments’. And on the other hand there is the often much more critical, and 
more theoretical, policy and governance literature, which does not directly address political actors 
and seek to find out the processes that are going on within the institutions themselves. What this 
thesis has sought to do is to attempt to bridge these gaps by taking a critical account, and prob-
lematizing, a particular political actor, consumer organisations, and their role in the policy and 
regulatory processes. The investigation highlights, through an empirical grounding, that the politics 
of  policy making is far more complex than the literature suggests, in that consumer organisations 
themselves are understood differently by different political hues, and they understand their role 
and impact differently in particular settings, sometimes seeing themselves as core to processes but 
more often being seeming to be peripheral. This is most interesting in light of  the various changes 
in governance which have led to the inclusion and engagement with civil-society organisations. 
As the regulatory state is said to have developed in the name of  better functioning for consumers, 
whilst processes in governance encourage greater participation with NGOs and other civil-society 
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actors in order to be both more ‘effective’ and harbour greater legitimacy. It seems from this inves-
tigation that consumer organisations are by and large peripheral to policy and regulatory processes 
despite the different ways in which they are institutionalised in the different political settings (UK 
and Norway). The complex politics at the heart of  regulating capitalism is in this way embodied in 
the struggles that consumer organisations have both in terms of  their legitimacy as political repre-
sentatives – the general lack of  ‘representativeness’ hinders their legitimacy despite the clear shared 
public interest in greater consumer power, and their actual impact on policy where they are by and 
large peripheral despite the positive light they are professed to be seen in by policy makers. In this 
respect more analysis of  consumer organisations in different political contexts, in terms of  their 
relationship to the EU, how they utilise the media, and their representativeness, will help to gain 
greater clarity of  some of  the complex characteristics of  contemporary capitalism and neoliberal-
ism, something which of  significant importance. 
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Appendix 1.1
List of Interviewees and Interview Dates
United Kingdom
(AS) Aniela Sroczynski, EU & International Advocacy Officer, Which? - 29th November 2011
(CM) Claire Milne, Antelope Consulting, Chair of  Consumer Expert Group, Ofcom - 30th 
November 2011
(CP) Claudio Pollack, Director of  Content, Consumer amd External Affairs Group, Ofcom - 2nd 
December 2011
(CB) Collette Bowe, Chair Communications Consumer Panel, Ofcom - 31st May 2012
(JH) John Holmes, Senior Economist, Which? - 29th November 2011
(RC) Robert Clarke, Voice of  Listener and Viewer - 21st October 2011
(RH) Robert Hammond, Director of  Postal Policy and Regulation, Consumer Focus - 14th October 
2011
(SC) Sophie Chalk, International Broadcasting Trust - 29th November 2011
Norway 
(AN) Anonymous, SIFO - 14th September 2011
(BF) Bodhild Fisknes, Director, Department for Consumer Affairs, Ministry of  Children, Equality 
and Social Inclusion - 19th September 2011
(ES) Eirk Skaudal, Senior Adviser, Department for Consumer Affairs, Ministry of  Children, 
Equality and Social Inclusion - 19th September 2011
(EJ) Eivind Jacobsen, Head of  Reasearch, SIFO - 14th September 2011
(GN) Gry Nergård, Norwegian Consumer Ombudsman Head, Forbrukerombudet - 12th 
September 2011
(IT) Iselin Theinen, Senior Researcher, SIFO - 14th September 2011 
(TN) Thomas Nortvedt, Director Digital Services, Forbrukerrådet - 16th September 2011
(UK) Unni Kjærnes, Senior Researcher, SIFO - 14th September 2011
(ØC) Øyvind Christensen, Senior Advisor, Ministry of  Culture - 15th September 2011
Brussels
(JM) Jacqueline Minors, Director of  Consumer Affairs, DG SANCO - 16th March 2012
(MG) Monique Goyens, Director General, BEUC - 16th March 2012 
Questionnaire Respondents
Communications Officer, The Swedish Consumers Association – 16th September 2011
Editor, Neytendasamtökin (Consumers’ Association of  Iceland) – 30th September 2011
Volunteer, L-Ghaqda tal-Konsumaturi (Consumers’ Association of  Malta) – 7th September 2011
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Interview Guide – Consumer Organisations/Groups
What is the role of consumer organisations in contemporary policy 
making? Do they matter?
BASIC INFORMATION ON INTERVIEW AND INTERVIEWEE
Interviewee Ref  No: …………  Recorded: Y/N   Gender: M/F
Date of  interview: ………………………………………  Time of  interview: ……………………...
Name: ………………………………………………………..         E-mail: 
……………………………………….
Political Institution: ……………………………………………………………………………………………
………..
Position: ………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………...
PRELIMINARY REMARKS:
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this interview.  As I mentioned in my e-mail/letter, it forms part of  my 
doctoral research project which is investigating the role of  consumer groups in contemporary policy making 
in the UK and Norway. I am interested in finding out what part they play in the construction of  regulation 
and whether or not they have any influence over legislation that concerns consumers. 
Your responses will be treated as confidential and used only in the final thesis and in any academic publications 
produced from this.  
The questions address the broader place of  consumer groups in contemporary politics, their specific role in 
the policy process, the connections they make between citizens and the polity, and will specifically focus on 
the implementation of  regulation on product placement as a case example. I will be interviewing a range of  
individuals from consumer organisation staff, to civil servants, to business leaders and lobbyists in both the 
UK and Norway 
It will take approximately 30 to 45 minutes.  
I will just say that by ‘Consumer Organisations’ I am referring to a variety of  organisations that represent the 
interests of  end user consumers. This does not include business as consumers.
Do you have any questions before we begin?
Appendix 2.1
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Background information on previous experience/positions if  not otherwise available:
PART I 
I would like to begin with some closed questions about consumer organisations
1. Are you a member-based organisation? Y/N
2. Do you have regular contact with consumers? Y/N
3. Are you members of  any broader alliances? Y/N
4. Are you members of  BEUC? Y/N
5. Do you think BEUC is an important body? Y/N
6. Do you have contact with policy makers? Y/N
7. Do you have contact with business groups? Y/N
8. Do you have contact with other consumer groups? Y/N
9. Have consumer groups increased their presence in policy forums over the past 
decade?
Y/N
10. Have consumer groups increased their connections to government 
departments?  
Y/N
11. Have consumer groups increased their connections other consumer groups? Y/N
12. On balance would you say consumer groups adequately represent consumers 
in policy forums?
Y/N
13. Do you regularly take part in policy discussions with government officials? Y/N
14. Do you consult with regulators more than the ministerial departments? Y/N
15. On average do you think that policy officials listen to the advice of  consumer 
groups? 
Y/N
16. Do you think that changes in government will have an impact on the strength 
of  consumer group connections with government departments? 
Y/N
17. Have European regulations increased the frequency with which consumer 
groups consult with government? And the EU commission?
Y/N
18. Do you think consumer groups are an important part of  the regulatory 
process?
Y/N
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PART II – CONSUMER ORGANISATION
I’d like to now consider the make-up of  your organisation in order to get some comparative information 
about how consumer groups are run and operate.  
1. (a) What would you consider your organisation type to be?
	 Grassroots
	 Advocacy
	 NDGB
	 Public Authority
	 Government Department
	 Other: 
**(b) Do you think this has any impact on your dealing with policy makers? Do other types 
of  groups have different relationships to policy makers? Can you give examples?
(c) In your experience do you think this has any impact on your dealings with other groups?
2. How would you describe your core mission?
(b) Do you feel that you achieve this more often than not?
3. How do you come up with your campaigns, or areas of  focus? What is the process?
4. When you respond to consultations, how is it organised? Who responds? 
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5. Do you consult individual consumers about campaigns or consultation responses?
PART III – CONSUMER ORGANISATION INTERMEDIATION
I’d like to now look at the connections between consumer organisations, regulators and government. I want 
to understand how important it is for both consumer organisations and governing bodies to have contact 
with each other, and whether the arrangements for consultation impact upon policy. 
1. How often do you have contact with policy makers and other groups/organisations?
	 Regulators
	 Government departments
	 Consumer Ombudsman
	 Business Groups
	 Other consumer orgs
**2. (a) Who do you normally speak to, and is this contact institutionalised or ad hoc? (Policy 
Makers & Groups/Organisations) If  institutionalised, what is the process?
(b) Who instigates the contact? (policy makers or yourselves)
(c) What tends to be the nature of  the contact? 
	 General position on policy
	 Technical information about regulations
	 Direct lobbying (targeted campaigns)
	 Consultation responses
	 Other
**3. (a) How effective is consulting policy makers in mitigating consumer issues? Could you 
give an example of  this?
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(b) What could be different?
**4. (a) Do you think the relationship between consumer organisations and government has 
changed over the past 5, 10 or 20 years? 
(b) In what ways do you think the relationship has changed? Do you think this is an 
improvement? What do you think the reasons are for this change?
5. (a) What are the most valuable connections to you in the regulation process and 
consulting on policy?
	 Other consumer organisations
	 Government ministers
	 Civil servants
	 Business spokesman
	 Courts
	 Other:
(b) What is it about these connections that you value? What could be improved?
**(c) What is their (connections) main impact? Is it on final policy or a more subtle 
embedding in a policy network, or other/both/neither? Examples?
165
PART IV – POLICY MAKING
I’d like to now look at what part consumer groups play in the policy making process., particularly how they 
engage with the process and what impact they may have upon it, and through what mechanisms. 
**1. (a) Do you think that the current formal mechanisms of  policy making, including 
consultations and consumer forums, provide an effective way of  improving policy? 
(b) Do you think they have an impact? Could you give examples of  this impact?
(c) Do they provide an effective way of  engaging with civil society generally? If  yes, why? If  
no, why not?
(d) Do you think that there are informal mechanisms that have more impact on policy? What 
are these?
2. (a) What would you say are the core concerns of  consumer groups with regard to policy in 
your area, and in general?
(b) How well understood are these by policy makers?
3. Which would you say had more impact on policy, campaigns or consultation responses? 
Or other forms of  communication. Can you give an example? 
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4. (a) Do you keep up-to-date with the campaigns of  other consumer groups? How do they 
inform you of  current campaigns? How do you inform them of  yours?
(b) What do you think is the most effective way of  influencing policy? Why?
	 Campaigns
	 Consultations
	 Advisory groups
	 Direct lobbying
	 Other
5. (a) Do you think consumer organisations are valued by policy makers?
(b) What is it that you think consumer organisations provide that is most valued to policy 
makers? (Does this match with the groups priorities and core mission?  - later analysis)
PART V – REGULATION 
I’d like to now look more specifically at what part consumer groups play in how regulation is adopted. 
Particularly how consumer groups help to construct the regulation of  markets instead of  broader policy 
programmes. I am especially interested in product placement regulation, and how consumer groups have, 
or have not, impacted upon the recent changes in regulation. 
**1. How essential is regulation in mitigating market failure and promoting consumer 
welfare?
2. Have you been able to initiate regulatory change? If  so, when? Or are you asked to help 
assess potential problems with soon to be implemented regulation?
**3. Do you think that consumer groups are an integral, or peripheral part of  regulatory 
design and implementation? Both personally (normatively), and as you think it stands 
(empirically). 
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4. In what ways do you think your core mission is reflected in contemporary policy and 
regulation? In what respects, and how might this be enhanced?
5. What are the regulatory issues that you are concerned with at present, and generally? Why 
these particular ones?
6. (a) Have you been involved in any campaigning or consultations about product placement 
regulation? If  so, what exactly?
(b) Does the liberalisation of  product placement regulation concern you? It what ways?
(c) Do you think that your concerns regarding product placement have been listen to by 
policy makers? Were you happy with the final legislation?
7. (a) Have regulations from the EU had an impact on consumer issues in general, and your 
organisation? In what respect?
(b) Do you think that EU regulations benefit consumers overall?(Norway: what do you think 
about the democratic deficit in that Norwegians have no say on these regulations?)
VI – THE STATE
Finally I would like to get an idea of  how consumer groups fit into contemporary understandings of  
the state more generally. I want to ask you to consider how both the structure of  the state, and how it is 
facilitated impacts on the demands and impact of  consumer groups.
** 1. What institutions are most important in the representation of  consumers within the 
state, and policy making?
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2. (a) How adequate is the provision for consumer issues in the current structure of  the state?   
How might this be improved?
3. (a) Do you think that consumer issues are a priority of  contemporary governance?
** (b) Do you think that the current institutional design allows for an adequate representation 
of  consumers outside of  markets?
**4. Do policies of  deregulation, privatisation and liberalisation, in and of  markets, mean 
that the representation of  people as consumers is more or less relevant? Why?
5. Do you think that the way that governance is orchestrated, through regulatory agencies, 
helps or hinders consumer representation?
**6. Do you think consumer groups are empowered by a decentralisation of  responsibilities 
to regulatory agencies? Do you think individual consumers are?
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7. (a) Generally do you think there been more or less engagement with civil society groups in 
the formulation of  regulation over the last decade? Examples?
 (b) Does this benefit the policy-making process and regulation? 
Can I finish by asking for any recommendations you might have for other people I could usefully speak to? 
Thank you very much for your time.
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Interview Guide – Regulators/Policy Makers/Independents
What is the role of consumer organisations in contemporary policy 
making? Do they matter?
BASIC INFORMATION ON INTERVIEW AND INTERVIEWEE
Interviewee Ref  No: …………  Recorded: Y/N   Gender: M/F
Date of  interview: ………………………………………  Time of  interview: ……………………...
Name: ………………………………………………………..  E-mail: 
……………………………………….
Political Institution: ……………………………………………………………………………………………
………..
Position: ………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………
PRELIMINARY REMARKS:
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this interview.  As I mentioned in my e-mail/letter, it forms part of  my 
doctoral research project which is investigating the role of  consumer organisations in contemporary policy 
making in the UK and Norway. I am interested in finding out what part they play in the construction of  
regulation and whether or not they have any influence over legislation that concerns consumers. 
Your responses will be treated as confidential and used only in the final thesis and in any academic publications 
produced from this.  
The questions address the broader place of  consumer organisations in contemporary politics, their specific 
role in the policy process, the connection they make between citizens and the polity, and will specifically focus 
on the implementation of  regulation on product placement as a case example. 
It will take approximately 30 to 45 minutes.  
I will just say that by ‘Consumer organisations’ I am referring to a variety of  organisations that represent the 
interests of  end user consumers. This does not include business as consumers.
Do you have any questions before we begin?
Appendix 2.2
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PART I 
I would like to begin with some closed questions about consumer organisations.
1. Do you consult with any consumer organisations? Y/N
2. Do you consult with business organisations? Y/N
3. Do you consult with labour organisations? Y/N
4. Which do you consult with most? C/B/L
5. Have consumer organisations increased their presence in policy forums over the past 
decade?
Y/N
6. Have consumer organisations increased their connections to government departments?  Y/N
7. Have consumer organisations increased their connections other organisations? Y/N
8. Do consumer organisations adequately represent consumers in policy forums? Y/N
9. Do your consultations always include consumer representatives? Y/N
10. Do you think that policy officials act on the advice of  consumer organisations? Y/N
11. Do you think that changes in government could have an impact on the strength of  
consumer group connections with government departments? 
Y/N
12. From experience have changes in government impacted on the connections between 
consumer organisations, regulators and policy makers?
Y/N
13. Have European regulations increased the frequency with which consumer organisations 
consult with government?
Y/N
14. Have European regulations increased the frequency with which you consult generally? Y/N
15. Do you think it is important that consumers are represented in regulation and policy? Y/N
16. Do you think consumer organisations are an important part of  the regulatory process? Y/N
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PART II – INSTITUTIONAL ORGANISATION
I’d like to now consider the make-up of  your organisation in order to get some comparative information 
about how consumer organisations are run and operate.  
1. (a) What would you consider your organisation/department type to be?
-	 Government Department
-	 Regulatory Agency
-	 Ministry
-	 Other
 2. (a) Do you routinely communicate with interest organisations?
(b) Do you think that your organisation/department type has any impact on your dealings with interest 
organisations, particularly consumer organisations?
3. (a) What is your core mission?
(b) Do you feel that you achieve this more often than not?
4. Are consultations important in your organisations/departments operation? What is important about 
them?
5. In what respect are consumers represented by your organisation/department?
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PART III – INTERMEDIATION
I’d like to now look at the connections between consumer organisations, regulators and government. I want 
to understand how important it is for both consumer organisations and governing bodies to have contact 
with each other, and whether the arrangements for consultation impact upon policy. 
 1. (a) How often do you have contact with interest organisations?
(b) How often do you have contact with consumer organisations?
2. (a) Who do you normally speak to, and is this contact institutionalised or ad hoc?If  institutionalised, what is 
the process?
(b) Who instigates the contact? (organisations or yourselves)
(c) What tends to be the nature of  the contact?
	 General position on policy
	 Technical information about regulations
	 Direct lobbying (targeted campaigns)
	 Consultation responses
	 Other
3. Do you think that consulting consumer organisations is an effective way of  mitigating consumer issues?
(b) What could be different?
4. (a) Do you think the relationship between consumer organisations and government has changed over the past 
5, 10 or 20 years?
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(b) In what ways do you think the relationship has changed? Do you think this is an improvement? What do 
you think the reasons are for this change?
5. (a) What are the most valuable connections to you in the process of  drawing up regulation and consulting 
on policy?
	 Other consumer organisations
	 Government ministers
	 Civil servants
	 Business spokesman
	 Courts
	 Other:
(b) What is it about these connections that you value? What could be improved?
(c) What is their (connections) main impact? On final policy or a more subtle embedding in a policy 
network, or other/both/neither? Examples?
PART IV – POLICY MAKING
I’d like to now look at what part consumer organisations play in the policy making process. I want to 
understand how they engage with the process and what impact they may have upon it, and through what 
mechanisms. 
1. (a) Do the current formal mechanisms of  policy making, including consultations, advisory organisations 
and consumer forums, provide an effective way of  improving policy? 
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(b) Do you think they have impact? Can you give an example of  this impact?
(c) Do they provide an effective way of  engaging with civil society generally? If  yes, why? If  no, why not?
(d) Do you think that there are more informal mechanisms that have more impact on policy? What are 
these?
2. (a) What are the core concerns of  consumer organisations with regard to policy in your area, and in 
general?
(b) How well understood are these by policy makers?
3. (a) Which would you say had more impact on policy, campaigns or consultation responses? Or other 
forms of  communication. Can you give an example? 
4. (a) Do you keep up-to-date with the campaigns of  consumer organisations? Do they frequently inform you of  
current campaigns? Do you inform them of  relevant consultations, policy and regulatory discussions?
(b) What do you think is the most effective way of  influencing policy? Why?
	 Campaigns
	 Consultations
	 Advisory groups
	 Direct lobbying
	 Other
5. (a) Do you value the input of  consumer organisations?
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(b) What is it that you think consumer organisations provide that is most valued? (Does this match with the 
organisations priorities and core mission?  - later analysis)
PART V – REGULATION 
I’d like to now look more specifically at what part consumer organisations play in how regulation is 
adopted. Particularly how consumer organisations help to construct the regulation of  markets instead of  
broader policy programmes. I am especially interested in product placement regulation, and how consumer 
organisations have, or have not, impacted upon the recent changes in regulation. 
1. How essential is regulation in mitigating market failure and promoting consumer welfare?
2. (a) Who initiates regulatory change? What is the process?
(b) Do you get help to assess potential problems with soon to be implemented regulation from interest 
organisations, particularly consumer organisations?
3. Do you think that consumer organisations are an integral, or peripheral part of  regulatory design and 
implementation? Both personally (normatively), and as you think it stands (empirically). 
4. Do you think that consumer interests are adequately reflected in contemporary policy and regulation? Do 
you think this could be enhanced? In what respect?
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5. What are the regulatory issues that you are concerned with at present, and generally? Why these 
particular ones?
6. Have you been involved in product placement regulation?
(b) Does the liberalisation of  product placement regulation concern you? In what ways?
(c) Do you think that the concerns of  consumer organisations were implemented in the regulation on 
product placement?
7. (a) Have regulations from the EU had an impact on the process of  regulation for your institution? In what 
respect?
(b) Do you think that overall EU regulations benefit consumers? (Norway: what do you think about the 
democratic deficit in that Norwegians have no say on these regulations?)
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VI – THE STATE
Finally I would like to get an idea of  how consumer organisations fit into contemporary understandings 
of  the state more generally. I want to ask you to consider how both the structure of  the state, and how it is 
facilitated impacts on the demands and impact of  consumer organisations.
 1. What institutions are most important in the representation of  consumers within the state, and policy 
making?
2. (a) How adequate is the provision for consumer issues in the current structure of  the state?
(b) How might this be improved?
3. Do policies of  deregulation, privatisation and liberalisation, in and of  markets, mean that the 
representation of  people as consumers is more or less relevant? Why?
4. Do you think the way that governance is orchestrated, through regulatory agencies, helps or hinders 
consumer representation?
5. Do you think consumer organisations are empowered by a decentralisation of  responsibilities to 
regulatory agencies? Do you think individual consumers are?
6. (a) Do you think that consumer issues are a priority of  contemporary governance?
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 (b) Do you think that the current institutional design allows for an adequate representation of  consumers 
outside of  markets?
7. (a) Do you think there been more or less engagement with civil society organisations in the formulation of  
regulation over the last decade? Examples?
 (b) Does this benefit the policy-making process and regulation? 
Can I finish by asking for any recommendations you might have for other people I could usefully speak 
to? Thank you very much for your time.
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Glossary of Abbreviations
BEUC  Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs – The European Consumers’ 
  Organisation 
BIS  Department of  Business, Innovation and Skills
DCA  Department for Consumer Affairs
DCMS Department for Culture, Media and Sport
DG SANCO  Director General for Health and Consumers
MCES  Ministry of  Children, Equality and Social Affairs
Ofcom  The Office of  Communications
Ofgem  The Office of  Gas and Electricity Markets
OFT   Office of  Fair Trading
RIU  Regulated Industries Unit
SIFO  Statens Institutt for Forbruksforskning – State Institute for Consumer Research
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